Hamas’ next step

Alaa Al-Mashharawi, Saturday 26 Oct 2024

Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza last week raises questions about prospective successors and the movement’s strategy.

Hamas’ next step

 

Hamas has sustained two major blows in fewer than three months. After the assassination of its former Political Bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh on 31 July in Tehran, Israel killed his successor, Yahya Sinwar, on 16 October in the Rafah district of the southern Gaza Strip.

Sinwar, a dominant military and political figure in Hamas, was believed to be the mastermind behind the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation on 7 October last year. His succession to the post of chief of the Hamas Political Bureau was a red flag to the Israeli bull, as Israel had long had him at the top of its hit list, especially since last year’s events.

His gruesome assassination raises questions about its impact on the movement’s strategy, the course of the war, and prospective successors from a dwindling pool given Hamas’ loss of key leaders in Gaza and abroad.

Political analysts have often described Sinwar as an enigma and as a man who though notoriously reclusive would then suddenly appear in public. Together with other leaders from Hamas and other Palestinian resistance factions, he took part in the March of Return demonstrations, weekly non-violent protests at the Gaza-Israel border that began in March 2018 to demand an end to what was then a more than decade-long Israeli blockade of Gaza.

An element of mystery continues to surround Sinwar’s death in a house in the Tel Al-Sultan neighbourhood of Rafah in Gaza as well as the pistol that Israeli soldiers claim to have found with him. One thing that is certain is that the Israeli and Western propaganda that said he had sheltered deep inside tunnels beneath the Gaza Strip was belied by videos released by Israel showing him in military attire with weapons and grenades and fighting Israeli forces to his dying breath.

In a statement confirming Sinwar’s death, Hamas Political Bureau member Khalil Al-Hayya said that this would only strengthen the movement’s resolve as it continued the struggle. However, analysts and observers believe Hamas is reeling from a shock that it will not quickly recover from, even it will survive because of the cohesion of its organisation and structures.

Sinwar’s assassination was “a cataclysmic event that has left a leadership vacuum in the movement, especially given the reported differences between its political leadership in Qatar and its military leadership in Gaza,” political analyst Nidal Khadra told Al-Ahram Weekly.

Noting the announcement by the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) on 1 August claiming they had killed Al-Qassam Brigades commander Mohamed Deif in an airstrike on Khan Yunis on 13 July, Khadra said that “while Hamas has not confirmed this yet, various cells have been continuing the fight, filling the void created by Deif’s absence.”

According to reports, Sinwar had not only taken over as Political Bureau chief but also as head of the Hamas military wing after Deif, and his death would therefore have dealt Hamas and its supporters a double blow.

Hani Al-Dali, an expert on the resistance movements, said that Sinwar’s assassination would not significantly affect Hamas’ organisational structure. It has a long history of surviving Israeli assassinations, starting with that of its founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and continuing through many other political and military leaders, such as Abdel-Aziz Al-Rantisi.

“Eliminating Sinwar does not mean the end of the movement,” Al-Dali said. “The resistance is an enduring idea. It is not linked to a particular individual.”

He said that Sinwar’s assassination would not significantly impact Hamas’ military capabilities. “The resistance produces its leaders, not the other way around. The only way the resistance will end is through solutions to the root causes of the conflict and the end of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories,” he said.

Political researcher Tamara Haddad said Sinwar’s death will affect the thinking and behaviour of the Hamas leadership in Gaza, especially regarding the hostage question. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insists on the unconditional release of the hostages ahead of any ceasefire and possible Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

“Sinwar’s absence will not significantly affect the individuals in command or the fighters. They will continue to fight, each one carrying out their assigned tasks. The leadership, however, must reorganise and recalculate its positions both at home and abroad, and first it must determine who will take over as Political Bureau chief.”

“Iranian or Qatari-Turkish influence will probably have a say in this. However, following a Hamas delegation meeting the Turkish foreign minister, it is abundantly clear that the movement is seeking a prominent role in the ‘day after’ arrangements by transforming itself into a political party that engages in political negotiating as opposed to just military operations.”

Israel and the Western powers have claimed that Sinwar was a major obstacle to a ceasefire and hostage/prisoner exchange agreement. Dali said that “Hamas has been consistently flexible in the negotiations and has made many concessions. However, it will make no more concessions in the future. Hamas may even toughen its conditions for a hostage deal, knowing that this will build up domestic pressure on Netanyahu, especially from the families of the hostages.”

According to Ayman Al-Raqab, a professor of political science at Al-Quds University, “Israel wants to obtain strategic gains without having to pay any political costs, such as withdrawing from Gaza or releasing thousands of Palestinian prisoners. Netanyahu has repeatedly rejected such conditions, which hampers the negotiations and complicates the situation.”

“Despite the stalled negotiations because of Netanyahu’s refusal to accept proposals from the US and Egypt, Hamas will continue to reorder itself and get back on its feet while the Palestinian people will remain adamant in their refusal to accept the occupation’s terms without clear political horizons.”

 

PLANNING: “Since Sinwar had anticipated that his martyrdom could come at any moment, he would have prepared contingency plans,” political analyst Mohsen Abu Ramadan told the Weekly.

Abu Ramadan believes that these plans included the decentralisation of the Al-Qassam Brigades organisational structures to eliminate dependence on a direct line of command. This became vital following the IOF’s physical occupation and geographic partition of Gaza.

Abu Ramadan agrees with other analysts that while Sinwar’s death marks a setback for the movement and its operations, especially given his iconic status as a resistance leader, it will survive. However, “it will have to reorder its military operations in line with the decentralised approach, and it will have to reorder itself politically and administratively. This latter might be easier than restricting resistance operations in the field, at least when compared to Hizbullah after the assassination of [Secretary-General] Hassan Nasrallah,” he said.

Abu Ramadan said that Hizbullah has the advantage of operating on a relatively stable territorial base, with open channels to Iran through Syria and Iraq. It also has a clear military structure, contingency plans, and logistical support, unlike Hamas, which relies on local manufacturing for its military and resistance operations, especially since the IOF’s re-occupation of the Gaza Strip.

Despite the loss of Sinwar as a leader who held the reins to both the military and political activities of the organisation, especially in Gaza, Hamas has no alternative but to persist. This will not only be reflected on the ground but also in its continued insistence on its demands regarding a hostage/prisoner exchange.

Palestinian commentator Omar Hilmi Al-Ghul said that Sinwar would have put organisational, military, financial, and logistical contingency arrangements in place in consultation with other leaders and fighters in Gaza. Lending weight to this is the fact that Sinwar had been moving back and forth between Khan Yunis and Rafah during the 377 days before his death, according to Israeli sources.

Al-Ghul believes that Hamas will not have a serious problem in electing a successor to Sinwar through established mechanisms. He said that the competition over the vacant post will most likely be between Khalil Al-Hayya, deputy head of the Political Bureau who had been leading the hostage/prisoner exchange and negotiations to end Israel’s genocidal war, and Khaled Meshaal, the current acting leader abroad.

Meshaal’s extensive relations in the Arab and Islamic world, largely by dint of his connections through the international Muslim Brotherhood organisation, and his greater political experience might give him a shot at regaining his position as the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, which he held for around two decades until 2017.

There has been speculation on the possibility of Mohamed Darwish, head of the Hamas Shura Council, being chosen as a compromise candidate.

Even if election of a replacement proceeds relatively smoothly, Al-Ghul believes that the vacancy caused by Sinwar’s death will aggravate Hamas’ current crisis given the control he had over its political, financial, administrative, and military affairs.

“The demands of the current and forthcoming phases require a redistribution of responsibilities. That Sinwar was responsible for everything during his brief tenure did not sit well with other members of the Political Bureau or, for that matter, members of the Shura Council and other leaders in the West Bank or abroad.”

“Also, the political and military demands and the effects of the ongoing genocide during the past months have increased popular discontent in Gaza towards Hamas as the sacrifices have not yielded the desired results. This has raised significant questions and created negative impressions, aggravating the contradictions between the movement’s leaders.”

 

ASSASSINATIONS: Israel has targeted and killed Hamas officials from the highest tiers of its political and military branches.

In addition to Sinwar and Haniyeh, the victims include Haniyeh’s deputy Saleh Al-Arouri, commander of the Al-Qassam Brigades Ahmed Jabari, second-in-command of the Al-Qassam Brigades Mohamed Deif, and four Political Bureau members in Gaza: Zakaria Abu Maamar, Mohamed Abu Shamala, Ruhi Mushtaha, and Abu Fikri Al-Sarraj.

The remaining prominent Political Bureau leaders are Khalil Al-Hayya, Mousa Abu Marzouk, Khaled Meshaal, Hussam Badran, Izzat Al-Rishq, and Suhail Al-Hindi. The remaining prominent military leaders in Gaza who are being hunted by Israel include Yahya’s brother and commander of the Khan Yunis Brigade Mohamed Sinwar, commander of the Rafah Brigade Mohamed Shabana, commander of the Gaza City Brigade Ezzedine Al-Haddad, and commander of the Central Province Brigade Imad Aqel.

Mohamed Sinwar has now taken over the command of the Al-Qassam Brigades. He played a central role in the Gilad Shalit prisoner swap in 2011 by including the release of Yahya Sinwar as a key condition for the deal. While remote from politics and the media, he is known for his strength of character and resolve as a fighter.

As Hamas’ main military leader, he faces formidable challenges under the current circumstances, especially given the disruptions in the communications between the fighters and Gaza and the political leaders abroad, which hamper political-military coordination.

Despite the blow it has received, Hamas will be able to choose the right person for this moment. This view is shared by many observers, who also say that while Khaled Meshaal and Khalil Al-Hayya are the foremost contenders, the organisation could still surprise by choosing someone unfamiliar to the public.

Hamas has a long history of quickly and efficiently replacing assassinated leaders. Credit for this goes to the organisation’s Shura Council, its highest decision-making body which is responsible for electing the chairman.

According to the Hamas constitution, the Shura Council is made up of about 50 members who represent the three regions where Hamas operates: Gaza, the West Bank, and Israeli prisons and the Palestinian Diaspora. These three operational regions have equal shares in the membership of both the Shura Council and the Political Bureau.

Agreements are often concluded behind the scenes before the members proceed to a vote to elect the head of the Political Bureau. Generally, the leadership in Gaza carries the most weight in this process because of its military, economic, and organisational strengths.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 24 October, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

Short link: