How much more suffering can the Palestinians endure? Could their unbearable hardship provoke a backlash against Hamas in Gaza? And at what point might Israel stop tolerating political gains being made from such misery?

Such questions are likely to preoccupy Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his hardline right-wing government more than ceasefires, prisoner exchanges, or hostage releases in the Israeli war on Gaza.

Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who often expresses Netanyahu’s thoughts, declared on Tuesday that the Israeli hostages will only be freed through intense military pressure and the cessation of fuel, food, and humanitarian aid to the Palestinians and not through political deals that he said could lead to further casualties and captives.

As the prospects for a truce between Israel and Hamas grow increasingly dim, despair is spreading among the Palestinians as the humanitarian situation reaches catastrophic levels in Gaza.

Amid severe fuel shortages, particularly in northern Gaza where Israel seeks to limit the return of displaced Palestinians, residents have resorted to burning wooden doors, windows, and even furniture to cook meals or bake bread. The dire conditions illustrate the depth of the crisis, as fuel has become nearly impossible to find in the Strip.

Recent statistics reveal the widespread devastation and human suffering. Since 7 October last year, over 50 per cent of all structures in Gaza have been completely destroyed. Around 360,000 housing units have been damaged, more than five per cent of the population have been killed or injured, and two million people have been displaced.

Essential utilities like electricity, water, and sewage systems are in ruins, leading to severe water contamination and frequent power outages. Almost all the hospitals and healthcare centres in Gaza have been destroyed, leaving the health service on the brink of collapse.

The destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure has led to a collapse of essential services. The electricity grid is nearly nonfunctional, exacerbating problems in hospitals, water treatment facilities, and other critical services. With over 90 per cent of Gaza’s water now unfit for human consumption, the risk of waterborne diseases is alarmingly high.

As law and order break down, crime and chaos have surged. The absence of security exacerbates the suffering, with civilians increasingly vulnerable to violence and exploitation. The insecurity also hampers the efforts of humanitarian agencies, making it even harder to deliver much-needed aid.

Without immediate and sustained intervention, the humanitarian catastrophe will continue to worsen in the Strip, with potentially irreversible consequences for the population – which is exactly what Netanyahu and his government might be seeking.

“Israel is clearly employing a scorched earth policy in Gaza, aiming to force the Palestinians to choose between their land and their lives,” an Arab diplomat told Al-Ahram Weekly.

This strategy hinges on the hope that as conditions become increasingly unbearable, many Gazans might prioritise survival over land, potentially leading to mass emigration with the facilitation of the US and Israel.

The approach aligns with Netanyahu’s long-held belief that Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza was a mistake. He now sees an opportunity to potentially reoccupy parts of Gaza, framing it as a security buffer for Israel. However, Netanyahu’s vision also involves a reduced Gazan population that can be more easily controlled, rather than reoccupying a densely populated territory.

“I don’t believe there will be a truce between Hamas and Israel because Netanyahu has done everything to prevent one. His plans for Gaza rely on continuing the war, even if there are no buildings left to bomb. The focus now is not on infrastructure but on the people, as he aims to kill and displace as many Palestinians from Gaza as possible,” the Arab diplomat said.

Adding to the controversy, former US president Donald Trump recently suggested that Israel, being a small country, might explore ways to acquire “more land.” The remark, made after Netanyahu’s recent visit to the US, sparked concerns as it appears to legitimise the idea of Israeli territorial expansion, a highly sensitive issue in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

While Trump’s statement might have seemed offhand, it could have been made deliberately and been influenced by discussions with Netanyahu during the two men’s recent meeting.

Using suffering as a political tool is a longstanding practice in warfare. For centuries, strategies like starvation, infrastructure destruction, and deprivation have been employed to create humanitarian crises, pressuring opponents to concede or to achieve strategic goals.

Such an approach weakens populations, forces displacement, and alters political or demographic landscapes. Examples include sieges and targeting civilian infrastructure, which cause severe hardship, drive people to flee or submit, and erode public support for governing authorities, leading to demands for an end to the conflict or a change in leadership.

While international law and humanitarian organisations condemn such tactics, the politics of despair nevertheless persists. In the current conflict between Israel and Hamas, this approach seems to be playing a role, and Israel’s use of despair as a weapon may serve immediate goals, such as forcing Hamas into difficult choices during truce negotiations.

However, it also has more dangerous, long-term objectives. Netanyahu’s reluctance to reach a ceasefire with Hamas is rooted in both strategic and political considerations. He views the ongoing military campaign in Gaza as essential for Israel’s long-term security, believing that a ceasefire would allow Hamas to regroup and rearm.

His government argues that the only way to ensure Israel’s safety is to decisively weaken or eliminate Hamas, which requires continued military operations.

Politically, Netanyahu benefits from maintaining a hardline stance, especially among his base and the extreme nationalist right in Israel. These groups support the idea of continuing the war until Hamas is significantly weakened or eradicated, arguing that any concession or ceasefire could be seen as a victory for the group, undermining Israel’s deterrence and emboldening other hostile actors in the region.

Moreover, the extreme nationalist right in Israel believes that the ongoing conflict could indirectly serve its broader agenda by making life in Gaza untenable. The intense military pressure and destruction could push many Palestinians to consider emigration, reducing Gaza’s population and weakening the Palestinian presence.

This aligns with the Israeli extreme right’s vision of securing Israel as a Jewish state with a stronger demographic balance in favour of Jewish citizens. It sees the continuing war as a way to reshape the demographics and political future of Gaza.

While the ceasefire talks continue in public, secret discussions about Gaza’s post-war future have also taken place, including a recent meeting in Abu Dhabi with officials from the UAE, Israel, and US Ambassador to the UAE Lana Nusseibeh, according to an article in the UK newspaper The Financial Times.

The meeting proposed an international mission in Gaza to address the humanitarian crisis and establish governance, with the UAE possibly contributing troops, it said. The Biden administration is facing challenges in convincing its Arab allies to support any such plan, as they want to see it lead to a two-state solution, a stance rejected by Netanyahu.

Separating the truce negotiations involving the US, Israel, Egypt, and Qatar from discussions about post-war arrangements between the US, Israel, and the UAE is “illogical,” according to the Arab diplomat.

“These issues are deeply interconnected,” he said.

But the artificial division seems to be designed to obscure Netanyahu’s true intentions regarding Gaza. By treating these things as separate matters, the broader strategy and long-term goals may be concealed, avoiding the scrutiny they could face if considered together.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 22 August, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly