Europe appears singularly ill-prepared for a crisis of the magnitude of the one unfolding in Ukraine. European leaders may repeatedly assert that they are presenting a united front, but their reassurances cannot paper over the cracks. While the continent’s major powers — Britain, France, and Germany — have in the past tended to coordinate their policies during major crises in Europe, today there is no disguising the fact they are adopting different approaches towards Moscow and the Ukrainian crisis.
So far, Britain has taken the lead in the crisis, threatening to double the number of British troops in Ukraine and send more military equipment. Perhaps as a distraction from the enormous domestic political pressure he is facing, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has thrown himself into the fray and on Tuesday headed to Kyiv to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
The British government insists it will press ahead with its “deterrence and diplomacy” strategy towards Russia. In a speech to parliament, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said the government was “considering options for further deployments of our armed forces to reassure and protect allies on NATO’s eastern flank.”
She also said London will consider supplying NATO with more “fast jets, warships, and military specialists”.
Johnson’s internal problems, including a police investigation into breaches of Covid-19 restrictions at the prime minister’s official residence 10 Downing Street, have limited his ability to make any effective intervention. Indeed, he was unable to make a high-stakes scheduled call with Russia’s Vladimir Putin on Monday because he was battling to keep his own job in the face of an outraged public and calls he should resign.
When Downing Street requested that the call with Putin be rescheduled to Tuesday, the Kremlin refused, suggesting Wednesday instead, leaving Johnson to head to Ukraine without speaking to Putin.
While British involvement in the Ukraine crisis may have removed doubts in Germany and France about London’s commitment to European security post-Brexit, Britain’s active diplomatic engagement is not exactly a cause for celebration in Paris and Berlin. The convergence of London and Washington’s positions on the crisis has reinforced London’s strategic importance as a close ally of Washington in Europe, leading to discomfort among European powers. France and Germany do not like to see a country outside the European Union (EU) coordinate with Washington more closely on European security than the EU itself.
Europe’s uneasiness is reinforced by the fact that Berlin and Paris have yet to put in place clear policies. In contrast to London’s threats to Moscow of diplomatic isolation and wide-ranging sanctions, Berlin and Paris have adopted a more cautious language. France and Germany’s relations with Russia are complex and intertwined. Last week, speaking before the European Parliament in Strasbourg, French President Emmanuel Macron called on EU countries to maintain a dialogue with Moscow and present “European proposals” to build a new “security and stability” order.
Macron’s speech was grounded in the French president’s belief that Europeans must assume responsibility for their own defence and security, a position that has, if anything, hardened in the wake of the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the catastrophic humanitarian and strategic legacy of the Iraq war.
Berlin and Paris are not alone in believing the Biden administration will eventually reach a compromise with Moscow to prevent the escalation of tensions. While Washington has not given Moscow any pledges that Ukraine will not join NATO, Moscow and Washington are likely to reach a compromise on this that practically eliminates the prospects of Ukraine joining NATO in the foreseeable future. Biden alluded to this a few days ago when, addressing the conditions under which Ukraine could join, he noted that “there are differences within NATO.”
Facing his own presidential election in April, Macron’s instincts are to use behind-the-scenes diplomacy to pave the way for a settlement regarding Ukraine, and in the process enhance his appeal at the polls. Tellingly, after the phone call between Putin and Johnson was postponed, Macron stepped in and spoke with the Russian president.
The Ukraine crisis has come at the worst possible time for Berlin. Germany’s ruling coalition is only a few weeks old, and is divided over how to deal with the crisis. The Social Democratic Party, the coalition’s largest partner, holds NATO and the US partly responsible for the escalation. For more than two decades it has watched askance as NATO extended its borders and Washington concluded security arrangements with Central and Eastern European countries without involving Moscow. In the eyes of many, the US’ unilateral security arrangements can no longer be sustained. The ruling coalition’s junior partner, the Green Party, however, disagrees with the narrative that NATO is the aggressor and Russia the victim.
In addition to differences within the coalition, there is the simple fact that Germany imports 55 per cent of its natural gas from Russia, and any sanctions on Russia that include the energy sector will force a large increase in gas and oil prices. Berlin, as a consequence, is leaning towards a diplomatic dialogue and time-buying approach rather than having to confront the huge contradictions between its immediate economic interests and European security, though Berlin’s ambiguous position may come under pressure when German Chancellor Olaf Schulz meets with Biden in Washington on 7 February to discuss the crisis.
The UK’s calculations are straightforward compared to those of Berlin and Paris. What Britain wants is to reassert its role as America’s closest ally in Europe, and to confirm that Brexit has not detracted from its international role or its involvement in European security.
Paris and Berlin worry that London’s enthusiasm to play an assertive role is fuelling tensions. Paris also suspects that London is seeking to form an alliance with several countries, including the Baltic states, that will weaken the EU’s French-German axis, and threaten Macron’s ambitions to forge a coherent European defence policy.
Instead of demonstrating the unity of the Western stance, the Ukrainian crisis has served to reveal the contradictions within Europe, and is foregrounding European states’ concerns about America’s waning hegemony. For major European powers such as France and Germany, ignoring Russia’s national security concerns while resolutely expanding NATO is a lose-lose situation.
While the Ukraine crisis is a European crisis, its implications will be international. Capitals in the Middle East and Asia will be watching closely to see if Biden gives ground and accommodates some of Putin’s demands, especially after Biden confirmed that America will not go to war with Russia over Ukraine.
Should Russia succeed in halting the expansion of NATO to its borders, Moscow may well be tempted to try and rearrange the security order in the Middle East to protect its interests, with Iran and Syria among the likely beneficiaries.
Putin has chosen to play poker, and his timing is perfect. America is mired in internal problems, Europe is divided, and no one has any appetite for a new cold war.
*A version of this article appears in print in the 3 February, 2022 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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