Russia may be trying to take advantage of the instability in the Middle East to counter Western pressures on it in Ukraine, especially now that the US and other Western countries have given Kyiv the green light to use their missiles against targets inside Russia.

Moscow was among the first international capitals to condemn Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran after the inauguration of the new Iranian president and to support Iran’s right to choose how to respond to the violation of its sovereignty.

On 6 August, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu flew to Iran to meet with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iranian security officials. There have also been reports of deliveries of advanced Russian radar and air-defence equipment to the Iranians. As tensions escalate between Tehran and Israel’s Western backers, Moscow has become Tehran’s main source of support, whether to enhance its capacities in the event of a direct clash with Israel or to bolster its deterrence against moves by the US and its regional allies to curb Iran’s regional influence and clip its military wings.

Russia’s relations with the Axis of Resistance have grown closer in recent years. It was remarkable that Moscow hosted a delegation of Hamas officials on 29 October 2023, soon after Israel launched its war on Gaza. The invitation openly defied Israeli pressure to designate Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Moscow has continued to maintain regular communications with the Palestinian resistance organisation at all stages of the present crisis, as it did during all previous confrontations between the Palestinian resistance factions in Gaza and Israel.

Russia’s relations with the Lebanese group Hizbullah have also evolved considerably, which is perhaps natural given that they are both on the same side in the Syrian conflict. Moscow has also refused to designate Hizbullah as a terrorist organisation. The same thing applies to the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement in Yemen. Not only has Russia not designated the Houthis as a terrorist group, it has also allowed them to open a permanent office in Moscow.

However, Moscow’s relations with Tehran are a priority. Maximising these in the form of a close strategic relationship could serve as an ace in Moscow’s hands in its dealings with its Western adversaries and Washington above all, not just in the Middle East region but also in other arenas from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Washington’s so-called backyard in Latin America.

Both Tehran and Moscow enjoy close relations with Venezuela and other left-leaning Latin American countries.

But the strategic relationship works both ways. If Moscow is investing in its relationship with Tehran to strengthen its influence in the Middle East and elsewhere, Tehran sees the need to invest in its relation with Russia as an international power with clout in the UN Security Council and, closer to home, as a power in Syria that could neutralise Israeli operations against Iranian assets in that country and perhaps also be an ally in the event of a full-scale war in the Middle East.

Signalling such hopes, Pezeshkian told Shoigu during the two men’s recent meeting that “Russia is one of the countries that has stood by the Iranian nation in difficult times.” He added that the two countries’ shared positions “in promoting a multipolar world will certainly lead to greater global security and peace”.

However, while Russia does feel it has something to gain from the explosive situation in the Middle East due to the escalation between Iran and its regional proxies and Israel and its US sponsor, and it may also feel that this will strengthen its hand against Washington in the short run or serve more long-range goals related to the development of a new multipolar world order, it is still keen to avert a full-scale war in the region.

Foremost among the reasons for this is that it believes that if Israel succeeds in dragging the West into supporting it in a war against Iran, this will lead to an expansion of the Western presence in the region that would inherently work against Russia’s regional interests, especially in Syria.

An outbreak of a regional war would also impact negatively on Russia’s plans to expand militarily elsewhere in the region. Moscow has recently made considerable inroads in this regard in Sudan, Libya, West Africa, and the Sahel.

Moscow also understands that its ally Iran could be severely weakened in any direct confrontation between it and US-backed Israel. For one thing, Iranian defence capacities would suffer, particularly in military production. From Moscow’s perspective, this would affect its own defence capacities, as it relies on Iran for military drones.

At the same time, if Russia sides with Iran in a potential confrontation with Israel and the West, this might adversely affect Moscow’s relations with the Arab Gulf countries. In addition to being a major source of investment in Russia, they have played a constructive role in the Ukraine crisis by offering to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv to end the ongoing bloodshed and attrition.

Russia does not want tensions with Israel to reach a breaking point. Should a full-scale regional war erupt, Israel would notch up the pressure on Russia to sever its ties, not just with Iran, but also with other groups Israel and the West rank as terrorist organisations, namely Hamas, Hizbullah, and the Houthis. This would put Moscow in a predicament, because as useful as it may find its relations with those groups to be, its relations with Israel are also useful on occasion to ease the US pressures on it.

Certainly, Russian President Vladimir Putin would not find it in his interest to become embroiled in a war he cannot control in the Middle East at this juncture. He has more than enough to worry about with the situation in Ukraine, especially given the additional complications created by the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory in the Kursk region.

In view of the foregoing, Russia will most likely pursue several courses of action.

First, it will try to persuade its ally Tehran to hold off on its retaliation for Israel’s assassination of Haniyeh and violation of its sovereignty. That would give it the opportunity to search for a peaceful settlement to that crisis and ward off an escalatory cycle.

Second, it will use all available forums to blame the West for any escalation in the region. Third, it will avoid taking sides between regional parties as it moves to strengthen its assets in Syria and elsewhere in the region.

In sum, while Russia may benefit to some extent by the current deterioration in the situation in the Middle East, it understands that its long-term interests are better served by working to contain the escalatory trends, especially given the risks they could spiral into a Third World War.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 15 August, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly