Yemen breakthrough expected

Ahmed Eleiba , Tuesday 11 Apr 2023

Ahmed Eleiba sounds an optimistic note

Yemen breakthrough expected
Houthi s Al-Mashat (l) welcoming Jaber and his delegation in Sanaa (photo: AFP)

 

Saudi Arabia and Iran appear to have been on the same page on Yemen since their historic agreement to restore relations. Both attach the highest priority to bringing peace to the war-torn country. Following an unprecedented visit by a Saudi delegation to the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, on 8 April, the head of the delegation, Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohamed Said Jaber, said that the purpose of the visit was “to prolong the ceasefire, support the prisoner exchange process, and explore avenues for dialogue between Yemeni contingents in the interests of reaching a comprehensive and lasting political solution in Yemen.” In a similar spirit, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kanaani underscored his country’s firm stance on the need for a political end to the conflict in Yemen. His country has played a “positive and constructive role” in the negotiations between Yemeni parties, he said. Now it was important for all Yemeni parties to come together “to negotiate and talk, focusing on ensuring the best interests of the Yemeni people as they determine the fate of that country and form a new government.”

These statements followed shortly after the Saudi-Iran foreign ministers’ meeting in Beijing hosted by Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang on 6 April, as part of the continuing reconciliation process between Riyadh and Tehran. Participants discussed various mutual concerns in addition to the Yemeni conflict, such as the situations in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Nevertheless, Saudi observers said that progress on resolving the Yemeni crisis will be the main litmus test of the rapprochement.

As encouraging as these signs are, the road to peace in Yemen is still very long. Some commentators have suggested that the political settlement process may take longer than the war has lasted so far, which is about eight years. While it is impossible to overstate the importance of the qualitative regional shift that occurred with the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, it is important to distinguish between four main phases in the Yemeni peace-making process. The first is the meetings and other formal procedural steps that are taking place within the framework of the Beijing-brokered reconciliation process. The second phase will be direct, exploratory talks in which Yemeni stakeholders begin to broach a range of complex and thorny issues, not least among which is the frame-of-references that will govern the political process. In the light of recent developments, it is unlikely the parties will return to the three previous frames-of-reference, namely the Gulf Initiative of 2012, the outputs of the 2013 National Dialogue and UN Resolution 2216. Other preliminary issues will also need to be addressed in order to ensure the sustainability of the peace process, such as security arrangements, disarmament of the militias and the creation of an independent interim executive authority.

After exploratory talks, the two sides would engage in more extensive dialogue in the framework of a settlement process through an interim phase, which some Saudi sources believe would last around three years. The magnitude of the complexities the various stakeholders would need to address will require extensive discussions, the sources said. Talks would not be smooth and there would be setbacks, but in the end they would hammer out a roadmap. In this context, it is important to differentiate between the next two phases: the political process and actual peace-building. The former can be carried out in the foreseeable future, especially given the cumulative expertise that  has been built up in this regard. Towards this end, it will be essential to secure the ceasefire and implement a number of security provisions, especially in light of the Houthi tactic of using the ceasefire merely to consolidate gains. Firstly, there must be a disengagement process along the lines of contact, since the ceasefire line, itself, will define spheres of influence on the ground and, hence, shape much of the political process. The forces of the Ansarullah (Houthi) Movement continue to launch attacks and military manoeuvres aimed at increasing or consolidating its territorial gains. Meanwhile, the conditions of the permanent ceasefire remain unclear, including whether it will include the deployment of an observer force.

Considerable speculation has surrounded the visit by a joint Saudi-Omani delegation to Sanaa on Sunday, 9 April. The delegation met with the head Houthi regime’s Supreme Political Council, Mahdi Al-Mashat, at the Presidential Palace, which constituted a tacit Saudi recognition of the legitimacy of the Houthi Movement. Now one might say that there are two entities with legitimacy claims in Yemen: the internationally recognised government headed by the Presidential Leadership Council that has its temporary seat in Aden, and the de facto Houthi government in Sanaa. While this is a major departure from previous Saudi and Yemeni official positions, it could be conducive to a permanent ceasefire and serious peace talks, unlike those that had taken place at various junctures in Geneva, Kuwait and Stockholm.

Although the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) expressed support for Riyadh’s diplomatic initiatives, it clearly harbours considerable reserves concerning the feasibility of normalising relations with the Houthis in the framework of any agreed-on frames of reference. The difficulties that arise may have less to do with the Houthis than the diverse and sometimes conflicting interests of the constituents in the PLC itself. Above all, there are the ongoing underlying tensions between the Southern Transitional Council (STC), the dominant group in the Yemeni Southern Movement, and other PLC contingents, such as that headed by the adviser to former president Abd-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and that headed by Tarek Saleh, nephew of the late Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Nevertheless, in a recent interview with the Saudi Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, the STC leader Aidarous Al-Zubeidi said that he welcomed the diplomatic steps that have been taken, but he also stressed that the PLC is “of one heart and mind.” The message was reassuring to all who support a peaceful solution to the Yemeni crisis. It should be borne in mind that, as indicated above, the PLC is an umbrella group. While the Houthis may consider themselves an entity on par with the PLC in formal terms in the framework of the political process, this should not be equated with the actual balance of power on the ground among the diverse forces as they have been shaped by nearly a decade of conflict.

In this regard, it is significant that Zubeidi, in his Asharq Al-Awsat interview, focused on the need to address the Southern cause in the framework of any political process. This, in itself, could present a stumbling block. Apart from the fact that the Southern cause had been addressed in the aforementioned frames of reference, which the Houthis do not recognise, the other constituents of the PLC would not give the same priority to the Southern cause and might be disinclined to address it in an initial phase of the talks. The National Dialogue in 2013 addressed the Southern question in the framework of a federal solution providing for two or more regions, including one led by the Houthis in the north and another, led by the STC in the South. Other groups, especially those led by Tarek Saleh and the Yemeni Congregation of Islah (Reform) Movement, would attempt to carve out their own provinces.

Zubeidi mentioned the possibility of the Arab Coalition serving as a sponsor of the political process, with the UAE taking the lead in that framework while Saudi Arabia would be one of the co-sponsors alongside Oman. As the Houthi leader Mohamed Al-Bakhiti noted, the UAE had withdrawn its military forces from Yemen last year, effectively withdrawing as an active participant in the coalition’s military campaign in Yemen. Abu Dhabi has welcomed the current initiative in Yemen, but it has given no indication of a role it envisions for itself in this process.

Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have much to gain from a solution to the Yemeni conflict. Saudi Arabia, which had already begun a major policy shift on the war last year, had invested heavily in the conflict and suffered directly from the spillover into Saudi Arabia itself. Ending the conflict will make more resources available to the Saudi comprehensive development process, which clearly requires a more stable environment. Iran, too, stands to gain from a more stable environment, both economically and politically, all the more so now that China has stepped in as a partner in both the peacemaking and development processes.

The US remains skeptical, especially with regard to Iranian intentions. US Special Envoy to Yemen Timothy Lenderking recently said that, if the Iranians want to show they are committed to peace in Yemen, then they will stop smuggling weapons to the Houthis. In a more pointed message, the US has just sent a nuclear powered submarine to the Gulf against the backdrop of mounting tensions with Iran, a move perhaps designed to bring Gulf countries under the US nuclear umbrella. The Houthis, for their part, have reiterated their determination to rid Yemen of all foreign presence, a message that has frequently been reiterated by Iran in the context of US/Western presence in the region as a whole.

The conflict in Yemen has generated the worst humanitarian disaster in the world, with more than 20 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, while levels of international aid have dropped against the backdrop of international crises and poor economic infrastructure. The Yemeni people themselves will be the most immediate beneficiaries of an end to the conflict and progress towards peace.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 April, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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