According to news reports last Thursday evening, a joint Egyptian-Qatari-US statement is urging Israel and Hamas to expedite negotiations to finalise a prisoner-exchange agreement and activate a ceasefire framework in the Israeli war on Gaza.

The mediators are sounding the alarm, emphasising that it is time for both sides to adhere to the achievements outlined in the proposals made by US President Joe Biden, which provide for a short-term roadmap to halt the war on Gaza.

These are based on the Egyptian proposals that Cairo has repeatedly presented over the past six months of extended negotiations. The joint statement, indicating Cairo or Doha as potential hosts and suggesting Wednesday or Thursday this week as possible dates for the negotiations, seems to be a political manoeuvre to revive the negotiation process.

The past week has revealed the extent of the damage resulting from the expansion of the Israeli war on Gaza. It has also confirmed that even minimum stability will be threatened should it continue. With the situation moving into critical areas, such as Iran’s response to Israel and the anticipation of a counter-response, the present phase appears to be a lost cause even before it begins. The prospect of a descent into complete chaos is now more imminent than ever.

Tehran is expected to make its military actions more impactful than its previous symbolic attacks, which were manageable as far as the situation in the wider region was concerned. Hizbullah is also expected to contribute effectively, leveraging its potential to establish a new deterrent equation, allowing it to position itself close to Israel’s northern borders, and restoring its political and security stature as this stood before 7 October last year.

However, these assumptions are highly questionable, and their outcomes remain uncertain for each of the parties involved. Consequently, the members of this axis have carefully chosen their roles within the Gaza war, given the complex and intertwined interests of Tehran and Hizbullah in the region and the wider world and their reluctance to jeopardise them.

Meanwhile, the US administration is caught up in problems having to do with personnel, and it has been turning in a performance that has been increasingly feeble and hesitant and has struggled to address the compounded threats to its interests in the region. With the escalating tensions in the Middle East worsening daily, the US administration is seemingly unable even to enforce what is necessary for its own interests.

Last Monday, Biden held a meeting with his National Security team at the White House to discuss developments in the Middle East. Reports indicate that the US believes an Iranian attack on Israel is imminent, and Biden asked his team to outline the parameters for any potential US military intervention, its readiness, and the extent to which Washington might agree to such measures.

In response, Tehran deliberately leaked information about the efforts made by US mediators tasked by Washington to negotiate with Iran to minimise the extent of any Iranian strike and allow Iran to repair its damaged reputation without escalating the conflict to uncontrollable levels. This might explain the sudden issuing of the joint US statement with Egypt and Qatar, alongside a presidential commitment to make an effort with the Israeli side and reconfigure the overall scenario, given the critical developments that have been placing the entire region on edge.

Washington has also turned to the G7 group of countries and sought to leverage the efforts of the major powers to salvage the situation from the “crisis point” created by Israel and Iran. After intense negotiations by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken with his counterparts in the G7, the group issued a statement placing its member states in a position of expected political action in the wake of their individual failures to manage the evolving scenario.

The G7 statement, made by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US, urged all the parties to refrain from perpetuating the current cycle of retaliatory violence, de-escalate tensions, and engage constructively towards de-escalation. Notably absent from it was the fact that Blinken had reached out to these countries due to his belief in an imminent Iranian attack on Israel and the need to put pressure on Tehran to limit its strike as the best way to avoid a regional war.

At the same time, US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin and his Israeli counterpart discussed scenarios and the corresponding defensive and offensive capabilities of the Israeli military in the event of a large- or medium-scale attack from Iran and its regional proxies. Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant openly acknowledged Israel’s heavy reliance on close strategic military coordination with the US, including the current and future deployment of US military capabilities in the region and changes in troop positions to defend Israel.

He explicitly requested US leadership in forming a coalition of allies and partners to defend Israel from anticipated air and missile attacks similar to last April’s attack in which US involvement was a decisive factor in Israel’s defence.

Prior to the issuing of the three-party statement from the mediators last week, during meetings with US intelligence and military leaders including US Central Command General Michael Kurilla, Israel argued that a preemptive strike against Iran would be the best way to respond to or prevent a forthcoming attack. However, at the last possible moment, the US reconsidered and informed Kurilla that Washington would need its own intelligence on this matter and that this would need to align with the intelligence provided by Israel.

Even if the intelligence matched, however, the US might still choose to avoid the option of a preemptive strike on Iran, it said.

The writer is director of the Egyptian Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS).

* A version of this article appears in print in the 15 August, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly