When the Israeli aggression against Gaza began, Tehran and its allies adopted a measured, calculated approach to supporting Gaza. It could not have foreseen the profound loss it would suffer by year’s end: the assassination of its most important and long-standing ally, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah, along with several senior Hizbullah figures, as Israel expanded the conflict to the Lebanese front.
Nasrallah’s death, as Iran’s closest and most trusted ally, strikes at the heart of Tehran’s regional strategy. Many in Iranian circles consider his assassination an even more devastating blow than the killings of two other key figures: Imad Mughniyeh, Hizbullah’s military commander, and Qassem Suleimani, the architect of Iran’s Middle East strategy.
In the wake of Nasrallah’s assassination and the destruction of much of Hizbullah’s infrastructure, Iran now faces critical decisions that will shape the future of its role in a volatile and unpredictable Middle East. Deeply intertwined with Hizbullah in Lebanon, its allies in Syria and Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Palestinian factions, Tehran remains steadfast in its commitment to the Palestinian cause—a central tenet of its ideological and geopolitical framework. But the region’s rapidly shifting dynamics—exacerbated by Israel’s aggressive ambition to reshape the Middle East—are forcing Iran to exercise extreme caution, carefully weighing every move.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly sought a broader regional conflict with Iran and its allies, using it as a pretext to redraw the Middle East. In a recent United Nations address, Netanyahu divided the region into two stark visions: the “Blessing” and the “Curse.” In his vision of “Blessing,” there is no place for Palestine—only a “Greater Israel” encompassing all of historic Palestine, the Golan Heights, and parts of Lebanon. The “Curse,” on the other hand, encompasses Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, which Netanyahu portrayed as future battlegrounds for Israel.
Senior Iranian officials have condemned Nasrallah’s assassination in the strongest possible terms, though they have refrained from specifying how or when they will respond. Revolutionary Guard officials have instead framed the response in broader terms, stating that “the Axis of Resistance will avenge Nasrallah by liberating Jerusalem and destroying the Zionist entity.” This suggests that retaliation will not come from Tehran alone and will not take the form of a single act of revenge but will be part of a long-term mission to defeat Israel and dismantle its regional ambitions.
Unsurprisingly, some factions within the Axis of Resistance are calling for an immediate, decisive response, urging direct Iranian involvement in striking Israel. However, the Iranian state’s calculations appear more measured. From the perspective of senior officials, this is perhaps the worst possible time for Iran to engage in open war against both Israel and the US. Decades after the 1979 Revolution, the logic of statecraft has largely overtaken the revolutionary zeal that once guided Iranian foreign policy.
Such strategic caution is partly driven by the proximity of the US elections, which are only weeks away. Should Republican candidate Donald Trump win, Iran is keen to avoid providing any pretext for aggression. Many Republican hawks are already advocating military action against Iran. After Nasrallah’s assassination, Jared Kushner, Trump’s former adviser, suggested Israel should take the opportunity to “finish Hizbullah” and launch an attack on Iran. These are delicate times for Tehran, Iranian officials argue, requiring restraint and careful deliberation rather than impulsive, emotionally driven reactions.
Recent statements from Iranian leaders offer insights into the country’s strategic mindset. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while acknowledging the damage caused by Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon, emphasised Hizbullah’s resilience, stating that the group’s structure and manpower remain intact. President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned Israel’s actions in Gaza and Lebanon as “state terrorism,” warning that continued aggression could escalate into a broader regional conflict, which Tehran does not want. Pezeshkian also highlighted Iran’s desire to enter a “new era” of foreign policy, seeking re-engagement with the West to alleviate sanctions and revitalise its economy.
Similarly, Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi accused Israel of recklessly pursuing an agenda designed to provoke a “comprehensive war” in the region. “While Iran has exercised restraint for the sake of stability,” Araqchi stressed, Tehran will defend its interests and those of its allies if Israeli provocations persist.
Those positions reveal key aspects of Iran’s strategic thinking. First, while Israeli strikes have weakened Hizbullah, they have not undermined its core strength or necessitated direct Iranian intervention. Secondly, Iran’s commitment to its regional allies remains unwavering, especially when their survival—and by extension, Iran’s influence—is threatened. Finally, Iran, alongside its allies, is determined not to allow Israel, backed by the US, to reshape the Middle East to its own advantage by dismantling the Palestinian cause and asserting hegemonic dominance. In this intricate geopolitical game, Iran’s actions are rooted in a long-term strategy of endurance.
“Israel’s relentless slaughter of civilians across the region appears calculated to instill fear, engraving into the collective memory a terror so profound that no one will dare to resist Israel’s aggression again,” an Iranian diplomat aligned with Mohammad Javad Zarif, strategic adviser to the Iranian president, told Al-Ahram Weekly.
According to him, Israel’s strategy is to project volatility and irrationality, deliberately cultivating an image of unpredictability. By doing so, Israel seeks to coerce the region into submission, making the risk of provoking further erratic and dangerous behaviour seem too perilous to contemplate.
As Israel’s brutal assault on Gaza continues and its military escalation in Lebanon intensifies, Iranian officials tread cautiously, balancing ideology with pragmatism and realpolitik. Tehran’s strategy hinges on the belief that endurance over time is key to victory. However, it must also act with caution due to complex domestic, regional, and global dynamics.
Domestically, Iran’s economic fragility, compounded by sanctions and public discontent, makes a war—especially one with Israel and the US—potentially devastating. Politically, while revolutionary ideals continue to guide the regime, maintaining internal unity is essential, and reckless actions could provoke dissent. Militarily, Iran’s proxies are strong but no match for the combined forces of Israel and the US, which could severely damage its defence and nuclear infrastructure.
Regionally, Tehran must carefully navigate Israel’s provocations while maintaining delicate relations with the Gulf states. A war could push them closer to Washington, undoing years of diplomatic progress. Globally, Iran recognises that, while US influence is waning, the geopolitical shift is incomplete, and premature escalation could hinder its regional ambitions. Despite its alliances with Russia and China, both have limitations: Russia is preoccupied with Ukraine, and China is unlikely to jeopardise relations with the West.
Amid these considerations, the last thing Tehran wants is a regional war. Reports suggest Iranian officials were caught off guard by the significant escalation on the Lebanese front and Nasrallah’s assassination. The prevailing belief in Tehran is that Netanyahu aims to undermine Pezeshkian’s efforts to build trust with the West and highlight the Biden administration’s failures in the Middle East, which could raise Trump’s chances of victory in November. Iranian sources dismiss claims that Tehran’s restrained stance on Israel reflects weakness.
“Unlike Israel and the US, which rely on the shock-and-awe doctrine, we believe in death by a thousand cuts,” said the Iranian diplomat. “Israel, intoxicated by its military power and emboldened by Western governments, continues its brutal assault on innocent lives. In its arrogance, it fails to recognise the growing hatred that surrounds it in the region and the irreversible damage to its global reputation among young people, progressives, and supporters of the Palestinian cause. The exodus of companies, capital, and talent as hundreds of thousands of Israelis choose to live abroad further illustrates this point. The Zionist project is unravelling from within.”
However, this calculated approach may seem unduly rational, especially as some political factions increasingly question Tehran’s restraint. In response to growing unease, Tehran has reassured its Lebanese ally, sending envoys to emphasise that its focus on improving relations with the West—a top priority for Pezeshkian—does not compromise its commitment to supporting them. Yet, even within Iran, criticisms of Pezeshkian’s conciliatory tone towards the West are emerging, particularly regarding his emphasis on reviving the nuclear deal. Some conservative voices argue that prioritising domestic concerns sends the wrong signal to Tehran’s allies at a critical time.
In response, Pezeshkian’s allies have stressed that his priorities — reviving the nuclear deal with the West, deterring Israeli aggression against Iran, ending the war in Gaza, and preventing a full-scale war in Lebanon — are essential for protecting both Iran and its regional allies. They maintain that Tehran should not be forced into an either-or choice between supporting its allies and protecting itself from US-Israeli aggression. Whether Iran’s reformist government manages to achieve all of this remains to be seen. It is a formidable challenge, but Pezeshkian draws confidence from Khamenei’s continued adherence to a strategic vision that sees no inherent contradiction in the current strategy.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 10 October, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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