The assassination of Hizbullah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and the Israeli attack on Lebanon will have far-reaching consequences for Syria as well. The Syrian regime, long a key ally and partner of Hizbullah, second only to Iran, is poised for multifaceted repercussions that could alter the dynamics in the country.

Syria is sharply divided in its reactions to Nasrallah’s killing, with two distinct camps emerging: the regime and the opposition. Joining the opposition are the people who have suffered from Hizbullah’s actions during its 13-year presence to support the Syrian regime, which Hizbullah has consistently justified by branding these groups “terrorist” to legitimise its violence.

The Syrian opposition welcomed the elimination of a man they view as the leader of a sectarian and murderous militia. Statements from various opposition political forces reflected their belief that Hizbullah not only devastated Lebanon but also played a key role in Syria’s destruction. They called for an end to its interference, urging Hizbullah to refocus its efforts on Lebanon and its Arab identity, to sever its ties with Iran, end its bloody support for the Syrian regime, and devote itself to the protection of the Lebanese people, the reconstruction of Lebanon, and its future.

Badr Jamous, head of the Syrian Negotiating Commission, expressed the view of a substantial portion of the Syrian opposition, stating, “the death of Hassan Nasrallah is a blow to the Syrian and Iranian regimes. It is an opportunity to reinvigorate efforts to resist Iranian influence in Syria and the region, enhancing the prospects for peace and stability, which the people of this region desperately yearn for.”

He added: “As Syrians, our hearts go out to the innocent civilians in Lebanon who are suffering from Israeli aggression, but we also hope that Hizbullah will recognise that its militias will not bring peace to either Syria or Lebanon. Hizbullah must realise that the time has come to cease meddling in the affairs of other nations and remain within Lebanon’s borders, to prevent the region from becoming a theatre of endless conflict.”

The second group consists of the Syrian regime and its loyalists, who expressed deep sorrow and a fervent call for Hizbullah to avenge Nasrallah’s death against Israel. The state media dedicated extensive coverage to events in Lebanon, and Syria officially declared a period of mourning. However, this group also voiced criticism of Iran, accusing it of betrayal and blaming it for its failure to support Hamas and Hizbullah. Some criticisms suggest Iran may have “sold out” Hizbullah to Israel in exchange for concessions in its nuclear negotiations with the US. Doubts have since emerged regarding the credibility of Iran’s commitments to the Axis of Resistance, which includes Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

The repercussions of Nasrallah’s assassination extend far beyond popular sentiment and media coverage. They are beginning to manifest in more tangible ways, signalling shifts in the military dynamics of the region, including Syria. Hizbullah, which has endured the loss of thousands of fighters and many of its top leaders through targeted assassinations, is now witnessing a decline in its influence in Syria. Its role as a powerful, uncontrollable militia that has long propped up the Syrian regime in its fight against the opposition has diminished.

Particularly striking is the Syrian regime’s military inaction since the Israeli war on Gaza started last year. Despite being a longstanding ally of Hizbullah, Syria has maintained a neutral stance on the ground, refraining from any direct response to Israeli strikes — even when those strikes targeted Hizbullah positions and Iranian hubs in Damascus and other Syrian governorates. Instead, the regime has limited its reactions to verbal condemnations and media campaigns denouncing Israeli aggression.

This silence from Damascus has been linked by many analysts to serious warnings from Israel, reportedly delivered through Russia during President Bashar Al-Assad’s visit to Moscow in July, that Syria should remain neutral in the conflict. Israel made it clear that any involvement by Damascus could prompt expanded Israeli military operations against Syrian targets, which would plunge Syria into a broader conflict the regime would be unable to handle.

Israel, currently refraining from opening a front in southern Syria against Hizbullah and Iranian centres, has expressed concern regarding the presence of tens of thousands of fighters in the Syrian Golan, alongside the influx of thousands Iraqi fighters loyal to Iran into the region. This raises the possibility that Israel may initiate military action in southern Syria to eliminate these groups, which the Syrian regime has permitted to establish a considerable presence in the area.

Political analyst Said Muqbil stated, “it is improbable that the Syrian regime would sacrifice Hizbullah to protect itself, as Hizbullah is one of its most prominent allies. Al-Assad relies on Hizbullah to support his regime, and abandoning it would mean relinquishing a vital ally that has previously helped the regime avoid collapse. Additionally, many leaders within the army and security apparatus are loyal to Iran and would resist any move to abandon their Shiite ally, in addition to the fact that such a decision could lead to internal divisions within the regime.”

Muqbil explained that “Al-Assad needs Iran’s backing and cannot afford to forsake one of Iran’s critical arms at this juncture. Nonetheless, it is likely that he is facing pressures and threats communicated to him from Israel through Russia, compelling him to adopt positions that may be interpreted as concessions. While these concessions might provide him with immediate protection, they weaken his political and military standing. Ultimately, Al-Assad may find himself with a single ally, Russia. The problem is that Russia can support the Syrian regime politically, but it cannot offer field support due to the absence of the necessary ground forces.”

The current Israeli silence should not be interpreted as Syria being excluded from the equation. From Israel’s perspective, Syria has played a significant role in facilitating Hizbullah’s growth and expansion. It has opened its borders and airports for the transfer of Iranian weapons to Lebanon, provided logistical and military support, and allowed Iran to operate freely within its territory. In fact, Al-Assad has effectively transformed Syria into the 35th province of Iran, a claim previously made by Iranian leaders.

Two days after Nasrallah’s assassination, Israel expanded its targeting operations, bombing sites along the Syrian-Lebanese border and assassinating members of Hizbullah in Syria. It also conducted air strikes in the countryside west of Damascus where it is believed meetings were held between Iranian leaders, Hizbullah officials, and Syrian officials. This means Israel believes that Syrian and Lebanese territories could potentially serve as a single arena for its military operations at any moment.

The Israeli war on Lebanon has far-reaching implications for Syria, creating military and political tensions and leading to humanitarian consequences. The war has resulted in a greater influx of refugees into Syria, exacerbating the strain on already limited resources and infrastructure. This is particularly concerning given Syria’s fragile economy and the scarcity of basic amenities such as electricity, water, and healthcare. This will probably pose an additional burden on the Syrian regime, which may appeal for international aid and donations to mitigate these pressures.

There is no doubt the Syrian regime finds itself in a precarious position, with Al-Assad caught between a rock and a hard place: either compel Hizbullah and Iran to withdraw from Syria or face collapse. These are not merely diplomatic overtures but direct military ultimatums. Should Al-Assad opt for the expulsion of Iran and Hizbullah, his regime would likely disintegrate more rapidly than anticipated, paving the way for the opposition and its allies.

It is difficult to predict the path Al-Assad will take. His silence will not suffice for Israel, which seeks action on the ground to curtail Hizbullah and Iran’s influence, and will not be easily misled by any Syrian manoeuvres. The fate of Syria’s political landscape remains foggy. Will the Syrian regime seek to dismantle the Iranian project on its land, or will that very project lead to the Syrian regime’s demise?

* A version of this article appears in print in the 3 October, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly