Two of the most significant victories for the Sudanese people before the end of 2019 were the disbanding of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the repeal of the public-order law that the regime of former president Omar Al-Bashir had designed to oppress women and restrict their freedom of dress, movement, work and study.

Public celebrations were held all over Sudan amid international praise, including from the international rights group Amnesty International and national contentment was expressed by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) that had spearheaded the public protests leading to the ousting of Al-Bashir.

The two decisions are “giant steps towards achieving the goals of the revolution. They are a true defeat for counter-revolutionary forces and the remnants of the former unjust regime,” the SPA said.

The decisions “are the result of the revolutionary leadership in Sudan,” said Magdi Abdallah, a Sudanese political activist.

 “At first, the Transitional Military Council forced us to share power in a transitional government. But now most ministers are outside the circles of its authority,” he told Al-Ahram Weekly in a telephone interview from Khartoum.

General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, deputy head of Sudan’s Transitional Military Council (l), Alhadi Idris, chairman of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (c), South Sudan President Salva Kiir, and Tut Galwak, chairman of the South Sudanese Mediation Committee, hold the agreement on peace and ceasefire during the signing ceremony in Juba (photo: Reuters)

Many observers agree that the difference between the Sudanese Revolution and the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 is the SPA, described by the BBC as a “mysterious and intriguing” body.

“From the beginning of the protests, the SPA was known to many Sudanese and observers, despite the vagueness surrounding its leadership. Everyone knew that independent lawyers, teachers, journalists, engineers and doctors had assembled under one umbrella,” Abdallah said.

The SPA was at the forefront of the protests against Al-Bashir, guiding youthful demonstrators in their protests in December 2018 and in the sit-in in front of army headquarters in Khartoum on 6 April, 2019.

“The Sudanese youth have rejected the Islamists that have ruled the country since they staged the coup led by Al-Bashir in 1989. The young people also stood against the mediocre parties that were a fading image of the past,” Abdallah added.

However, according to Al-Tayeb Zein Al-Abidine, a professor of political science at the University of Khartoum, “the SPA is a product of Sudanese politics since before independence. In a country ruled by tribal, religious or military leaders, or Islamists, Sudan’s middle classes have no one else than the SPA to represent their aspirations.”

The SPA is the “fourth generation” of middle-class efforts to rid the country of traditional and military control, said Hamour Ziada, the Sudanese author who won the Naguib Mahfouz Award presented by the American University in Cairo this year.

Many observers will understand Ziada’s reference to the Graduates Conference in Sudan, established in the 1940s as a resistance movement without ethnic and religious affiliations against the then British occupation. Later the Associations Assembly brought together protesters who overthrew the regime of Ibrahim Abboud (1958-1964) in Sudan, and the Syndicates Association led the Ramadan demonstrations that toppled president Gaafar Numeiry (1969-1985).

After South Sudan gained independence with international blessings in 2011, Sudan’s economic conditions plummeted.

Since the majority of the country’s oil riches are concentrated in the South, the secession of South Sudan led to a loss of revenues in Sudan. The currency depreciated, food and fuel prices skyrocketed and inflation hit the highs reached when the Islamists took power in the early 1990s.

In 2013, protests swept Sudan, with Al-Bashir quick to quell the movement. The regime killed 185 people and injured and arrested thousands of others, according to Amnesty International and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, a NGO.

The 2013 events were “a rehearsal for the revolution,” Ziada commented.

Sudan’s economic conditions then worsened after 2013. “Al-Bashir didn’t even try to fight corruption or return to the public treasury the riches he knew had been collected illegally. Even worse, he introduced another batch of austerity measures,” Abdallah said, referring to Al-Bashir’s decision to cut subsidies on wheat, fuel, medicine and electricity, and reduce social spending.

In late 2018, the price of bread tripled in Sudan, causing massive protests to erupt across the country apart from in Khartoum.

Demonstrators burnt the headquarters of the ruling party in the areas hit by the protests and broke into food-storage facilities in a “show of revenge for being deprived,” Ziada said.

With Khartoum and its six million people out of the picture, many believed the protests were a repetition of the September 2013 narrative. But with the first demonstrations taking place in Khartoum, a key factor emerged in the SPA which “gave the orders,” according to Ziada.

Even when the protests calmed in February 2019, the SPA was still at the forefront of Sudan’s political scene.

Upon a call made by the SPA on Twitter, the last round of demonstrations against Al-Bashir kicked off when protesters converged on the army headquarters in central Khartoum on 6 April. Social media networks were used to extend the reach of the protests to smaller cities.

“The following months were the most difficult,” said Wagdi Saleh, a SPA activist involved in negotiations with the Transitional Military Council that took power after Al-Bashir was toppled.

“The military manoeuvred for months to make the biggest gains possible and the least concessions they could afford. Moreover, some parties in the Alliance of Freedom and Change attempted to make gains at the expense of each other and the SPA,” he added.

On and off negotiations continued for four months until the military signed the Constitutional Declaration with the Alliance of Freedom and Change, an umbrella group comprising the SPA and a number of other parties.

Based on the declaration, a Sovereign Council was formed to preside over Sudan as well as a transitional government. A senate of 300 members will soon be formed.

But these were not the end of the Sudanese people’s aspirations. Despite the air of euphoria that hovered over Sudan when the Constitutional Declaration was signed, the NCP was disbanded and the public-order law abolished, the country’s challenges are still more than it has achieved thus far.

“A just and comprehensive peace is a primary demand,” said Saleh, adding that “without it, Sudan will be a failing state mired in civil wars that will prevent the government from achieving economic progress.”

The government and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front that comprises the majority of the armed movements in the corners of the country have not yet signed a final peace deal that would merge the armed groups into the state institutions.

Sudan’s economy is still suffering, and so are the majority of the Sudanese people. Large investments are needed to improve the economy.

“There is an attempt to restore unity with South Sudan to benefit from its oil revenues,” said Abdallah, adding that this scenario was unlikely. “What will the North present to the South after years of war during which the northerners committed numerous crimes? The reasons that drove South Sudan to seek independence are still present,” he added.

“The southerners sought independence against their will. They prefer unity, but they will not accept Sharia Law. In addition, they suffered from the unfair distribution of oil revenues in the past,” said Alor Ding, a professor at Juba University in South Sudan.

“This is why the two countries will not re-unite,” he added.

Sudan has received little foreign investment, and the country is still on the US list of countries harbouring terrorism. “This should be Sudan’s first foreign mission. Without being lifted off the terrorism list we will not receive investment,” Saleh said.

The challenges are bigger than the “stumbling” government can overcome, said Fayez Al-Salik, an editor with the Sudanese Change website. “The government has made no tangible achievements, being consumed by issues of the toppled regime,” he added.

“The government removed from power figures from the former regime who were accused of corruption and other charges, disbanded the NCP, and repealed the public order law. Otherwise, nothing much has happened. Even the SPA’s role is finished. The association was disassembled, and no one is listening to it anymore,” Al-Salik said.

The break-up of the SPA is similar to what happened with the Graduates Conference before independence, the Associations Assembly in the 1960s, and the Syndicates Association in the 1980s.

“The SPA doesn’t represent all of the Sudanese people. It has been more concerned with Khartoum’s middle class, and it had nothing to do with farmers, herders and labourers,” said Al-Salik.

The majority of SPA members are North Sudan Arabs who inhabit areas along the Nile. There are fewer Arabs in the west of the country and in “marginalised” areas.

In Sudan’s political culture, these are far from the capital and the Nile cities. The marginalised groups suffer from a lack of services and government investment, and this has driven some of them to take up weapons against the central state, according to Ismail Abkar, an expert on Sudanese affairs.

“The marginalised areas that lack a middle class the size of Arab Sudan are often represented by armed movements,” said Haidar Ibrahim, a professor of sociology at Khartoum University and the author of many publications on Islamist rule in Sudan.

“The Arabs of west Sudan are represented by a civil administration,” he added.

“At present, however, west Sudan is represented by a civil administration and the Rapid Support Forces led by [Mohamed Hassan Hamdan] Hemeti,” Al-Salik said.

“Taming Hemeti and his forces is another challenge for the government in Khartoum,” said Khaled Mahmoud, a researcher in African affairs.

“The Rapid Support Forces is a body that has thousands of armed followers in Khartoum. It is accused of dispersing the sit-in at the army headquarters in which about 100 people died,” Mahmoud added.

The BBC has published a report saying the Rapid Support Forces control gold mines in west Sudan that bring in revenues estimated at tens of millions of dollars, according to unofficial estimates.

The Islamists are another challenge for the new rulers of Sudan, since they control much of the economy and numerous state institutions.

Mahmoud downplayed the Islamists’ capabilities, but Abdallah believes they could have a strong effect, especially if they line up with other forces. “I think the Islamist ranks may unite and align with a tribal force in the west or centre,” he said.

The Islamists are divided between supporters of Al-Bashir’s party, the Popular Congress, founded by Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood figure Hassan Al-Turabi, a current led by long-time Al-Bashir minister Ghazi Salaheddin, and Salafi forces.

Many observers believe that opposition figurehead Al-Sadek Al-Mahdi could benefit from the support of the Islamists and the civil administration current, which has raised fears among the country’s middle class.

While Sudan’s conflicts have not led it to the verge of collapse, dangerous elements still exist. Sudan’s neighbours are also worried about the repercussions should the situation spiral out of control, and many of them already suffer from political or security fragility.

Yet, peace is near with the shrinking of the rebel forces, save for areas in the Nuba Mountains close to South Sudan. The Islamists are getting weaker because of their inability to move against the new regime, and the traditional forces, outside the circle of west Sudan’s Arabs, seem unable to effect change outside their immediate circles.

Hemeti could be conquered in any confrontation with the Sudanese army, and his forces are likely to seek political integration in the state.

It seems that Sudan has become a success story, but the tale is still open to many possibilities.

*A version of this article appears in print in the  26 December, 2019 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.