Everyone in Tunisia has been calling for reform for some time, but the president hesitated, relying on the fact that those asking for reform were a minority of politicians who are professional political agitators and could easily be controlled or contained.

By focusing on the political opposition, Bin Ali did not notice the transformations taking place among the ranks of the wider population. The mood of the majority of the people was taking a turn towards revolution and anger, at times because of their direct suffering and at others because of the environment and ideas promoted by the opposition that Bin Ali had succeeded in isolating. 

But Bin Ali did not notice that despite their seclusion, the handful of Tunisian opposition figures was able to shape the mood of a people whom the Tunisian regime had neglected to address.

Bin Ali succeeded in neutralising the opposition in Tunisia to the extent that when riots began none of the opposition was involved. The people who took to the streets had no leaders, and hence the acts of vandalism. More importantly, there was no head to talk to or with whom to make a deal to end the demonstrations. 

Weakening and putting the opposition under siege is a two-edged sword; while it prevents the opposition from attracting supporters and limits their ability to compete with the regime, at the same time the outburst by the people is sudden, destructive and possibly unstoppable. This is what happened in Tunisia.

If reform was possible, as Bin Ali promised in his last speech, then he should have carried it out earlier and preempted the demands of the opposition and the eruption of the population. Implementing reforms without pressure gives the ruler legitimacy and increases his popularity, but those that come under pressure of demands undercut his credibility and make him appear weak and encourage more demands. 

Wise political leadership should anticipate events, but Bin Ali was well behind developments that brought to an end his reign.