There are numerous approaches that can aid in elucidating the ongoing military escalation in the region, which began with the Gaza war, extended to the West Bank, and has now spread to southern Lebanon, with its repercussions reaching Syria, Yemen, and the Red Sea. The possibility of its expansion to Iran cannot be dismissed.
In this article, I will confine myself to presenting a set of determinants that may help in interpreting certain aspects of this complex situation.
The first determinant concerns the far-right faction currently steering the Israeli government. This faction does not perceive the events of last 7 October as a “catastrophe” for Israel, but rather as an “opportunity” to achieve broader goals that transcend mere retaliation against Hamas.
Orit Strock, the Israeli minister of settlement affairs and a prominent figure within this group, referred to the present moment as a “miraculous time”. In a conversation with a group of settlers, she emphasised how easy it now has become for her and her fellow extreme-right-wing ministers to authorise and fund additional Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and displace rural Palestinian communities.
Bezalel Smotrich, the Israeli minister of finance and leader of the Religious Zionism Party, has declared that the Gaza war represents a “divine opportunity” to pursue more ambitious objectives, such as initiating a wider conflict in Lebanon against Hizbullah, dismantling the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, and annexing the West Bank to Israel. The expansion of the war’s objectives is one of the primary aims of the extreme right-wing faction presently leading the Israeli Government.
The second determinant pertains to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose political ambition and narcissism are significant factors. As one US analyst who has closely followed Netanyahu’s political career has observed, “Netanyahu views himself through a Churchillian lens. I alone possess the political acumen and cunning, and I alone have a realistic vision of Israel’s historical circumstances. I alone can lead this nation,” he thinks.
Netanyahu’s pathological desire to remain in power has led him to forge a Faustian alliance with Israel’s most extreme religious factions, rendering him captive to their ideologies. Without this alliance, his coalition government would disintegrate, leaving him outside the corridors of power.
Furthermore, there is an ideological dimension tied to Netanyahu himself. He has never believed in the establishment of a Palestinian state or the two-state solution. It appears that the Gaza war has provided him with the opportunity to align more consistently with his long-held beliefs, which previous political circumstances and compromises had prevented him from openly articulating or implementing.
The third determinant concerns the US, which has become a passive observer and whose policies have failed spectacularly in addressing the crisis. The US routinely urges Israel to refrain from escalation, yet the Israeli government continually disregards these requests.
Meanwhile, the US has dispatched additional forces to the Middle East, ostensibly to deter escalation in the region. However, the actual outcome has been to encourage Israel towards further escalation, revealing a profound contradiction in US policy that is unlikely to be resolved in the near future.
Another factor related to timing is that we are now in the final four weeks leading up to the US presidential elections in November, a period during which the US will be preoccupied with domestic concerns. This affords the Israeli government greater latitude to act with impunity in the region, ignoring any US demands for de-escalation.
Netanyahu would prefer to see the victory of the Republican Party candidate and former president Donald Trump in the upcoming elections. This sentiment is shared by a majority of the Israeli public, as indicated by a recent poll in which 50 per cent of Israelis favoured Trump, 25 per cent preferred Democratic Party candidate Kamala Harris, and the remainder expressed no preference.
Netanyahu believes that the continued escalation, the refusal of any ceasefire in Gaza or Lebanon, and his defiance of the Biden administration’s demands will deny the Democrats any diplomatic victories and may even embroil them in a military conflict in the region. Such developments could harm the Democrats’ chances in the elections and bolster Trump’s prospects of returning to the White House.
This does not negate significant shifts in US public opinion, particularly within the Democratic Party, regarding the Palestinian cause. However, these shifts have yet to significantly influence US policy, largely due to the influence of pro-Israel interest groups in the US.
According to a recent poll conducted by the US think tank the Institute of Global Affairs, a strong majority of Democrats (67 per cent) believe that the US should either cease supporting Israel’s war efforts entirely or condition such support on a ceasefire, compared to only 41 per cent of Republicans. Only 23 per cent of Americans favour providing unconditional aid to Israel, with this figure sharply divided along partisan lines — just eight per cent of Democrats compared to 42 per cent of Republicans support the idea. Nonetheless, the influence of pro-Israeli lobbying groups ensures the persistence of a wide gap between public opinion and US policy.
The final determinant concerns Iran. Despite attacks on its proxies and assets in the region, Iran has refrained from escalating the conflict with Israel, expressing a desire to avoid widening it.
Iran’s position is rooted in its fear that further escalation, with Iran as a direct participant, might provide Israel with a pretext to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme or intensify pressure on the regime, both scenarios Iran is eager to avoid. For now, Iran appears willing to exercise restraint, even sacrificing some of its proxies to maintain its strategic objectives, including the completion of its nuclear programme and the preservation of the Islamic Republic.
In sum, these determinants suggest an increasing likelihood of further escalation and a broadening of the conflict throughout the region.
The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University and dean of the Institute of Arab Research and Studies.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 10 October, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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