Iranian and Pakistani casualties have been reported in recent days following missile attacks launched by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) against Pakistan and the latter’s retaliation.The flare-up between the two sides has brought a previously overlooked conflict to the fore.

Contrary to earlier predictions, which warned of the potential expansion of the Israeli war on Gaza to involve Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq, the missile exchanges between Tehran and Islamabad have caught many observers by surprise.

Western media reports suggest that the clashes between the two neighbouring countries can be attributed to conflicts on the border. These factors have compelled Iran and Pakistan to take a path they might not have chosen under normal circumstances, influenced by the mounting pressures, such reports say.

Since former US president Donald Trump decided to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear agreement with Tehran negotiated by his predecessor Barack Obama, Iran has been grappling with economic sanctions. The national currency has depreciated, and both its balance sheet and oil revenues have taken significant hits.

Following the US decision to withdraw from the agreement, the influence of hardliners like the IRGC, the Razavi Endowment, one of the largest charities in Iran, and the Qom Seminary has grown in Iran.

This had led to a rise in Iran’s“arrogance”in foreign affairs, said Israa Abdallah, a journalist specialising in Iran affairs.

“Political discourse against the US and its allies has become the daily diet of Iranian political circles to the extent that all the symbols of the reformist movement in Iran, such as former president Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, the architect of the nuclear agreement, have become open to criticism,” Abdallah said.

“It has even escalated into bitter regional conflicts, including in Syria, Yemen, and the Caucasus,” she added.

In Yemen, Tehran supports the Ansarullah (Houthi) movement against the internationally recognised government of the country backed by the Arab Coalition led by Saudi Arabia. This support prolonged the conflict in Yemen from 2015 to 2022 and resulted in the deaths of over 100,000 people and left millions displaced.

Iran’s backing of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad increased since the onset of the country’s Civil War in 2011and became even more decisive after the Russian intervention in favour ofthe Al-Assad regime in 2015.

Tehran has also aligned itself with Armenia in its conflict against Azerbaijan for control of the Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh, despite both Iran and Azerbaijan being Shia Muslim nations.

During the crisis in Lebanon that began in 2018, Iran has consistently supported its ally the Lebanese Shia group Hizbullah against its opponents, with the political landscape eventually seeing the formation of several governments under the label of “Hizbullah governments”.

Tensions in Tehran have intensified due to the escalation of the Baloch separatist movement on the country’s border with Pakistan, along with discontent in Iranian Kurdistan and southern Azerbaijan on the border with Azerbaijan to the north.

Balochistan is divided between Pakistan and Iran, with a small part in Afghanistan. Criminal networks involved in human-trafficking and weapons and drugs smuggling are active in the border area, alongside separatist movements like the Army of Justice, the Balochistan Liberation Front, and the Balochistan Liberation Army.

These are advocating for the formation of an independent Baloch state, causing tensions in these areas of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan.

According to Abdallah, “although good relations were assumed to be in force between Pakistan and Iran due to the Baloch situation, other factors have come into play that have contributed to the escalation.”

Pakistan has accused Iran of supporting Pakistani Shias, who constitute almost a quarter of the country’s population. In return, Tehran has accused Islamabad of supporting Baloch Sunnis, with both countries denying each other’s claims.

Pakistan collaborated with China to expand the port of Gwadar in Pakistani Balochistan as part of the Belt and Road Initiative launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his first term in office. In response, Iran entered into an agreement with India to operate the port of Chabahar, perceived by Islamabad as a move against the port of Gwadar.

Both Chabahar and Gwadar are situated on the Gulf of Oman.

Cooperation between India and Iran parallels the partnership between Pakistan and the US, seen by Tehran as a threat to its national security. Tehran also harbours concerns about Islamabad’s relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, which has Salafi and anti-Shia tendencies.

“All these factors have contributed to the escalation between Iran and Pakistan,” Abdallah said.

Pakistan is grappling with a profound economic crisis compounded by a third of its agricultural land having been submerged in recent floods. Internal political conflicts with former Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan and strained relations with India, ruled by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, have added to the challenges.

The instability in Afghanistan, which represents“strategic depth” for Pakistan, has further complicated the situation in Islamabad.

With general elections approaching in February, the Pakistani army had to respond to the Iranian missile attacks in Balochistan, and this has further heightened tensions. However, Pakistan is wary of engaging in further conflict with its neighbours, “for fear that India will exploit Pakistan’s weak position,”Abdallah said.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars since the two countries gained their independence in 1947, with Pakistan losing its eastern part, which became Bangladesh, in the last conflict in 1971.

“Tehran is also facing increasing public pressure due to the economic deterioration and political restrictions, particularly against women and minorities. The anger intensified following the killing of Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish woman, by the religious police in Tehran for not wearing the prescribed hijab,” Abdallah said.

Tehran is concerned that any “leniency towards opponents, and women”could weaken its position both domestically and internationally, she added.

It has long “exploited the Palestinian cause,” she said, and has come under pressure from various factions, including Hamas, Hizbullah, the Houthis, and Iraqi and Syrian militias, collectively known as the “axis of resistance,” to do more.

“While Iran cannot afford to risk a war with Israel or incite its ally Hizbullah to engage in a conflict with Tel Aviv, there is growing anticipation among many people to see what Iran can offer,” Abdallah said.

Tehran aims to divert local and regional attention away “from direct confrontation with Israel” by instigating conflicts in countries such as Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan, she added.

“Iran is pursuing a strategy of keeping the fire away from home

The IRGC stated that its strike in Pakistan was carried out in response to attacks by two suicide bombers in Kerman in southern Iran on 3 January during an event commemorating the assassination of Suleimani by US forces in Iraq. The IS group claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Iran has been avoiding what the “axis of resistance” perceives as its responsibility to confront Israel, Abdallah said.

Tehran has sought to lead the Palestinian cause for decades, but any direct involvement by Iran in the current war on Gaza would have significant implications for the Islamic Republic.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 25 January, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly