Ahram Online: How did the recent Israeli assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the assassination of the Hezbollah military commander Fouad Shukr in Beirut change the calculus in the region?

Ali Vaez: It is a perilous turning point in the region. Until now, Iran and its allies were hoping that the war after 7 October, despite its disastrous implications both for Israel and Gaza, would be on par with the previous confrontations between Israel and the members of the Iran-led "Axis of Resistance" - such as the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah or previous confrontations between Israel and Hamas.

Iran and its allies were hoping this war would also be a short and devastating one but a passing phenomenon.

However, it has become clear that this moment in the region could prove to be a "1914 moment" - one that could change the Middle East forever.

Even the unprecedented exchange of attacks between Iran and Israel in April did not fundamentally change everything.

But, it does appear that now we are on the verge of major complications.

In the past four decades, we had bilateral tensions and conflicts in the region, whether it was between Iran and Iraq, Israel and one of the members of the "Axis of Resistance", and civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.

Yet, we have never had a situation in which all of the countries in the region and non-state actors were all engaged in one war at the same time. This is why this moment in the region is one of great peril.

AO: You mentioned the April attacks and retaliation between Israel and Iran. What can be different this time?

AV: The Iranian response in April to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus was a show of force but it did not establish the kind of deterrence against Israel that Iran was hoping for.

Now, Iran needs to demonstrate its resolve and this is why it has to conduct an attack that is different and incurs a significant degree of damage and casualties. That could change the game. 

It is one thing for Israel to demonstrate a degree of restraint in its response after the massive Iranian retaliatory attack in April since nobody was killed and the damage was limited.

However, this time around, it would be a different thing if Iran and its allies manage to cause significant numbers of fatalities then it would be very difficult for Israel not to respond in an escalatory manner.

At a point like this one, tensions can spiral out of control.

AO: Are you saying it is inevitable that Iran will retaliate?

AV: Iran does not have the option of not retaliating. You know, from the Iranian regime's perspective, not retaliating would be fatal to their command of their national security. For Iran, the regime has to demonstrate to its enemies that they cannot get away with killing its most senior military officer Souleimany in 2020; they cannot get away with bombing Iran's diplomatic facilities around the world like the attack in April in Damascus; they cannot not get away with killing senior Iranian allies like Haniyah in the middle of their capital.

From their perspective, If they allow their enemies to get away with all of this then there would be no limit to how far they can go to undermine the regime.

Not retaliating would send a signal of weakness to opponents at home and abroad and that is something that the Iranian regime cannot live with.

I mean, if Iran does not respond to this attack, they would be seen as incapable of protecting their homeland and their allies. It would undermine Iran's national security and its credibility in a way that would be, from the Iranian regime's perspective, very dangerous.

So Iran has to draw a line against this pattern of Israeli behaviour, and the only way to do it is to retaliate.

Now, there are significant risks associated with retaliation. I think the Iranians are fully aware of the costs and the risks involved in this. But, they simply feel that they have no other option.

To be able to cause damage and casualties, given Israel's defensive capabilities and US support, Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis would have to act in concert. 

AO: Is Iran able to respond in a manner that could achieve its goals this time given how the US jumped to defend Israel back in April?

AV: The reason the Iranian attack in April was defeated was largely because it was highly telegraphed in advance. Iran acted alone and the US and its partners were given enough time to prepare for it.

So, I think this time around three different factors will be in play. 

Iran is unlikely to give 72 hours advance notice as it did last time. It is unlikely to inform the US of what it is exactly going to do. And it is unlikely to act alone.

In April, it took upwards of $1.2 billion and the mobilization in multiple states to defeat the Iranian attack despite its predictability.

This time, Iran will act with an element of surprise. 

An Iranian attack this time around would be larger in scale and would be carried out in concert with their allies in the region. It will also probably be conducted over multiple days and could cause significant damage and casualties in Israel.

Also, this attack is going to be different than the one in April because Iran now sees Israel and the US targeting its "Axis of Resistance" in unison in just one week.

In one week, Israel killed a senior Hezbollah official in the Lebanese capital, assassinated a senior Hamas official in the Iranian capital, and bombed Hudeida in Yemen - and the US bombed Hashd Shabi in Iraq.

Put all of those things together and they warrant, from the Iranian perspective, a joint attack by the members of the "Axis of Resistance" against Israel.

Again, all this means that the risks involved are so much higher this time around. 

AO: Iran said that the assassination of Ismail Hanieyah was carried out through a missile but the Israelis suggested using a planted bomb in a covert intelligence operation. Do these two scenarios change anything in the equation?

AV: We do not have enough empirical evidence to determine what exactly happened. 

