The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) made a remarkable breakthrough on 6 August. Through a cross-border incursion, they captured a significant chunk of territory in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, as well as some small settlements in eastern Ukraine.

Taking advantage of these gains, the UAF attempted to consolidate a bridgehead inside Russia with a view to wreaking attrition on the Russian war machine. For the purposes of this operation, which took place over two years after the Russian invasion, the UAF used US-made HIMARS missile systems and drones to strike bridges and, later, pontoon bridges erected by the Russians to replace them. 

The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk caught Russia off-guard and caused considerable embarrassment to the Russian military command and to President Vladimir Putin. However, within a couple of weeks, the Russians managed to rally, reformulating their strategy and at least stabilising the situation in Kursk. 

If one of the aims of the Kursk offensive was to force Russia to shift troops away from the Donetsk front in eastern Ukraine, where Russian forces have been steadily gaining ground, that did not work.

The Russian forces have continued to advance along that front, the main focus of the current phase of Russian operations. Most recently, on 29 August, Russia managed to seize three more towns in eastern Ukraine, two on the Donetsk front and one on the Kharkiv front. 

Many military observers believe that Russia’s incremental advances in eastern Ukraine more than compensate for the Kursk crisis and once again establish the rules of engagement in Moscow’s favour. This is borne out by the fact that, since the UAF have been unable to score further victories since the 6 August blitz. It also helps to explain Kyiv’s appeal for help from the West and the list that Ukrainian President Zelensky submitted to the Biden administration containing targets he would like to strike inside Russia, for which Ukraine would need more financial and material support.

Experts also attribute the Russian Armed Forces’ success at halting the UAF’s advance into Kursk to their adaptability and ability to switch tactics. For example, the RAF have begun to launch their periodic air strikes across Ukraine in the morning instead of at night. More personnel and equipment are located at the targeted sites in the morning. 

Another aspect of Russia’s new tactic is its countrywide launch of air strikes against Ukrainian military installations and electrical power facilities in Ukraine, using a whole array of high-precision missiles, including Iskander cruise missiles and hypersonic Kinzhal ballistic missiles fired from air and sea. Some of the strikes homed in on heavy military hardware gifted by the US and its allies, such as HIMARS rocket launchers, as well as Ukrainian weapons manufacturing facilities.  

Rather than the Russian forces suffering from attrition, let alone Ukraine turning the tables on Russia, it appears that Russia will continue with the progress it has been making on the ground. Ukraine, on the other hand, must scramble to repair its degrading power and other infrastructures that are vital to the operations of its military industrial facilities. President Zelensky has acknowledged that the Ukrainian energy sector has sustained severe damage and is in critical difficulty. 

Other bad news for Ukraine comes from Germany, which announced that it would halve its financial assistance to Ukraine in 2025. Berlin is the second largest supporter of Kyiv after the US. Germany faces economic pressure as a result of the impact of sharply rising energy prices on its industrial sector, and these strains have been aggravating the mounting political polarisation in the country. The government has therefore been forced to reassess its economic strategy and trim expenses, entailing a reduction in military support to allies. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his Finance Minister Christian Lindner, who represent two of the three parties of the ruling “traffic light coalition”, have agreed to cap assistance to Ukraine at four billion euros in 2025 and not to furnish further support for the remainder of the year. In effect, this means halting funding for the IRIS-T anti-aircraft system that Germany supplied to Ukraine, as well as for ammunition and drones, which Kyiv desperately needs.  

Electoral calculations are most likely a factor in the cutbacks in Germany. But ongoing support for Ukraine is an electoral issue throughout Europe as well as in the US, which is headed for elections in November.

In Europe, opposition forces are pushing harder for a political settlement that will end the war in Ukraine, largely because of the drain it constitutes on economies already been rocked by the Covid-19 pandemic. France is in crisis after Macron’s party lost the recent election, and controversy rages over the process of forming a new government. Britain has experienced an outbreak of far-right rioting reflecting mounting racism and xenophobia related to the immigration issue. But there, too, economic strains play a part. In Italy, the government is focused on fighting illegal immigration from the south while extending a hand eastward for economic cooperation, which was the purpose of Prime Minister Meloni’s visit to China this summer. 

In general, European capitals are signalling the inclination to significantly reduce their support for Kyiv or, at least, focus more on domestic concerns and crises. Lending weight to this shift is the growing conviction among Western military and political officials that it is impossible to turn around the situation on the ground and inflict a definitive defeat against Russia. Naturally, this will benefit Russia and its military operation in Ukraine. Perhaps Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban heralded the direction of European policy on Ukraine back in January, when he blocked a $55 billion package of additional financial aid that the EU was going to provide to Ukraine. 

* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 September, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly