Ahram Online: It has been over a month since the visit by US President Joe Biden to the Middle East. It is not clear yet what impact this visit is likely to have on improving the status-quo of the Palestinian situation. Do you think we should expect any?
Khaled El-Gindy: I think there is no impact on improving the status quo for Palestinians. The visit was not about Palestinians. At best, I think, the visit to Bethlehem and the meeting with [Palestinian] President [Mahmoud] Abbas was a courtesy call.
The focus [of the visit] was really Israel and Saudi Arabia, and secondarily the potential for future normalisation. The [US] administration made a big deal about the direct flight between Israel and Jeddah. I think it was about trying to demonstrate to America’s regional partners in the Gulf, as in Israel, that the United States is committed to regional security and stability, and that Iran is a priority, and that they will be coordinating together in looking at a regional defence architecture. But, nothing to do with the Palestinians, I think. It is not a priority for this administration.
AO: Was there anything that the Palestinians could have done to get more attention from the Biden Administration?
Kh.G: I don’t think it is really a question of what the Palestinians could do. It is more a question of what the Israelis could do, and we know that the Israelis are not interested in doing much beyond talking about some kind of economic improvement, because the situation on the ground is quite terrible.
There are almost daily incursions – not what happened in Gaza [on the second week of August]. Israel is not interested in political [talks] with the Palestinians. This we have known for many, many years. And Washington is not interested in pushing Israel to do anything on the political track with the Palestinians. So, the goal is really to try and maintain the status quo as much as possible. This is why Washington is pushing for things like UNRWA and for hospitals, and certainly for continuing Israeli and Palestinian security cooperation. These are the priorities.
The administration is not interested in changing the status quo for Palestinians because that would require too much of a political investment as well as political risk in terms of putting pressure on Israel, which is something that this administration does not want.
AO: Is this just about Israel and the current US administration, or is it also about some Arab capitals who might be feeling somehow that the “Palestinian Cause” is something of the past, and the thing to do now is to move ahead with relations with Israel?
Kh.G: I do think that in some Arab capitals, especially in the Gulf, things have reached a certain point of fatigue with the Palestinian issue because this has simply gone on for too long. I think that is the mindset behind the normalisation agreements, as they start to say we cannot just sit here and keep waiting for the two-state solution before we pursue our interests, and Israel has [a lot to offer in terms of] trade, technology, military [cooperation].
I think where the Palestinians do play a role is the divided leadership [not just] of Hamas and Fatah, but even within Fatah, where there are new divisions every day. There is too complete a disfunction and growing authoritarianism. It is a situation that does not inspire confidence, and it is not surprising that many Arab regimes are thinking that this is not something we want to continue to invest in, because [they say] we should we care more about the Palestinians than the Palestinian leaders, both Hamas and Fatah, themselves.
AO: Is this for long or is it for good? And what does this tell us about the future of the Palestinian Cause?
Kh.G: Right now the Palestinian National Movement is in a state of disarray. There is [also] a huge gap between where the Palestinian political leadership and political elite are and where ordinary Palestinians, who are mostly young, are. And they are not speaking the same language. Mahmoud Abbas talks about a two-state solution and a political horizon and [UNSC] Resolution 242, and this does not resonate with Palestinians who are mostly under the age of 30. Most Palestinians do not feel that their leadership is talking to them or for them. This is the problem. And when you ask Palestinians there is hardly any agreement on the two-state solution, the future of the Palestinian state, or [even] the future of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation). This is also part of the problem.
In the next phase, the Palestinians will have to rethink and maybe develop a new national consensus on all of these issues: one state or two states, what sort of a struggle, what kind of resistance, is BDS [Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions] the future or are rockets the future of resistance – or [are] other methods?
Palestinians have a lot of work to do, and there is not going to be anyone from the outside who is going to rescue them; not the United States certainly, not Europe and not the Arab states now too. I think that the Palestinians have to put their house in order before anything can change.
This state of affairs is not necessarily permanent, but first and foremost Palestinians need to put their own hose in order.
AO: Could this happen before the end of the leaders of the current era? Could we see any shift before we say goodbye to the era of President Mahmoud Abbas?
Kh.G: I think it is theoretically possible, but highly unlikely. We have seen over and over again Abbas being extremely rigid in his approach and he does not accept dissent, even from within his own party. Anyone who tried to express a different opinion has been ‘ex-communicated’, like Nasser Al-Kadwa, among others. So, it is highly unlikely that there will be major changes until Mahmoud Abbass’ departure, one way or the other.
