Military coordination between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is more intense than ever. In late October, Western reports indicated that thousands of North Korean troops had been transferred to Russia in preparation for deployment on the battlefronts in Ukraine. Some reports went so far as to suggest that Pyongyang, during the visit of its foreign minister to Moscow on 1 November, requested transfers of advanced Russian technologies in exchange for its military support. Although Pyongyang has repeatedly denied any involvement in the war in Ukraine, there are a number of signs to the contrary. Most recently, on 28 October, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated unequivocally that North Korean troops had been deployed to Russia and were operating in the Kursk border region, where Ukrainian troops have a foothold.

Last month, the Russian national parliament, the Duma, ratified the Strategic Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The agreement was signed by the two countries’ heads of state on 26 July during an official visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang. A comprehensive cooperation agreement which includes a significant security component stipulating that neither side can enter treaties with third parties that infringe on the other’s sovereignty and that, in the event of an attack on one side, the other side will provide support including military support. 

The ratification reignited a furore in Ukraine and among its Western allies over possible North Korean assistance to Russia in its operations there. More reports then reiterated the same news of thousands of North Korean soldiers being sent to Russia, possibly to be deployed on the front lines against Kyiv. Pyongyang, again, denied all such reports, saying that any deployment of North Korean forces to Russia would nonetheless be in compliance with international law. 

On 24 October, the Ukrainian military intelligence agency alleged that North Korean units had been sighted in the vicinity of Kursk as of 23 October. It also claimed that 12,000 North Korean soldiers, including 500 officers and three generals, were already in Russia, receiving training at five military bases. According to South Korean intelligence, its northern neighbour has already sent 3,000 troops, including special forces, to the far east of Russia for training and acclimation.

On 25 July, US Secretary of Defence Lioyd Austin made remarks that his government had evidence of the 3000 North Korean troops on Russian soil for possible deployment on the front lines. Echoing Washington, South Korea and Japan voiced concerns over the possibility of North Korean troop deployments in Russia. President Putin has done little to allay suspicions about the nature of Russian-North Korean military cooperation. He did not deny claims of the presence of North Korean troops in Russia, saying that it was up to Russia how to implement its partnership with Pyongyang. 

In their strategic cooperation agreement, Moscow and Pyongyang aim to achieve several objectives, although clearly the main purpose is to counter mounting Western pressures on both countries due to the current situation on the ground in Ukraine on the one hand, and North Korea’s improved nuclear arms capacities and alleged military support for the Russian side in that war on the other. The provision regarding mutual military assistance can therefore be seen as a message to the West/NATO in response to what Moscow and Pyongyang maintain is Western escalation against them. Article 4 of the 23-article agreement states that “in the event that any one of the two sides is forced into a state of war by an armed aggression [. . .], the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and the Russian Federation.” 

Under the agreement, the two sides have committed to working together to accomplish other aims. One is to establish a just, democratic and multipolar global system anchored in international law and cultural and civilisational diversity. Others are to boost mutual cooperation in space exploration, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, AI, and IT, as well as in countering misinformation, disinformation and mal-information. 

However, the agreement also includes a significant economic component. Developing their bilateral economic relations is a strategic priority for both Moscow and Pyongyang. While Russia needs to work around mounting Western sanctions against its oil, grain and other vital sectors since the war in Ukraine began, the North Korean economy has been reeling under Western sanctions for decades. With antiquated production technology, rigid and outmoded centralised management systems and closed borders, its economy remains in a severe state of deterioration. Economic cooperation, therefore, opens windows to both sides. 

Certainly North Korea will welcome the opportunity to meet its energy needs from Russia’s abundant oil and gas resources. Of course it depends on China for many of its resources, but it can also look to Russia as another reliable partner.

While ushering in a phase of much closer collaboration, the security partnership is unlikely to evolve into a full alliance, nor is it likely that North Korea will become directly involved in the hostilities in Ukraine. For one factor, neither Moscow nor Pyongyang wants to create tension with China, which is already concerned by Russian support for North Korea’s nuclear programme. Secondly, neither country is in a position to offer the other full military support in the event of hostilities against it. North Korea is preoccupied with disputes in its own neighbourhood, especially South Korea and Japan, and wants to avoid riling Washington and incurring further sanctions. Moscow, for its part, would probably be unable to furnish significant military assistance to Pyongyang should North Korea come under attack because of its need to keep its military energies and resources focused on operations in Ukraine. 

Still, the significance of Russia and North Korea’s strategic partnership should not be underestimated. It may work to mitigate Western pressures on them both. Much depends on their ability to handle their partnership in ways that do not court unwanted reactions from their adversaries. The partnership may also give Russia more leeway to exhaust Ukrainian defences in the Donbas. Perhaps an indication of this is to be found in the Ukrainian president’s refusal to meet with the UN Secretary-General Guterres on 26 October because Guterres had attended the recent BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. 

* A version of this article appears in print in the 7 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly