A central question is occupying the minds of Hamas leaders: what are the options for the movement if the truce negotiations with Israel collapse?

This question also resonates far beyond Hamas, as it is a concern for Israel, the US, and regional mediators Egypt and Qatar, as well as neighbouring countries like Jordan and Lebanon.

Iran and its allies in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria are also closely watching. Most critically, it is a matter of deep concern for the Palestinians in Gaza.

“You’d have to be very optimistic to believe we are close to a truce agreement. The political landscape shows no signs of an imminent ceasefire. The Netanyahu government clearly does not want one and is doing everything in its power to block that option, while the US administration is entirely incapable of exerting pressure,” an Arab diplomatic source in London familiar with the talks told Al-Ahram Weekly.

Several deeply ingrained factors make optimism unrealistic, chief among them the fundamental nature of the conflict.

For Israel, the survival of Hamas as a political and military force in Gaza would be a strategic defeat, making a ceasefire that leaves Hamas intact unacceptable for the right-wing government in Israel.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains unwavering in his strategy for Gaza and resisting widespread protests calling for a hostage deal. He insists the war will only end when Hamas no longer governs Gaza, and he refuses to withdraw troops from key areas like the Gaza-Egypt border, one of the main stumbling blocks in the negotiations.

Netanyahu’s hardline stance is shaped by Israel’s polarised political climate. His support base is deeply rooted in a security-first agenda.

A ceasefire could weaken his standing among his right-wing supporters and embolden political opponents who advocate tougher military action. Therefore, Netanyahu has little incentive to engage in the negotiations, especially when Israel’s military strategy focuses on degrading Hamas’ infrastructure and leadership.

Netanyahu has downplayed the chances of a breakthrough, while blaming Hamas for changing the terms of any agreement, something Hamas firmly denies.

For Hamas, after enduring an Israeli bombing campaign that has killed around 50,000 Palestinians in Gaza since October last year, its leaders say they cannot simply agree to a temporary truce for the exchange of hostages and prisoners without solid guarantees from the US and regional powers.

These guarantees would have to ensure Israel’s complete withdrawal from Gaza, the unhindered return of displaced Palestinians, and the free passage of humanitarian aid. Without such assurances, Hamas sees agreeing to a truce as political suicide.

“Netanyahu believes he has much to lose if he agrees to a truce that doesn’t meet all his conditions and demands. However, Hamas leaders think that they have even more to lose if they accept a subpar deal. Agreeing to a truce on Israel’s terms, backed by the US, could mark the beginning of the end for Hamas as a political and military force, potentially leading to the reoccupation of Gaza by Israel,” the Arab diplomatic source told the Weekly.

“The Hamas leaders are telling mediators: no deal is better than a bad deal,” he added.

Amid this deadlock, the US military is preparing for the potential collapse of the ceasefire talks, concerned that the failure of the negotiations could ignite a wider regional conflict. General Charles Q Brown, chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has expressed concerns about how regional actors might react to a failed truce, fearing miscalculations and further escalation.

Though the Biden administration views the talks as crucial for preventing a broader war, they remain stalled on critical issues.  

Amid clear signals from Iran and Hizbullah that they are not poised to initiate a major regional war to relieve the pressure on Hamas or to increase the pressure on Israel to accept a truce, Hamas is now compelled to consider long-term strategies for a protracted war of attrition with Israel.

While it is unlikely that Hamas will be able to return to rule Gaza in the same capacity as before 7 October any time soon, the group has strategic options for continuing its operations, potentially shifting back to its roots as an underground armed resistance movement.

This approach could see Hamas employ asymmetric warfare, including rocket attacks, guerrilla tactics, and ambushes, to exhaust Israel militarily, economically, and politically.

This strategy could be seen as a long-term effort to make Israel’s continued presence in Gaza a burden, similar to the conditions that forced it to withdraw in 2005. At that time, Israel’s military occupation of the territory had become too costly, not only in terms of military resources, but also due to political and economic pressures.

Hamas may hope to replicate this outcome by focusing on inflicting sustained damage on Israel’s military forces, infrastructure, and civilian morale.

As has been seen in many asymmetric conflicts, a smaller, more agile force can inflict disproportionate damage on a larger one by focusing on psychological and political objectives rather than purely military ones.

While Hamas’ military and logistical infrastructure has suffered significant damage, the group remains intact. According to Hamas sources, the organisation has already begun reorganising its ranks in Gaza, with approximately 3,000 new fighters volunteering to join its military wing.

Hamas’ recruitment efforts highlight its ability to maintain local support despite the hardships caused by the war. This is crucial for sustaining the movement, as it shows the group can still rally fighters and maintain a base of operations within the Gazan population.

Underground resistance groups, like those Hamas has operated in the past, often rely on mobility, secrecy, and local support to exploit their opponent’s vulnerabilities. Historically, Hamas has operated under harsh conditions with limited resources and international isolation, yet it has managed to remain resilient.

The strategy of a prolonged war of attrition against Israel also benefits Hamas’ allies in Iran and Lebanon. While no one desires a large-scale regional conflict, Iran, Hizbullah, and the broader resistance axis are prepared to support Hamas in resisting Israeli actions in Gaza.

According to Arab diplomatic sources in London, Hamas leaders have indicated their readiness for a protracted confrontation if necessary.

A prolonged war of attrition against Israel could boost Hamas’ popularity among Palestinians, but it is not without risks. Gaza faces severe humanitarian crises, and an extended conflict could exacerbate civilian suffering, potentially weakening Hamas’ control or provoking internal dissent.

Additionally, there are questions about military capacity. While Hamas has operated successfully in a highly constrained environment, maintaining sufficient military capabilities in the face of Israeli air and ground superiority is challenging. Israel’s blockade and targeted strikes on infrastructure make sustaining a prolonged conflict more difficult.

Considering all these factors, Hamas leaders are likely to be weighing the military, political, and humanitarian costs of a continued conflict against the potential benefits of securing better terms in the ceasefire negotiations.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 September, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly