In a way similar to the Monroe Doctrine, introduced into US foreign policy in 1823, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, issued by the US Congress in 1957 following the Suez Crisis, what some authors are now calling the “Biden Doctrine” or the “Biden Principle” in the Middle East is now taking shape along multiple pathways.
These pathways involve recognising a demilitarised Palestinian state, enhancing Israeli-Arab normalisation, particularly with Saudi Arabia, and diminishing Iran’s influence over Palestinian factions materially, logistically, and politically. According to many experts, if the US administration manages to formulate such a doctrine in the Middle East, it will constitute the “largest strategic alignment since the Camp David Accords” in the late 1970s.
Establishing such a doctrine would serve as a strategic move to expose Iran’s deceit and initiate an unprecedented initiative to lay the groundwork for a demilitarised Palestinian state. It would represent a fully-fledged geopolitical vision both domestically and internationally.
Over recent weeks, European and US statements regarding the recognition of a Palestinian state and the two-state solution as the only way out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have become more frequent. They have been echoed by EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell and US officials, including President Joe Biden himself and Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
Blinken has tasked his aides with exploring the issue of recognising a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the restructuring and renewal of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the restructuring of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to take the reins of this nascent state.
These developments, both in Europe and particularly within the US administration, have given rise to both astonishment and cautious optimism. The astonishment comes from the fact that there has been an absence of such statements over the past few decades, owing to the Israeli approach during the period in office of current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which has emphasised that the Palestinian issue is not a condition for normalisation with the Arab states and does not represent a gateway to the Arab recognition of Israel.
However, this notion has proven to be invalid, and the linkage between resolving the Palestinian issue and engaging with Israel remains a decisive one for influential Arab states. The recent statements also seem to be tied to the ongoing and criminal war against the Palestinian people, whether in Gaza or the West Bank.
As for the cautious optimism that such statements have provoked, this lies in the shift in international discourse and in particular in the acknowledgement by the US of the rights of the Palestinian people to a Palestinian state on Palestinian land. However, this optimism could evaporate at any moment, especially given the numerous indicators that make it closer to a mirage than reality.
At the time of writing, the US supports the continuation of the Israeli aggression against Gaza under the false pretexts that it is now transitioning to the third stage and is minimising civilian casualties. These terms contain many contradictions, as the third stage essentially means the continuation of the Israeli killing and aggression, granting it more time to accomplish its declared mission of eliminating Hamas and freeing its prisoners by force or negotiation.
Moreover, the mystery surrounding the borders of the proposed Palestinian state and the mechanisms for its establishment still remain. UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012 recognises the borders of a Palestinian state within the territories occupied after 1967, including East Jerusalem.
Would the potential US recognition of a Palestinian state align with the content of this resolution? Or would the present US administration adopt the Palestinian state proposed under the “Deal of the Century” put forward by former US president Donald Trump, in which there would be a state that would not be based on geography and sovereignty and would be a kind of virtual state or one that only bore that name?
The potential US recognition of a Palestinian state includes puzzles and traps that must be addressed. It might seek to appease the Democratic Party voter base in the US, particularly young people supportive of the rights of the Palestinian people, before the start of the US presidential elections later this year. It might aim to dismantle the slogans of unity in solidarity with the Palestinian people and end the war on Gaza in a way that enables Israel to achieve its goals, which it has failed to achieve in reality.
Discussion about such recognition has not been linked to ending the Israeli occupation, halting the Israeli settler violence, and evacuating the settlements, nor has it specified how to deal with the extreme right-wing racist mobilisation within the Israeli elite and public opinion.
There has been no indication of how the establishment of a Palestinian state would in fact be done. Would it be done through an international conference or a binding decision by the UN Security Council? And would the establishment of a Palestinian state be binding on Israel itself, rather than on the present Israeli government, which of course may change or be overthrown?
The writer is an Arab affairs expert at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 15 February, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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