Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan plans to visit Baghdad next month in a fresh attempt to warm relations with Iraq after years of both divisions and cooperation over thorny issues including security, energy, and water between the two neighbouring countries.
In recent months, Ankara has launched a charm offensive seeking to lower tensions with Baghdad after Iraq announced plans to launch an ambitious plan to build a strategic transportation network to link the Arab Gulf with Europe through Iraq and Turkey.
Ankara also hopes to lure the Iraqi government into being an active partner in its 40-year war against its Kurdish insurgents that use outposts in mountainous northern Iraq to attack Turkey.
It remains to be seen, however, whether Turkey will succeed in its endeavours as it navigates a complex internal situation in Iraq and contests Iran’s increasing influence in the beleaguered country.
Turkish officials and the Turkish media have been upbeat about Iraq’s participation in Ankara’s campaign to achieve its proclaimed objective of eradicating threats from the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) that partially operates from the Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq.
Turkey’s enthusiasm for a breakthrough with Iraq came after a visit by a high level delegation to Baghdad earlier this month to discuss security issues, including potential measures against the PKK, after Turkey warned of new military operations in the region.
During their visit, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defence Minister Yaşar Güler, and National Intelligence Organisation (MİT) Chief İbrahim Kalın held talks with their Iraqi counterparts, including on preparations for a planned visit by Erdogan to Baghdad that is expected to take place after the Muslim holy month of Ramadan which ends in April.
Ankara said that Erdogan, whose last visit to Baghdad was in 2012, will sign a broad “strategic agreement” with Prime Minister Mohamed Shiaa Al-Sudani that will see assertive Iraqi participation in the war against the PKK.
A spokesman for Ankara’s Defence Ministry told reporters on 21 March that Baghdad has responded positively to Ankara’s proposal to set up a “joint operation centre” with Iraq in order to combat the group that has been fighting the Turkish security forces since 1984.
Turkish officials went as far as to claim that the two sides are drafting a plan to be signed during Erdogan’s visit that will outline details of a joint military operation that will drive PKK fighters from their outposts in the mountains to places where they will be disarmed.
Iraq, meanwhile, said that the two countries have decided to establish joint permanent committees that will “work exclusively in the fields of counter-terrorism, trade, agriculture, energy, water, health, and transportation.”
Iraq’s Foreign Ministry said the discussions in Baghdad with the Turkish officials had also underlined “the importance attached to Iraq’s political unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”
In a statement, the ministry said the two sides had agreed that “the PKK represents a security threat to both Turkey and Iraq.” It said that Iraq “considers the PKK to be a banned organisation” and that it would consult on measures with Turkey to be taken against the group.
For Turkey, an alliance with Iraq in the war against the PKK will be a boost to Turkish forces that have been engaged in a series of operations against the rebels, striking mostly along the shared border but also deep into Iraqi Kurdistan.
Erdogan has vowed that the PKK problem in the Iraqi territories will be resolved by this summer. He has vowed that military “operations will continue until every inch of the mountains in northern Iraq that have become the source of terrorist actions... are secured.”
Yet, Turkey’s ability to achieve its proclaimed military objectives against the PKK, as well as other implicit economic and geopolitical goals in Iraq, will now be put to the test.
For years, Turkey has exerted pressure on Iraq to try to extract concessions from a position of strength on several issues such as energy and water. two vital lifelines for Iraq, as well as demanding a greater say in Iraq’s affairs.
A critical issue that has served as a key obstacle to developing better bilateral ties has been the water flow from the Turkish highlands towards Iraq, as Ankara continues to hoard water behind some 22 dams and giant reservoirs it has built on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers that travel south into Iraq.
Millions of Iraqis in the country’s central and southern provinces rely upon these two rivers to provide drinking water, agricultural irrigation, power generation, and transportation, and they have been badly affected by shortages of water combined with climate change.
Yet, Turkey has repeatedly turned down requests from Iraq to finalise an agreement on how the water flows from the two rivers should be managed during and following periods of drought or shortages in Iraq.
Another sticking point is Turkey’s halting of the flow of oil through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline after the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ruled in favour of Baghdad and against Ankara in allowing the Kurdistan Region to begin independent oil exports through the 970 km pipeline that was built under a 1973 transit agreement.
To avoid paying penalties imposed by the ICC and in another legal case in a US court started by Baghdad to reinforce the ruling, Ankara wants Baghdad to amicably settle the dispute before it reopens the loading terminals of the 450,000 barrels per day (bpd) at the Turkish port of Ceyhan.
In addition to its security concerns, Turkey’s policy towards Iraq has long been guided by its strategic goals of linking its water strategy with its energy interests. This policy was best summarised by remarks made by Suleyman Demirel, Turkey’s former president, in 1992 when opening the Ataturk Dam.
He said that “neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey’s rivers any more than Ankara can claim their oil.”
While Turkey has remained adamant about delaying agreement on these two crucial issues, new economic and geopolitical realities have begun attracting its attention after Baghdad announced its ambitious Dry Canal or Development Road through Turkey.
Iraq is seeking to create 1,200 km of road and railway infrastructure that will connect its southern Al-Faw Grand Port, which is under construction, with Europe through Turkish ports and road networks.
Once it is completed, Iraq hopes the route will turn the country into a regional commercial transit hub and improve international trade by shortening the time taken to cover the distance between East Asia and Europe by half.
With various competing multinational road, rail, and shipping projects also under consideration, including the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Turkey’s participation in Iraq’s Development Road project looks essential.
A panel discussion held at the Ankara-based Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), a think tank, last week to discuss promising new horizons for cooperation between the two countries concluded that the Iraqi multi-billion-dollar project could have not only “economic but also regional consequences” for Turkey.
But in order for Turkey to be part of the project, the Erdogan government needs to change its parameters in Iraq, which are currently in favour of a narrowly security and geopolitical agenda at the expense of broader mutually beneficial cooperation and interests.
One of the major challenges for Turkey’s joining the project is Iran’s growing influence in Iraq. Iran’s influence is manifested in religious, economic, and political activities through its powerful Shia allies in the government.
Iran is also Iraq’s main trading partner, and it has been one of the largest investors in the construction and industrial sectors in Iraq. With $8.91 billion in exports to Iraq in 2021, Tehran is the main rival to Turkish exports, which amounted to $13.75 billion in 2022, according to the UN COMTRADE database on international trade.
Tehran is also devising its own regional strategic corridor linking East Asia and Europe through a railway line connecting the Arabian Gulf to the Mediterranean via Syria. It hopes that this corridor will be part of the Chinese BRI Middle East network.
Despite Ankara’s optimism about starting a new page in bilateral relations with Baghdad, a number of internal and external factors remain that will likely keep the mood downbeat for the moment.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 28 March, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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