“The government should take responsibility, order the IDF to eliminate terrorism in Gaza once and for all, no matter how long it takes. Because we will not return to the south as long as there is one bullet, one gun, or one terrorist in Gaza,” wrote Haim Jelin, former head of the Eshkol Regional Council, in Negev, Israel’s Southern District, in Israel Hayom on 22 October.
Jelin’s words reflect the prevailing sentiment in Israeli society, extending beyond the areas bordering the Gaza Strip to encompass the entire country. A significant majority of Israelis believe that achieving a sense of security hinges on the removal of Hamas from Gaza, regardless of the duration of the conflict and the cost Israelis must pay to achieve this objective.
As a matter of fact, political and media discourse in Israel has been fuelling feelings of revenge against Hamas and Palestinians in general. It is informed by four elements. The first is that if the occupation constitutes a logical and legitimate pretext for the Palestinians to launch attacks on Israel, this pretext was lost with Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.
The second is that Hamas and Jihad do not express ideological positions limited to their supporters, but rather the feelings of all Palestinians. Those positions focus on the necessity of removing Israel from existence and killing Jews en masse, or forcing them to leave their country — examples being repeated exile and extermination of the Jewish people throughout history. This is the same position adopted by Iran, which arms and finances Hamas and Jihad, and which is behind Hamas’ attack on 7 October.
The third element informing Israeli political and media discourse is that the events of 7 October stand out from previous conflicts between Israel and Palestinian movements in Gaza, both in terms of Hamas’ objectives and the losses incurred by Israel.
The fourth element is that Israel faced existential threats on two notable occasions: in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War; and at present with the incursion of Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants into Israeli territory, resulting in the killing, injuring, and capturing of thousands of Israelis within a short time.
Those four elements are widely supported in Israeli newspapers and discussed on television talk shows. The Israeli media has effectively utilised videos recorded by Hamas during their military operations in Israeli cities neighbouring the Gaza Strip. These videos often focus on disturbing scenes of violence, including the targeting of vulnerable people such as the elderly and children.
As an example, the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper website reported on 19 October that a video released by the Israeli army on YouTube garnered over 5.5 million views in less than 24 hours. The video contains horrifying footage depicting the tragic scenes of Israelis being killed and the destruction caused during an attack on a concert attended by hundreds of young people on 7 October.
Various Israeli newspapers publish photographs and statistics of casualties of the ongoing conflict on a daily basis. They also provide comparisons of human losses between Israel and Hamas, citing data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
According to this data, from 2009 to September 2023 — a period of 14 years that witnessed three major confrontations along with numerous smaller clashes — 6,407 Palestinians were either killed or injured, whereas the corresponding figures for Israelis stood at 308. Additionally, 152,560 Palestinians were reported injured, in contrast to 6,307 Israelis. In 2008, 899 Palestinians were killed. The figure rose to 1,066 in 2009. The highest death toll was recorded in 2014, with 2,329 Palestinian fatalities. By contrast, Israeli casualties in those years respectively were 33, 11 and 88.
In this war, 1,400 Israeli civilians and military personnel were killed. More than 5,000 Israelis have been wounded, and 203 were taken hostage by Hamas and Jihad. The Israeli media’s emphasis on these comparisons serves as a means to motivate Israeli society to accept the inevitable costs of seeking retribution against Palestinians and to prepare them for the prolonged duration of the war. Israeli Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy expressed this sentiment by stating that these scenes will remain in the consciousness of Israeli soldiers as they prepare for a large-scale ground operation in Gaza.
On the other hand, the Israeli media’s approach has contributed to pushing Israeli society towards greater extremism, particularly concerning the issue of delivering humanitarian aid to the residents of the Gaza Strip. The Times of Israel reported on 19 October that some family members of Israelis held captive by Hamas in Gaza expressed extreme anger following the decision made by Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to allow the transfer of humanitarian aid to the strip through Egypt, without linking it to the release of their kidnapped relatives.
The Bring Them Home Now organisation, representing the families of the kidnapped, issued a statement expressing their outrage, saying that “the decision to allow humanitarian aid to the murderers of Gaza has caused great anger among the family members.”
The response of Israeli society to the war in Gaza is not solely determined by the objective of overthrowing Hamas. An opinion poll published by Maariv newspaper on 20 October stated that 65 per cent of Israelis support their country’s anticipated ground attack in Gaza.
Public attention is also focused on the fate of Netanyahu and the right wing coalition he led prior to the war and the formation of the current emergency government. According to the same poll, 80 per cent of Israelis believe that Netanyahu should be held accountable for the security failure exposed by the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October.
However, Netanyahu appears to be delaying the ground invasion of Gaza perhaps because it will not change the fact that his political career is already over, regardless of whether or not he acknowledges his role in this catastrophe.
The aftermath of the war is likely to draw comparisons to the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War — the October 1973 War — during which the Agranat Commission was formed. The commission absolved political leaders, including prime minister Golda Meir and defence minister Moshe Dayan, of responsibility for the initial days of the war, which Israeli literature refers to as “negligence” or “complacency.”
However, over the course of the past 50 years, the commission’s recommendations have faced significant criticism from Israeli researchers who deemed the report biased in favour of the political leaders and unjust towards the security and military leaders who were held accountable alone.
No doubt Netanyahu’s current situation is more challenging than Meir’s half a century ago. Netanyahu’s proposed judicial amendments plan, which preceded the war, caused division within Israel and had consequences that diverted the focus of security and military institutions away from addressing the looming threats. Consequently, Netanyahu will inevitably bear responsibility for his direct contribution to the circumstances that precipitated this disaster.
The ramifications of the present in Israel transcend the mere conclusion of Netanyahu’s political career. The right wing coalition he spearheaded will grapple with obstacles, as recent public opinion surveys suggest the loss of at least 20 seats in the Knesset if new elections were to be held subsequent to the war’s end. The right wing, comprising Likud and religious Zionist parties, currently hold 64 seats in the Knesset.
The lasting implications of the war for Israeli public opinion remain uncertain. There looms the imminent prospect of an escalation, with Hizbullah poised to join the fray at any given moment.
Furthermore, it is not improbable that Iran, under specific circumstances, might partake in the hostilities, driven by the objective of impeding Israel’s attempts to neutralise the military capabilities of its regional proxies, encompassing Hizbullah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.
If a multifaceted war scenario were to occur, Israeli society would bear the brunt of the escalation it clamoured for against the Gaza Strip. Evidently, numerous population centres within Israel could become targets of a barrage of thousands of rockets, potentially culminating in urban battles, particularly in proximity to the northern borders adjoining Syria and Lebanon. This forebodes a harrowing toll of human casualties from which Israel would continue suffer for many years to come.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 October, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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