Since the Israeli-Iranian conflict shifted from indirect confrontations to direct engagements, particularly with Israel’s bombing of the Iranian Consulate in Damascus in April, a widely held view has emerged: that the ongoing exchanges between Israel and Iran amount to little more than farce. 

According to this perspective, both states depend on one another to exhaust the region’s resources while stoking various fears. Some countries see Iran as the threat, while others perceive Israel as the danger.  

Supporters of the view that the ongoing confrontation is a farce argue that Iran’s response to the consulate bombing involved firing numerous missiles to attack Israel with these having a minimal impact and being confined to military targets. Likewise, Iran’s reactions to the assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, along with Israel’s retaliations to these, have appeared more like restrained posturing than all-out aggression. 

The timing of certain exchanges was reportedly known in advance, such as Iran’s missile strikes against Israel last April, which the world followed from launch to impact. Similarly, the latest Israeli counter-response was anticipated by a suspension of flights into and out of Iran, with several countries halting services to Tehran and hinting at prior knowledge of the attack.

Nevertheless, it is important to draw a distinction between a performative, staged conflict, involved in the notion of “farce,” and a calculated, restrained series of actions and reactions shaped by domestic and international considerations.  

To begin with, the claim that Israel and Iran share no genuine foundation for enmity oversimplifies the long-standing clash between their respective regional ambitions. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran marked a turning point in Iranian foreign policy, particularly towards Israel. Since then, Iran has viewed Israel as an existential threat. 

This stance has been evident in the rhetoric employed in Iran from the earliest days of the Islamic Revolution to the recent speech by new Hizbullah Secretary-General Naeem Qassem, a client of Iran. Iran’s founding of Hizbullah in Lebanon was closely tied to Israel’s 1982 invasion of the country, and Iran has since supported Hizbullah in each of its major confrontations with Israel, in 1993, 1996, and notably also in 2006.  

Following the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation last year, Iran engaged with Israel through its allies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, intensifying the direct nature of the conflict after Israel targeted the Iranian Consulate in Damascus. Given this history, can we really consider Israel and Iran’s confrontations to be mere theatrical display? Iran’s antagonism towards Israel is deeply rooted, and Israel’s animosity towards Iran—especially since the 1979 Revolution—has remained consistent across successive Israeli governments, including the current extreme right-wing administration of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

 In his address to the UN General Assembly in September, Netanyahu placed Iran at the centre of what he called the “Axis of Evil.” Israeli apprehensions towards Iran’s nuclear programme are profound, and they have shown themselves in attacks on Iranian nuclear scientists, cyber-warfare against research facilities, and attempts to persuade the US to target Iran’s nuclear sites— all clear evidence of Israel’s enduring sense of vulnerability.  

Turning to the reciprocal strikes between Israel and Iran over the past seven months from April to October this year, it is clear they have been measured engagements. Each side is testing the other’s capabilities and exhibiting its own strength without crossing into an all-out, prolonged war. 

Both nations face domestic constraints that moderate the impulse for open warfare, and these considerations have prevented reckless escalation. Iran, for example, waited two months before responding to Haniyeh’s assassination, while Israel delayed its reaction by 25 days after Iran targeted Israeli air bases. 

In both cases, the prolonged pauses highlight the complexity of these decisions. The conflict between the two countries is thus not a farce — instead, it is more like a calculated dance, as military and political officials within each camp debate the best course of action. This internal dialogue is particularly apparent in Israel, given the differences in the two countries’ governance structures.

In essence, both sides seek to harm each other, to borrow a phrase from Qassem, without closing the door to a political settlement. Here we can also see international influences at work to moderate the cycle of escalation. 

For instance, it has been suggested that the US Biden administration is not pressuring Israel to restrain its responses to Iran, since it may already be in its last days. However, the assumption that any future Republican administration would necessarily support Israel’s desire to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities may not be true. Would the Israeli government delay its response to Iranian attacks this year in anticipation of a change in the US leadership in January?

The absence of an Israeli-Iranian farce does not require the two countries to plunge into all-out war. For the sake of regional stability, perhaps it would be better if we remain under the illusion of farcical manoeuvres in this conflict rather than resigning ourselves to witnessing irrevocable damage.

* The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University and the head of the National Dialogue’s Subcommittee on Human Rights.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 7 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly