This week Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan unexpectedly announced he may invite the Syrian president to visit Turkey at any given moment. Ankara appears to have the aspiration to reestablish diplomatic ties with Damascus after all. Relations between the two countries had lapsed in 2011 due to Turkey’s condemnation of the violence with which the Syrian regime suppressed the popular uprising.

Erdogan’s remarks, which stirred local reactions, threw the ball in Syria’s playfield and quelled the voices of the Turkish opposition, particularly those who have long accused him of accommodating around three million Syrian refugees and dismantling previously strategic relations with Damascus.

But Damascus did not welcome Erdogan’s statements so readily, outlining prerequisites for the restoration of relations. The Syrian Foreign Ministry stated that the withdrawal of Turkish forces “illegally present” in Syrian territory and combatting “terrorist groups”, including opposition factions, are the core pillars of any potential effort to “reform relations”. The ministry added, “any such initiative must be founded on clear principles to ensure the desired outcome of reinstating bilateral relations to their pre-2011 state.”

Russia, Syria’s foremost ally, has been endorsing and facilitating the reconciliation process for some time. Maria Zakharova, the spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, conveyed Moscow’s welcoming of normalisation efforts between Turkey and Syria, acknowledging the “important strides” Turkey took in recent days. Russian media sources pointed to Russia’s rejection of Bashar Al-Assad’s proposal for a four-party meeting that would include, besides Turkey and Syria, Russia and Iran.

A few days later, however, Al-Assad softened the Syrian position, informing the Syrian People’s Assembly that Damascus had not made the withdrawal of Turkish forces a prerequisite for talks. He also said that previous negotiations had not yielded tangible results, expressing his willingness to continue discussions on condition that Syria’s core demands are met. Those include upholding sovereignty, combatting terrorism, and addressing refugee repatriation.

Erdogan, the seasoned statesman, was careful to make it clear that Turkey’s readiness to normalise relations with Damascus is not unconditional. The Turkish media had previously announced four prerequisites for restoring Turkish-Syrian relations to their pre-2011 status: purging Syria of terrorists (read Kurdish separatist forces); fostering genuine national reconciliation; advancing the political process with a new constitution in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254; and establishing an environment conducive to the safe and dignified return of refugees.

The disparities between the two nations are vast. Syria is incapable and unwilling to fulfil any of Turkey’s conditions. It staunchly opposes the political process imposed by Resolution 2254 and resists the notion of drafting a new constitution. It is rigid regarding engaging with or granting amnesty to the Syrian opposition, a key element within Turkey’s concept of “comprehensive national reconciliation”. It also lacks the ability to diminish the influence of US-supported Kurdish separatist forces in northeastern Syria.

On the other hand, Turkey stands firm against abiding by any Syrian conditions. It has reiterated that it will not withdraw its troops from Syrian soil as long as the Kurdish rebels of the “Syrian Democratic Forces,” who are affiliated with the terrorist-designated Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party, pose a threat to Turkish national security. The Adana Agreement, Ankara points out, permits the Turkish military to penetrate deep into Syria in the event of security concerns.

Turkey will not easily disband the military forces of the opposition Syrian National Army, either. They play a pivotal role in safeguarding northwestern Syria in collaboration with Turkish forces. And it is unwilling to forsake the Syrian opposition institutions headquartered on its territory without a definitive political resolution, as such an action could incite discontent among the three million Syrian refugees in Turkey.

This was confirmed when Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said the Turkish government and Erdogan have not changed their position on Syrian refugees: “We have stood against terrorism alongside the National Army for many years and will continue to support it.”

It would be naïve to expect a meeting between Erdogan and Al-Assad to herald an immediate resolution to all issues, but such a meeting could be a step towards mitigating animosity between the two leaders. It is plausible that both parties might consider facilitating certain mutually beneficial economic matters, establishing mechanisms to address logistical challenges that impact economic activities through Syria. But discussions pertaining to military, security, and political dimensions may be deferred.

Syrian political analyst Said Muqbil told Al-Ahram Weekly, “Turkey is unlikely to acquiesce to the conditions set by the Syrian regime. Turkey upholds a stringent and transparent policy concerning its national security interests, with no room for compromise. The withdrawal of Turkish forces from the territories under its control in northern Syria is improbable in the near or medium term.”

He added, “Turkey has conducted cross-border operations to counter the terrorist threats posed by Kurdish separatist forces. The Syrian regime cannot offer Turkey a viable solution in this regard, as it neither commands these Kurdish forces nor can it effectively restrain them. Additionally, Turkey is apprehensive about dealing with these forces due to their US backing.”

Muqbil noted that “the step taken by Erdogan is a symbolic gesture rather than a concrete action, signalling to the global community and Russia his willingness to engage in this process. However, implementing his conditions, which he is resolute on not relinquishing, are currently unfeasible.”

The Turkish media has cautioned that withdrawing Turkish forces from northern Syria and relinquishing control of the borders to the forces of the Syrian regime, armed opposition groups, and Kurdish groups could lead to prolonged security conflicts detrimental to Turkey’s interests.

Badr Jamous, the head of the oppositional Syrian Negotiating Commission, told the Weekly, “Turkey’s conditions for normalising relations with Syria, particularly the pursuit of a political resolution aligned with UN Resolution 2254, are crucial for safeguarding Turkey’s national security, countering terrorism, and facilitating a safe and humane repatriation process for millions of refugees.”

He stated that “Turkey shares with us the belief that a political solution in Syria, in accordance with UN resolutions such as the Geneva Statement and Resolution 2254, is the sole sustainable approach to ensuring security and justice. We share strategic relations, with ongoing coordination and consultation, as well as a shared commitment to ending the Syrian conflict by adhering to and strictly implementing international resolutions.”

In a broader context, a key constant is the anticipated weakening of Iranian influence in the region, which is in the interest of both Russia and Turkey. Discussions surrounding a potential meeting between Erdogan and Al-Assad in August generated speculation about possible locations such as Baghdad, the Syrian-Turkish border, or Ankara. However, until now there are no prospects for such a meeting in the foreseeable future. Without adequate preparation and the right circumstances, such a meeting would amount to a superficial diplomatic formality devoid of substance, however. All sides may also be awaiting the results of US elections, the better to gauge the future role of the US in the region before committing to any agreements.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 September, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly