On the anniversary of the end of British colonial rule in Sudan, there was little to celebrate with a political crisis pitting young protesters against the conservative forces that control most of the country. Hamdok’s resignation follows two weeks of escalating tensions across the country between the two components of the interim phase (civilian and military) as well as differences within each camp. Disputes in the civilian camp are more serious and a continual point of debate in Khartoum.

In an address broadcast on public television on Sunday evening, Hamdok said Sudan is going through “a dangerous juncture that threatens its entire survival”, adding that he did his best to prevent the country from “slipping into disaster”. The economic expert admitted that “despite all attempts to reach consensus, it did not happen.”

He concluded his address by saying, “I announce my resignation as prime minister... to allow another son or daughter of this nation to continue the process towards a democratic civilian state.”

Hours before Hamdok’s resignation address, thousands of citizens took to the streets to protest the army taking over on 25 October. There is an endless debate between the camp supporting the army, including tribal leaders, leaders of Sufi sects, the Muslim Brotherhood and armed struggle movements (mostly non-Arab ethnicities), who believe what occured was “a correction of the revolution’s direction” and middle class youth across the country who view the move as a “coup d’etat”.

Over the past six decades, the Sudanese army carried out 17 coups, at times with participation from conservative political forces: the Umma Party with general Ibrahim Abboud in 1958; the leftists -- namely communists and Arab nationalists -- with colonel Jaafar Numeiri in 1969; and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1989 which brought former president Omar Al-Bashir to power. 

Hamdok’s resignation speech was not the only major address in recent days. One day earlier, the Army Commander and Chairman of the Sovereign Council (head of state) General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan gave an address to mark Independence Day, and defended the October takeover to prevent “civil war”. Al-Burhan asserted his commitment to transitioning to civilian rule with elections slated for July 2023.

Although the two camps are far apart, they both needed Hamdok to remain in power. The conservatives along with the Armed Forces believed a deal with him would give their camp much needed legitimacy on the international scene in order to rule Sudan. However, Hamdok’s resignation also empowers this camp since his presence put pressure on the army and conservatives to appease civil forces, or at least some of them, and participate in a government that is mostly civilian.

Meanwhile, Hamdok’s absence from the political scene represents a crisis for the civil camp which lacks another consensual figure. It opens a Pandora’s box of divisions that will be difficult to close without decimating the Freedom and Change forces or the Sudanese Professionals’ Association (SPA).

By leaving power, Hamdok, who previously served as secretary-general of the UN Economic Commission for Africa headquartered in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, unveiled the fragility of alliances in both camps. The camp supporting Army Commander Al-Burhan includes rivals, such as Rapid Support Forces led by Al-Burhan’s Deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) alongside groups he fought against for years in Darfur including Justice and Equality (Islamists) and Sudan Liberation Army led by Mini Arko Minawi. The latter two represent the Zaghawa Baggara (cattle herders in southern Darfur). The technocrats and professionals working in government sectors mostly hail from tribes north of Khartoum, lean more towards the Sufi movement, and are allied with the Umma Party which is their historical nemesis since the 1940s.

The civil camp, meanwhile, is also plagued with serious rifts between the Communist Party and Baathists on the one hand, and the SPA (centre) on the other. At the same time, those affiliated with the SPA were unable to win any syndicate elections during Bashir’s rule because the Muslim Brotherhood had a strong grip on professional unions. Not much has changed, and no one believes the opposition will win the majority of syndicate councils.

The most radical political step would be to eliminate or ignore the prime minister position, as had been the case for 52 years of military rule, which means almost completely eradicating any civilian political administration in a country that provides no opportunity for upward mobility except through tribal or religious structures, the Armed Forces or government jobs.

A version of this article appears in print in the 6 January, 2022 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.