Houthi threat in the Mediterranean

Mina Adel, Tuesday 7 May 2024

Are the Houthis able to sabotage maritime trade in the Mediterranean, asks Mina Adel

Houthi threat in the Mediterranean

 

On Tuesday, 30 April, MSC Orion, a Portuguese-flagged container ship, came under attack from a one-way drone in the Arabian Sea. The authorities said Yemen’s Houthis were responsible for that attack. The MSC Orion has been associated with the London-based Zodiac Maritime, which is part of Israeli billionaire Eyal Ofer’s Zodiac Group. The targeting of the ship in this location precisely represents a turning point in Houthi capabilities because this time the targeting distance was more than 600 km, marking a long-range attack.

Four days after the event, military Spokesman Yahya Sare said Yemen’s Houthis will target ships heading to Israeli ports in any area within their range. “We will target any ships heading to Israeli ports in the Mediterranean Sea in any area we are able to reach,” he said.

The Mediterranean Sea is up to 2000 km away from Yemen, raising doubts about these claims due to the distance, which requires extraordinary targeting capabilities. Yet the threat was made in spite of the American and British military efforts known as Operation Poseidon Archer which began in January 2024, the primary objective of which was to eliminate the Houthis’ capability of carrying out multiple swarm and complex attacks simultaneously. The US Navy and the British were able to accomplish this mission by carrying out precise and intensive strikes of Houthi command and control systems, as well as cyber-attacks on a suspicious Iranian ship, Behshad, which many observers believed was helping the Houthis with intelligence and coordinates. On the other hand the smuggling of weapons to the Houthis proceeded through medium and small civilian boats.

According to USCENTCOM, in January 2024, “US Navy SEALs operating from USS Lewis B Puller (ESB 3), supported by helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), executed a complex boarding of the dhow near the coast of Somalia in international waters of the Arabian Sea, seizing Iranian-made ballistic missile and cruise missile components. Seized items include propulsion, guidance, and warheads for Houthi medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as air defence associated components. Initial analysis indicates these same weapons have been employed by the Houthis to threaten and attack innocent mariners on international merchant ships transiting in the Red Sea. Houthi weaponry are simple and inexpensive to install, build, and use, which is also beneficial for the Houthis in maintaining custody of more munitions to target in their new presumptive campaign in the Mediterranean.”

To assess the Houthi claims, Al-Ahram Weekly sought the opinions of two experts. Samuel Bendett works on unmanned military systems and artificial intelligence at several research organisations, including CNA, CNAS, and CSIS, while David Hambling is an expert on unmanned systems at Forbes.

Speaking “off the record”, Bendett said, “I think we have learnt so far that states without massive military budgets can produce weapons and systems that can threaten the global commons.”

For his part Hambling gave a clear explanation for the long distance targeting: “In 2021 an Iranian drone struck the merchant ship Mercer Street 300 km from Oman. Since the Iranians supply the Houthis with all their drone technology, there is every reason to believe that the Houthis already have the capability to hit moving targets at long range. This might be achieved either by having a communication link with the operator, or by some kind of terminal guidance on the drone; either is possible. Houthis can track merchant ships easily because they are required by law to broadcast their position. Apps like Ship-finder will tell you where all the shipping is in a given area and its speed and direction so they can send their drones near the area and use its camera.”

The tactic cited is very similar to the recent targeting of a Greek ship flying the Maltese flag, MV Cyclades. The Houthis released a video of the operation showing a suicide drone Samad-3 heading to the ship, and scenes have been recorded with the drone Nikon D810 camera. This drone can travel up to 1800 km. The Houthis also have the famed Iranian Shahid-136 drone, commonly known as Waeed, which has a range of 2000 km.

The US Navy and its European allies have intercepted over 100 of these types, in addition to carrying out pre-emptive strikes on missile platforms and drones on the ground. However, the Houthis continue to launch drones, and the American carrier USS Eisenhower has already left the Red Sea, leaving a cruiser and destroyers behind. Then it returned on May 6 for the second round after being maintenanced and being resupplied.

Hambling stated that targeting “Houthi launch sites is difficult: they have mobile infrastructure, with radars and drone launch units on trucks which can be quickly relocated and hidden. After several years, the Saudis had little success stopping the Houthis from launching long-range drones.”

Houthi drones, or even cruise and ballistic missiles, whose ability to carry out these missions is questionable and their accuracy poor, are considered a major threat because of the possibility of falling after launch, but despite this, there are many technical solutions to neutralise these risks.

According to Hambling, “the most effective countermeasures depend on the type of guidance: if it is via radio guidance, then jamming will break the link. If it is terminal homing, then decoys or other methods (eg smoke) might be used to confuse the sensors. However, this will only reduce the success rate. As with the approach of shooting down Houthi missiles, the risk is that sooner or later the Houthis will get lucky and a drone will get through. Fighter planes CAP-Combat Air Patrols might be a good way of spotting drones early so they could be intercepted, but this would require a huge amount of resources.”

The Israeli Air Force was able to intercept drones north of the Red Sea by F-15 Baz fighter jets, but this can be reiterated. This necessitates a swift resolution to the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, which the Houthis utilised as the primary justification for their actions. Unfortunately, military options have not been effective in defeating them, even if they have limited offensive capabilities. Over time, the Houthis will be able to recover their losses and regain full targeting capability. It must be understood that utilising military force to resolve such conflicts against unconventional forces is not the most effective strategy to prevent Middle East escalation. Instead, additional political solutions are required.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 May, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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