One explanation of why Iran insists on the fact that this was by a missile is that a planted bomb scenario implies a degree of deep Israeli intelligence infiltration of the Iranian security apparatus.

Bombs need to be planted and detonated remotely, which requires a presence on the ground and possible infiltration of and collusion from some members of the Revolutionary Guard who were responsible for securing that facility.

A bomb explanation would be highly embarrassing to the Iranians and could have destabilizing effects inside the Iranian national security apparatus.

The Iranians would prefer not to say it was a bomb attack and go for a missile attack because a missile is much more difficult to guard against and would not necessitate any infiltration of their elite Revolutionary Guard.

A covert intelligence operation would not suffice to justify a military response.

Add to this, the Revolutionary Guard do not possess the intelligence capabilities that could allow them to retaliate in kind for a bomb attack on their soil with their bomb attack on Israeli soil.

The only way that the Iranian regime can avenge the Israeli attack on its soil is through military action. And the missile theory allows them to justify it. 

AO: Do you think there is enough evidence to suggest that Israel desires to drag Washington into a direct war with Iran?

AV: It is no secret that Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has wanted for years to fight Iran to the 'last American'. He has been pushing for a US military confrontation with Iran for years.

He also believes that his political survival depends on the continuation of a conflict with Tehran.

For Netanyahu, a vertical escalation in Gaza is no longer possible so he is seeking a horizontal escalation and broadening of this conflict with Iran.

Yes, Israel has every interest in provoking a direct US military confrontation with Iran, a trap that the Iranians have tried to avoid falling in for months.

But now, even if they see the trap, the Iranians believe that the risk of not responding outweighs the risk of responding.

AO: Do you think the Americans are trying to mitigate the situation or did they bless the Israeli assassinations during Netanyahu’s last visit to Washington?

AV: There is certainly an Iranian perception of an American collusion. 

But, I think Netanyahu presented the US with a fait accompli: he did not inform Washington of his plan to assassinate Haniyeh in Tehran apriori.

The Biden administration is now left with limited preemptive options.

On the one hand, Washington lost credibility with the Iranians; it showed weakness through its repeated inability to influence Israeli policy; and it now finds itself in a situation where it cannot deter Tehran from taking escalatory military action.

On the other hand, Washington cannot dissuade Israel from responding to an Iranian retaliation or further escalation.

I think the US is now hoping for the following scenario to play out: Iran would not push too far with its retaliation; Washington would come to Tel Aviv's rescue and take credit for defending Israel against an Iranian attack; and, eventually, Washington would hold Israel back from responding to the Iranian military action in a way that could escalate the situation.

Of course, this is easier said than done. Even in April, a high degree of luck was behind why the situation was contained.

Now, there are only two courses of action available to the US to prevent this situation from spiralling out of control. These two options are a binding UN Security Council resolution for a ceasefire in Gaza, which would give the Iranians a face-saving way out, and a Washington commitment to halt the delivery of offensive weapons to Israel if the Netanyahu government does not comply with that resolution. 

AO: So, you see a way out of this escalation trajectory if there is an immediate ceasefire in Gaza?

AV: I don't think one could stop the Iranian retaliation at this. I think it is inevitable now.

The question is: What would it take to stop further tit-for-tat that would result in an all-out war? I am saying that the ceasefire after the Iranian response could be an effective way of halting this cycle and drawing a line.

I am talking about a ceasefire that comes with a threat of withholding US offensive weapons for Israel because that would affect any Israeli calculations to expand the war.

But, if the US continues to provide Israel with offensive weapons and if the Israelis believe that they have what it takes to expand the war then they will see no reason not to do it.

Image these two possible US responses to a simultaneous attack by the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iran against Israel that causes significant damage and even casualties in Israel.

One, the US says to Israel: "You will get all you need in arms to go and strike Lebanon, strike Iran, strike Yemen, and start a broader war." Israel will do it.

Two, the US says to Israel: "You took a shot. Iran took a shot. It's enough now and if you don't agree to it we will stop arming you."

That would end the cycle of violence. The only thing that would dissuade Israel from perpetuating the cycle of violence is the US pulling the plug on arming it.

The Iranians could save face by saying that nothing in the past ten months - whether it was Egyptian or Qatari mediation or calls from the international community - nothing brought about a binding ceasefire resolution, other than us taking military action.

But, I'm not being naive about it. It appears unlikely that Biden would pursue this track because this is politically costly, especially for a lame-duck administration this close to presidential elections.

AO: So the US would give Israel the green light to do whatever it wants to do?

AV: I don't think it would give Israel a green light, but it would not also give it a red light.