The second most populous country in Africa, Ethiopia is facing civil wars in its three largest regions, the most severe being with the Amhara.
The Amhara have been the dominant ethnic group for centuries, starting with the establishment of the Suleiman dynasty in the 13th century AD. Their language is the state’s official language and the language of education, and it is used by the majority of the middle-class in the capital city of Addis Ababa. However, since the decline of Communist rule in the early 1990s, the Amhara community have been marginalised as power shifted to the Tigray.
The Tigray, who constitute 7.5 per cent of the population, took control under the leadership of Meles Zenawi, who ruled from 1991 until 2012. Since Zenawi’s departure, the various ethnic groups comprising the Ethiopian Federation have been voicing grievances through protests, particularly the two largest ethnic groups: the Oromo, making up 34 per cent of the population, and the Amhara, 28 per cent. The Somalis, representing 7.5 per cent of the population, have also staged demonstrations.
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, which was the main political force in Ethiopia’s ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Front, was in charge until Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in early 2018. Ahmed gained popularity at home and internationally due to his political initiatives, including the release of thousands of detainees, allowing the return of exiled citizens, and pursuing reconciliation with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s long-standing adversary, with which it went to war in 1998-2000.
Within two years of taking office, Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. But the “man of peace” soon fell foul of the recently divested Tigray, who had lost their military privileges. This quickly led to the outbreak of war in the northern region in late 2020. Amhara (Fano) and Afar militias (aka Fano) had aided the army in the war with Eritrea, which killed half a million people whether in combat or due to famine and lack of medicine. But, as soon as it became clear that Tigray would accept a ceasefire, Ahmed signed the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022, involving neither the Amhara nor the Afar, and ignoring his newfound ally, Eritrea.
The Tigray war ended for Addis Ababa, but peace did not come about. The Tigray has been living in a state of “neither peace nor war” since then. They were not disarmed, and the government forces did not withdraw from their region, despite the state of emergency being partially lifted. And that is how Ahmed’s troubles with the Amhara and Eritrea began. The Amhara felt excluded from the peace negotiations, and thus from the benefits of the ceasefire, and their leaders accused Ahmed’s government of trying to the community and replace its members in power with Oromos. Ahmed’s father is a Muslim Oromo, his mother an Orthodox Amharic woman; he himself became a Pentecostal missionary, however.
Be that as it may, a gradual war broke out between the regime and the Fano militias. “The Amhara war is not as violent and extensive as the Tigray war, but it is bloody,” said a report by the International Crisis Group published on its website in late 2023. After the Tigray war, the government announced the need to disband all regional forces. The Amhara rejected this, feeling that the decision was intended to make them an easy target for Tigray and Oromo attacks.
According to a report by Ethiopian researcher Adani Tedessie from the American Wilson Center, “50 per cent of Amhara soldiers defected from the armed forces and joined Fano.” This was followed by waves of government military operations in the Amhara region, during which local militias gained control of Bahir Dar, the former capital of Ethiopia. The situation is particularly alarming because Addis Ababa is under threat due to the absence of barriers between the capital and the Amhara region. The Amhara middle class constitutes a significant portion of the capital’s population, too, including the majority of professionals.
Amhara has been in a state of emergency since August 2023. It has witnessed mass killings, according to a report by Human Rights Watch in April 2024, which documented incidents in January and February in the city of Merawi, where dozens of people were unlawfully executed. Widespread confrontations in the region paved the way to insecurity, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, inadequate access to basic services, and Internet shutdowns. Given the region’s population of 20 million people, its challenging mountainous geography, and the tensions between the government and various Ethiopian groups, the conflict in Amhara could escalate into a large-scale war that spills over into neighbouring countries.
Faced with struggles in several regions, the Ethiopian government has attempted to export its problems in an effort to unify the domestic front. Ethiopia has requested access to ports along the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean coasts from its neighbours, but this exacerbated tensions in the Horn of Africa, particularly with Eritrea and Somalia. Ahmed’s declaration of the need for Ethiopia to break free of its “geographical prison” and by using ports such as Assab in southern Eritrea and Berbera in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland has heightened those tensions.
Ethiopia is also engaged in a dispute with Sudan over the Fashqa region in eastern Sudan. Covering over a million feddans of agricultural land, Fashqa had been utilised by Amhara farmers protected by Fano militias. However, the Sudanese forces regained control of the region after a bloody conflict. The Greater Horn of Africa, which includes Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea, suffers from a proliferation of weapons. Combined with the region’s already impoverished conditions, this could have dire consequences. The wars in the region have already weakened agricultural productivity, raising concerns over the potential for widespread famine.
The security decline in Ethiopia coincides with the world’s preoccupation with other issues, such as the rise of far-right movements in Europe and potential political developments in the US, let alone the war in Gaza. This may result in neglect of other Third World issues, particularly those in Africa. If conflict escalates in the Horn of Africa, it is unlikely to remain confined to the borders of the countries involved, however, and the region would be left to tackle the crisis on its own.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 25 July, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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