Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian made his first official visit abroad since taking office on 11-13 September, to Iraq. He toured several cities as well as the autonomous Kurdistan region, demonstrating improved relations between Tehran and Erbil. Iraq, home to a significant number of Iran-aligned militias, is a major platform for strengthening Iran’s regional role.
The visit takes place against a tense regional and international backdrop shaped, most immediately, by the repercussions of Israel’s ongoing war on Gaza. There remains the potential for another direct clash between Iran and Israel in retaliation for Israel’s assassination of the late head of Hamas’ political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, on 31 July in Tehran, where Haniyeh was attending Pezeshkian’s inauguration. Tensions remain high between Tehran and the US-led West, which is concerned that, given closer Iranian-Iraqi cooperation, growing cooperation between Iran and North Korea might have an impact on regional security. Within Iraq itself, political forces are still engaged in an ongoing debate over a US-Iraqi agreement on the withdrawal of US-led coalition forces from Iraq, with some factions seeing this as an important step towards sovereignty and independence and others arguing that it will open the way to greater Iranian influence through its militias.
This may explain the timing of Pezeshkian’s visit. Baghdad has been trying to distance itself from its role as a battleground for Western-Iranian conflict. This is an important component of Prime Minister Mohamed Shia’ Al-Sudani’s vision for securing Iraqi stability. To this end, Al-Sudani hopes to restructure bilateral relations with Washington towards a strategic partnership that would respect Iraqi independence. However, his task has been complicated by Iran-aligned groups targeting US interests in Iraq and elsewhere in response to Washington’s support for Israel.
At the same time, mounting tensions among Iraqi Shia factions may have contributed to the timing of the Iranian presidential visit, given how these factions form the basis of Iranian influence in Iraq. The tensions are coming to a head as former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki pushes for early elections in an attempt to curtail Al-Sudani’s growing influence. Iraqi parliamentary elections are currently scheduled for 2025.
Pezeshkian’s decision to include Iraqi Kurdistan in his visit has a range of domestic and regional reasons. The Iranian president appears determined to put relations with Erbil on a new footing, overcoming some deep disagreements over the years, especially with regards to Iranian-Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan since the 1980s. But the Iranian president may also be eyeing Turkish competition in that region. Ankara, which also has security issues with Kurdish groups based in Iraq, has recently signed an array of security agreements with Baghdad, enabling it to strengthen its presence in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Tehran hopes to achieve a number of objectives. First, it aims to strengthen its resilience against pressures from adversaries, especially Washington and Tel Aviv. Both are pushing for heavier sanctions to curb its nuclear programme by crippling its economy. They are also working together to ward off an Iranian retaliatory strike in response to the assassination of Haniyeh. Secondly, Tehran wants to undermine Al-Sudani’s current drive to steer his course to stronger and more balanced relations with Washington and away from the close alignment with Iran that hardline Iraqi Shia factions have been pushing for. Thirdly, the presidential visit is intended to send a message to Tehran’s proxies in Iraq that Iran is behind them and able to neutralise pressures against them. It simultaneously directs a message to the US and other Western powers that their pressures will not prevent Tehran from pursuing its national interests by strengthening its cooperative relations with regional allies while building an opposition front against the US.
It is no coincidence that Pezeshkian’s visit to Iraq comes right after France, Britain, and Germany, joined by the US, announced a new raft of sanctions against Iran for allegedly delivering ballistic missiles to Moscow. In a joint statement released by the German Foreign Ministry, the three European countries stated that the transfer presented “a direct threat to European security” and represented “a substantive material escalation” by Iran and Russia. The three countries vowed to take “immediate steps to cancel bilateral air services agreements with Iran” and “work towards imposing sanctions on Iran air.” Tehran denied the allegations and condemned “positions and actions that represent a continuation of the West’s hostile policy against the Iranian people.”
In shoring up relations with Iran’s neighbour, Pezeshkian could partially mitigate the impact of further sanctions. Iraq is the second largest destination for Iranian exports and the volume of bilateral trade reached $12 billion by the end of the first half of 2024. Clearly Iraq is an economic lifeline in the face of the decades-long siege of Western sanctions.
While in Baghdad, Pezeshkian encouraged the rapid implementation of cooperation projects which have picked up pace again after being on hold for years. One of the projects is the Shalamcheh-Basra railway, which promises to enhance Iraq’s overland communications with Iran and encourage tourism.
Given all of the above, it is understandable that Pezeshkian should make Iraq his first visit abroad. Iraq is pivotal to Tehran’s relations with its regional environment and an essential bulwark against Western plans targeting its interests.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 19 September, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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