P
olitical scientists have taught us that, in times of crisis, decision-makers and statesmen should remain aloof from the noise of the media and politicised attempts to divert attention from the actual direction of events. Meaningful moves are military in nature or carry economic weight. Political moves that affect the global balance of power will henceforth determine tales of war or peace and tension or harmony in the world. War generally brings about a fog that creates mirages in which colours, earth and water mix and shift depending on the light.
Amidst the cracks and the thunder of guns and bombs in the fifth Gaza war, a Chinese-American summit was held on the fringe of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum in California. A similar summit was held on the side-lines of the G20 in Indonesia last year. Last week’s summit follows a series of meetings that covered almost all strategic issues between the two countries from the question of Taiwan to drug-related concerns. The meetings and accompanying positive statements they made picked up pace at the end of October and they brought together US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and the governor of California with their Chinese counterparts, which brought us to the meeting between Xi and Biden.
Although the war in the Middle East, which began on 7 October, continued to rage while the two heads-of-state met, it had very little effect on their meetings. This is rather surprising given that both countries support the two-state solution to the intractable Palestinian question. That the US-China summit has nearly disappeared from the headlines can only mean one thing: the two superpowers were discussing crucial matters possibly related to the reordering of world politics.
The most important fact, here, is that, until the fifth Gaza war erupted, the main event since the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian crisis is that China’s rise to the status of superpower is now taken for granted. Yet, during the Gaza crisis, the world’s second superpower did not behave as such, but rather confined itself to signals and statements. Hamas’ attack on 7 October came at a time when the world was preoccupied with Ukraine. This created a vacuum that the US hastened to fill when the Gaza war erupted.
Russia is caught in the vice of a war it has failed to win, and Putin appears torn between a strategy for winning and a strategy for retreat. China is a completely different story. Economically, its GDP at purchasing power parity surpasses that of the US and, technologically, it is expanding horizontally across the planet and vertically into outer space. While the US is withdrawing from the Middle East in order to focus on Europe and the Indo-Pacific, China holds an Arab-Chinese summit in Saudi Arabia, weaves a new bond between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and spreads its influence along the Belt and Road. But the most pressing Chinese riddle at present is what is it doing about the current Middle East crisis. Its denunciation of the war, whether of the Hamas attack or the Israeli response, was faint and the voice of the Chinese envoy to the Middle East was barely audible. The Chinese president’s visit to the US was of central concern in Beijing, while the Middle East was barely visible in the summit.
On the other hand, the US riddle is multifaceted. At the beginning of the crisis, Washington stood solidly behind Israel, bringing with it overwhelming European support while telling the Arabs that it wants to turn the crisis into an opportunity to promote peace on the basis of the two-state solution.
Investing all that support in Israel has yielded nothing. It did not stop Israeli bombardments of Palestinian hospitals, despite US warnings. The growing gap between the US and Israel became yawning when the latter openly stated its intentions to, firstly, stage another Nakba in the direction of Egypt; secondly, level the whole of Gaza to the ground; thirdly, reoccupy Gaza for an indefinite period and perhaps rebuild its settlements there; fourthly, run rampage in the West Bank to create a parallel Nakba in the direction of Jordan; and, fifthly, to invite a war with Hizbullah and another with the Houthis in Yemen. In short, Israel has been working against everything the US wanted to achieve. The Israeli tone towards the US was cold and, in some quarters, derisive. One recalls that Bill Clinton, after meeting Netanyahu at the White House for the first time, wondered out loud who the real superpower was.
In sum, the US is up to its nuclear and conventional ears in a region from which it has long since decided to ostensibly withdraw because its main interests reside in Asia. China has, up to now, been reserved. Perhaps it fears being sucked in too deeply into the turbulent seas of the Middle East. A summit conference in the region or building a bridge between Saudi Arabia and Iran (both of which are linked to China through major economic interests) are one thing. The bottomless seas of the Arab-Israeli conflict are another, and the Palestinian question is so mine-ridden that it could blow up in China’s face, especially given that it is a historic friend of the Arabs. Meanwhile, technology and the US are forging powerful bonds with Israel.
So, what did the Beijing-Washington summit in San Francisco accomplish? If the Middle East was so remote from the superpowers’ table, what did they agree on? Or is China an altogether new kind of superpower?
* A version of this article appears in print in the 23 November, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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