Following the defeat in the 1967 War, the ultimate strategic aim of the Egyptian political leaderships in the eras of then presidents Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Anwar Al-Sadat was to regain the Egyptian territory that had been occupied in the war, namely the Sinai Peninsula.

Doing this would require addressing the unfavourable balance of power and expanding the limits of what could be accomplished on the ground. This entailed building Egyptian military power through the extensive training and skills development of Egyptian troops and the acquisition of weapons of a quantity and quality that could inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy in both manpower and equipment.

It also entailed planning the offensive in stages and combining combat with the judicious use of the Arab oil weapon in accordance with a strategy for gradually reducing production and boycotting Israel’s most hard-line backers, the US and the Netherlands.

Egypt also had to generate a more favourable regional and international political and negotiating environment by developing networks of relations conducive to the goal of liberating the occupied territory. While president Nasser undertook the first task, rebuilding the Egyptian forces after an overwhelming defeat and launching the War of Attrition to rebuild the confidence of our soldiers and increase the cost of the territorial occupation for Israel, president Al-Sadat was the architect of a war that would highlight the costs of military conflict and occupation for both the US and Israel but at the same time would also clearly show the way to a solution through negotiations leading to the restoration of Egypt’s territory.

The 1967 War did not end with the ceasefire. Within a month of its signing, Egyptian forces that were still stationed on the east bank of the Suez Canal near Port Said had succeeded in intercepting and defeating Israeli forces that were advancing towards that city. This victory has gone down in history as the Battle of Ras Al-Esh. Several months later, Egyptian missile boats sunk the Israeli destroyer Eilat. These actions, together with sporadic operations east of the canal, were the prelude to the War of Attrition that would cause considerable pain to Israel in 1969 and 1970.

This period was also a difficult time for Egypt, but the Arab support that was forthcoming following the Arab Summit in Khartoum enabled it to withstand the hardships and prepare for further conflict. The Israeli literature that is currently available on the October War acknowledges that one of Israel’s biggest mistakes was its failure to grasp the extent to which the Egyptian Armed Forces had advanced during this period. The Israeli leaders remained captives of an image of the Egyptian Army upon its defeat in 1967. They also could not imagine the scale of the Arab support and steadfastness that would culminate in that great act of defiance, the deployment of oil as a weapon in the war.

Before the October War began, president Al-Sadat had begun to open channels of communication with the US. He was fully aware of the close relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv and at the same time of how preoccupied the US was with the war in Vietnam and the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

After Egypt launched the war in October 1973, communications intensified between Cairo and Washington. The latter had been taken by surprise by the Egyptian strategic offensive, and it was acutely aware of the costs that would accrue when it came to be time to compensate Israel for its losses in the war.

Although the Nixon and Ford administrations, influenced by US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, pushed a step-by-step approach that proposed peace in exchange for an Israeli phased withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, the Arabs refused to deviate from their goal, which was the full recovery of their national territories.

Towards that end, as soon as the guns fell silent, Egypt was ready to go to Geneva for the Middle East Peace Conference and, moreover, to represent Damascus in the negotiations that followed. These led to the disengagement agreement, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the west of the Suez Canal on 18 January 1974, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the vicinity of Damascus in May 1974.

Syrian hard-line posturing and hesitation did not keep president Al-Sadat from entering a new round of negotiations and reaching a second disengagement agreement on 1 September 1975. This brought the Israeli withdrawal from the east of the canal, making it possible for Egypt to reopen it to international navigation after its closure in June 1967.

The fact that this was achieved through Egyptian-US collaboration gave Egypt enough leverage in Washington to deal effectively with president Jimmy Carter’s administration that had come to power in 1977. Carter was keen to hold an international conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. But this meant giving the Soviet Union, Syria, and other Arab countries a right to veto the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Egyptian territory unless Israel agreed to withdraw from other occupied Arab territories as well.

In addition to opening the door to Arab one-upmanship over Egypt, the conference would thus render Egypt’s cause prey to the dynamics of the Cold War. Moreover, the election of the right-wing government of Menachem Begin in Israel increased the likelihood that all the parties would harden their stances and obstruct the required liberation. The situation called for a second strategic surprise that would complement the first one that president Al-Sadat had delivered with the offensive in October 1973.

President Al-Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 was a diplomatic and political coup par excellence. If the war in 1973 threw into relief the costs of territorial occupation for Israel and the US, the famous visit showed the diplomatic and political path out of the Middle East crisis. That path led to the full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai after the conclusion of the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

The 1973 October War will remain a source of pride for an entire generation of Arabs. Every passing year will reveal more chapters of this event that Egyptians will discuss in detail when the need arises. Let us salute and express our gratitude to all the heroes of the war, both those who sacrificed their lives and those who are still alive today.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 October, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly