Parties to Sudan’s political process are scheduled to sign a final agreement on 6 April to settle the political crisis and form a civilian government in which the armed forces play no political role.
In Sudan’s political memory 6 April is of great significance. On 6 April 1985 the regime of Gaafar Numeiri was overthrown.
Amid cycles of democratic civil rule in Sudan, three military coups were toppled by popular revolutions: on 24 October 1964 the people removed the rule of general Ibrahim Abboud; on 6 April 1985 Numeiri was toppled; and in December 2019, the Muslim Brotherhood led by Omar Al-Bashir was overthrown.
Since the toppling of Al-Bashir, Sudan has been on a bumpy road, consumed by fights between the military and civilian forces over ruling a country already exhausted by Civil War, the cessation of South Sudan, the bloody conflict in Darfur, and famine striking parts of it.
A civilian government was formed under Abdallah Hamdok, deputy executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, headquartered in Addis Ababa. Hamdok’s government remained in power for two years, before the military took over on 25 October 2021 under army commander Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan. The move ignited protests and the population stood divided into groups supporting or opposing the army.
On 5 December, civilian forces, the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — a paramilitary force, founded by Al-Bashir and drawing on Arab Bedouin tribes in the west of the country — signed an agreement to target the protests of non-Arab farmers in Darfur and armed rebel movements in Darfur and Southern Blue Nile.
However, the 5 December accord was a framework agreement made up of eight principles: handing over power to a civilian government without the participation of the armed forces; ensuring that the army should shun political, economic, and commercial activities; reforming the police and intelligence services and placing them under the authority of the prime minister; reforming the judiciary and the prosecution and launching transitional justice procedures; implementing the Juba Peace Agreement; removing the remnants of Al-Bashir’s regime from power; drafting a new constitution; and holding elections by the end of the 24-month transitional period.
This agreement was widely rejected by the Muslim Brotherhood and their Islamist current who had claimed they supported a civilian state. The communist party, which doesn’t have much electoral weight but has a solid cultural base, also rejected the accord, claiming it did not decisively decide on the matter of keeping the army away from power and ignored justice issues.
“Sudan is left with no choice but to accept the framework and final agreements. Otherwise, the country will remain mired in supporting and opposing protests,” said Faisal Mohamed Salem, who served as information minister in Hamdok’s government.
Salem, a veteran journalist, added that “the problem now is not between civilian and military forces, but rather between two military leaderships, Al-Burhan and [Mohamed Hamdan] Dagalo.”
Dagalo, aka Hemedti, is the leader of the RSF, the forces accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, in the westernmost part of Sudan.
However, Fayez Al-Salik, media adviser to Hamdok, disagreed with Salem, saying the two men share the same boat and neither of them can politically survive if they sacrifice each other.
For many months Khartoum has been witnessing “muffled struggles” between Hemedti and Al-Burhan due to integrating the RSF into the armed forces. Army leaders are not in harmony with the fact that the military now comprises former rebels and the RSF.
Meanwhile Hemedti is courting the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), leading some observers to suggest he is “trying to book a place in the coming political arrangement”.
Amin Magzoub, a professor of political science in Khartoum, noted, “I don’t have confirmed information, but I can deduce the FFC and Hemedti have some sort of agreement whereby the latter will run for president with the support of the FFC.”
Neither does Magzoub have “a logical explanation for the rapprochement between Hemedti and the FFC except that integrating the RSF into the army strips Hemedti and his fellows of the power that can be granted by tens of thousands of armed men, which is why he wants to be shielded by the rapprochement with the FFC.”
However, “democracy-supporting FFC can’t accept this arrangement,” said Al-Salik, adding that “if the FFC supports Hemedti – a man who has accusing fingers pointed at him – the force may lose part of their popular credit.”
It is no secret the FFC suffers wide rifts due to its rapprochement with the military, whereas neighbourhood committees comprising extremist youth reject the participation of the army. Moreover, none of Sudan’s political parties or organisations are elected and none have been close to power for very long since the Al-Bashir’s Muslim Brotherhood ruled the country for 30 years.
The Sudanese Professionals Association, the backbone of the FFC, was disassembled during the negotiations over the 5 December agreement.
According to Islamists, the Sudanese Professionals Association doesn’t enjoy considerable weight among professionals and the middle class, which resulted in the association’s failure to secure victory in any syndicate and led them to found unelected groups such as the Central Committee of Sudan’s Doctors and the Sudanese Lawyers Assembly.
The same goes for armed movements, formerly described as rebel currents, members of which were not elected by the national groups that claimed to have supported them.
“On this Sudanese stage, none other than the armed forces – being a legitimate institution – has real legitimacy,” said Magzoub. Even the RSF doesn’t enjoy the legitimacy of a regular army because it is formed of the tribal members of west Sudan.
In the meantime, Al-Burhan and Hemedti are at loggerheads. Al-Burhan wants to see more parties engaged in the Sudanese formula, while Hemedti, and the FFC, are rushing the formation of a civilian government.
According to Magzoub, “Expanding the agreement will strengthen – and complicate – the deal. However, forming the government quickly will mean the army’s exit from the political scene and result in the creation of a weak administration that does not represent everyone.”
* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 April, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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