A few months after the end of the October 1973 War, Egyptian political scientist Mohamed Sid-Ahmed published his pioneering book After the Guns Fall Silent. The book envisioned a Middle East free of wars, where political conflicts would be resolved, and the nations of the region, both Arab and Jewish, would engage in developmental cooperation for the prosperity of all its peoples.
Sid-Ahmed belonged to a group of communists who accepted the 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine, believing that it would resolve nationalist conflicts and open the door to peace, development, and prosperity. Did the Arabs miss a valuable opportunity by not embracing this option, or was the actual outcome inevitable, as Arab acceptance of the Partition Plan in 1947 may have been a utopian fantasy detached from reality?
The vision Sid-Ahmed proposed in 1974 was also disconnected from the complex realities of the Middle East. Some 50 years after the book’s publication, the region has neither prospered nor cooperated, and the sound of guns continues to reverberate across its land.
Conflict in the Middle East has persisted throughout the past half century, and no one dares to imagine what might happen when the guns finally fall silent, as they have never done yet. Instead of discussing what might follow the cessation of all conflicts in the region, we are now speaking about “the day after” as part of an attempt to think about what might happen after the current round of violence ends, not after all conflicts are resolved.
“The day after” is a neutral expression that neither foretells war nor peace. It simply considers the questions raised by the trajectories and outcomes of the latest round of conflict. These questions vary from one country to another. There are Lebanese, Iranian, Israeli, and wider Arab questions. But above all, there are Palestinian questions, some of which I will attempt to explore here.
The intensity of military confrontations in Gaza may decrease, but we will not reach a state of peace and stability. For Palestinians, “the day after” refers to the day when the fighting subsides, but the attainment of a final settlement seems unlikely. Nothing will be final in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for many generations to come.
The most pressing question regarding “the day after” concerns Hamas, the movement that triggered the current wave of violence with its 7 October attacks on Israel last year. What is the nature of the internal discussions now taking place among Hamas leaders? How do they assess their experiences over the past year?
If Hamas could turn back the clock, would it still carry out the 7 October attacks? If another similar opportunity arises in the future, will the movement seize it again, or has the experience of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation last 7 October made them hesitant to repeat it?
What scenarios did the leaders behind the 7 October attacks envision? To what extent did their plans align with what actually transpired? I believe there is a gap between the leadership’s calculations and the real-world outcomes. Where did this gap originate? What mistakes were made? What did the leaders fail to anticipate? Was the failure in planning due to a lack of knowledge, organisational shortcomings, or ideological biases that produced a distorted view of reality?
Can Palestinian society endure further pressures from war and conflict, or do Palestinians, especially in Gaza, require a period of healing to rebuild the social fabric torn apart by war, displacement, and the tens of thousands of dead and injured?
Does Hamas still seek to liberate all of Mandatory Palestine, from the River to the Sea, or has it come to realise the necessity of accepting a compromise that allows for the division of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish? If Hamas’s convictions regarding the goals of the Palestinian national struggle have shifted, and it now believes in a compromise solution, is the movement prepared to openly declare this within the framework of a new strategy for that struggle?
But what is the value of lowering expectations and seeking compromises when Israel has abandoned moderation, seeking to gain everything while leaving the Palestinians with nothing? Has the window for compromise in Palestine closed? Have we passed the time when a compromise was possible, leaving the Palestinians with no choice but to continue armed resistance, even if it leads nowhere?
How do Hamas’ leaders evaluate the different methods of struggle? Do they still view armed struggle as the only path to achieving Palestinian national objectives? If the Palestinians were to abandon armed resistance, could non-violent methods of struggle bring them closer to realising their national goals?
What is the nature of the relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA)? Will Hamas continue its efforts to weaken the authority and to replace it, or will the lessons of war prompt Hamas to adopt a more united approach that values Palestinian national unity?
What about the PA itself, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people? Could it have acted in such a way as to prevent the Palestinian struggle from reaching the present deadlock? How can the central role of the PA in the national struggle be restored, and how can the Palestinian people once again rally around it? Will this require reforms, greater openness to Palestinian political and civil society, or a rebalancing between the demands of governance and the imperatives of national struggle?
The Palestinian national movement is now tasked with rebuilding itself, as the achievements gained over 70 years of struggle are in danger of being lost.
The writer is a senior advisor at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 10 October, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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