Mohamed Ouda, Milad Thawra (A Revolution Is Born) – The General Organization of Culture Palaces, The Identity Series, pp 303, 2023

Egypt could not have reached independence from the British occupation without the Free Officers. There was no way for the 23 July Revolution to have lived and succeeded without Gamal Abdel-Nasser. This is the key argument of Mohamed Ouda, a journalist and writer born in 1920 and died in 2006 after covering the country’s most consequential political events of the second half of the 20th century. 

Milad Thawra is originally published in the 1960s as a narrative on the path towards independent statehood.

The book is one of several titles Ouda wrote to document and support the July Revolution, to which he was fully committed. 

According to the theory put out by Ouda, all attempts to secure an independent state, starting with the Ourabi Revolt in 1879 before the actual 1882 British occupation, have failed to deliver.

This, the book argues, is due to a range of reasons including the lack of political shrewdness of political leaders like Ahmed Ourabi, Saad Zaghloul, and others.

There was also, the author wrote, the limited impact of political parties, including Al-Wafd which was the nation’s top political umbrella from 1919 to the eve of 1952. 

Ouda wrote that even the militant wings of Al-Wafd and other political parties, which were conducting assassinations against British soldiers and Egyptian affiliates of the British occupation, failed to force the independence of Egypt. 

He added that all attempts to lobby for efficient international support for the legitimate Egyptian demand for independence had failed.

In parallel, political parties were falling into endless internal disputes, the rulers of Egypt were systematically falling under the sway of colonial powers, and the vast majority of Egyptians were falling into avid poverty.

Meanwhile, there was growing contempt and political mobility among a group of Egyptian officers, who had accessed the otherwise exclusive military academy upon signing the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which "formally" terminated the occupation of Egypt, Ouda wrote. 

Inevitably, these officers, who had the power to act, proceeded to remove the monarch King Farouk independently of any political agreement with any of the existing powers who were reluctant to act this way, he added. 

Once Farouk was removed, the revolution had to act to avert possible counter-revolution. This, he argued, meant that Abdel-Nasser, which he Ouda labels as the one and actual leader of the July Revolution, could not have tolerated any hesitation from Mohamed Naguib, the “façade leader” to rule.

"It was impossible otherwise," Ouda wrote, especially because of the many international dynamics including the nascent power conflict between the outgoing British power and the incoming American power.

He suggested that with the two powers struggling to control the Middle East, with Egypt at the heart of the feud, Abdel-Nasser had to put his feet down.

This, he wrote in a big part of his 18-chapter volume, entailed taking strong measures, including the Agrarian Reform Law and pursuing a regional presence, including supporting nascent liberation movements, especially in North Africa, to the west of Egypt.

It also entailed forging international relations with newly independent countries on the path of post-colonial state-building moments.

Ultimately, Ouda wrote there was a price to pay, the Tripartite Aggression of October 1956.

After the Suez War, which came right after the nationalization of the Suez Canal ahead of the launch to construct the High Dam, Abdel-Nasser and the revolution had won the battle with the anti-revolution powers and secured the nation's support, Ouda concluded.