I was recently in Palestine and most of the Palestinians I got to talk to are really waiting and preparing for the day after. The day after could be very dynamic, but it could also be [violent]. It is likely to be chaotic and it is probably not going to be very smooth, because reaching consensus within Fatah is going to be very difficult with people like Jebril Rajoub being very much opposed to people like Hussein El-Sheikh.
Mahmoud Abbass’ circle has become smaller, but in a way, people have been trying [to find allies], including people who are [said] to be communicating with Mohamed Dahlan to prepare for the day after.
AO: Egypt is worried about the security of Gaza, and Jordan is also worried. There have been reports that Jordan wants to bring international attention to the Palestinian issue at the upcoming UNGA, especially vis-à-vis the situation in Jerusalem. Could Egypt and Jordan get the US to do more on the Palestinian front – to go beyond humanitarian assistance?
Kh.G: It is possible, but I am not certain that the Jordanians have their views [fully] heard in Washington. Even the Israelis have acknowledged that the relations with Jordan have been severely damaged under [Likud leader and former Israeli prime minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, and both [successive Israeli prime ministers Naftali] Bennett and [Yair] Lapid have been trying to improve the relationship. I think that the Biden administration is trying to bring Jordan back into the fold after the [Donald] Trump administration very much alienated Jordan. But I don’t know how far it will go. The Biden administration wants very much to avoid the Palestinian issue, which is one reason why it could want to improve relations with Jordan, given that Jordan is a reliable partner and it actually has some influence on what happens in Jerusalem. So, there is a room for greater cooperation between the Biden administration and Jordan, but [again] that would be with the aim of maintaining stability and calm, not beyond that – all within the range of keeping the status-quo, including that of [the holy sites], which is being eroded every day by Israeli extremists and sometimes with the [consent] of the Israeli government.
I am told that this administration at the highest level understands the threat to Christian and Muslim places and that this is one issue it is working on [with the Jordanians]. Obviously, the absence of the two-state solution puts pressure on Jordan, especially when extremist voices in Israel are growing louder in saying that Jordan is Palestine.
A lot of Palestinians are worried about a second Nakba. And I think that this is a worry that Israel is also aware of.
We will see what happens after Israeli elections [later this year] and [how many seats the extremists will get in the Knesset] as opposed to Labour.
This is the trend in Israeli politics, and many in Washington are in deep denial about this trend. Biden talks about Israel as if it is 1996, when Israeli society and politics are far more right wing. This is actually one reason we see more instability, because [for example] there is more willingness to attack Gaza and to carry on incursions.
AO: Does it look like Netanyahu can make a comeback? And if this happens, how would this influence the positions of the Biden administration on the overall Palestinian-Israeli situation?
Kh.G: Of course it is impossible to predict, but it is possible that Netanyahu could come back. He seems to be doing better in the polls. But I think that it is more likely to see more of what we have been seeing during the past year of no clear majority on either side, and that this means more negotiations to try to put together some coalition.
I think that now Bennett has been discredited and that he is no longer the leader of his party, most of the party, Yamina, will probably go to Netanyahu. This will not be enough for Netanyahu, but it will certainly increase his chances over others. The other scenario is for the anti-Netanyahus to put together some strange broad coalition as we have seen during last year. Neither scenario is promising.
As far as relations with Biden if Netanyahu comes back, Biden is not Obama and he will be very reconciliatory [no matter how he may dislike Netanyahu]. So, the line will be: we will deal with whatever government is elected and we have a special relationship and all of that. At the practical manner, the comeback of Netanyahu might make the Biden administration more inclined to put some pressure at least on major issues like expulsions in Jerusalem, or maybe to become more vocal on some of the bigger settlements, but it will not make a major difference.
AO: On Iran, there seems to be expectations on a new nuclear deal. What does this specifically mean for the relations of the Biden administration given the commitment that Biden himself made to the security of Gulf countries during the Jeddah summit in July?
Kh.G: I think if this happens, the priority for the Biden Administration is to do damage control with Israel. The main problem will be to try to sell to the agreement to the Israelis. And it will be a hard sell given that the Israeli political class, not just at the right but even at the centre, is very sceptical about any kind of diplomacy with Iran.
Of course, some Gulf countries will have some views.
But certainly, it is not a forgone conclusions that a nuclear deal is within reach, even if the chances look better.
AO: And in this case, will the Biden administration have even less attention to address the Palestinian issue?
Kh.G: Yes, it could push down the Palestinian issue further down on the Biden administration’s agenda. So, it is all bad news for the Palestinians.
Short link: