Following an unprecedented “red wave” in the US presidential elections on 5 November, a columnist in the US magazine Foreign Affairs remarked that “although we don’t know the composition of the new order, we know Trump will be at the top of it.”

This statement encapsulates the challenge of navigating a controversial return: a former president now leads a political and social movement that dominates one of America’s two major parties.

His first term, marked by turbulent attempts to reshape global policy, ended with the Capitol riot, nearly destabilising American democracy. Yet, Trump has returned to power for a second term with deep popular backing, signalling profound shifts in American politics and the United States’ role on the global stage.

A conventional view holds that the Republican Party is split into two factions: the Reaganite wing, which adheres to traditional leadership ideals on the world stage, and Trump’s MAGA movement, which endorses isolationism and scepticism about America’s global role, advocating a focus on domestic affairs and the avoidance of foreign entanglements.

Some argue, however, that these portrayals are inaccurate. Contrary to common perceptions, the MAGA wing may favour international engagement—arguably even more than traditional Republicans.

According to a study by the Ronald Reagan Institute in June, two-thirds of Republican respondents identified strongly with the MAGA movement. When asked about international issues, MAGA Republicans expressed strong support for a robust US stance on issues ranging from Ukraine to Taiwan, Israel, and China, often advocating a more assertive approach than their non-MAGA counterparts.

Traditional US foreign policy circles often view Trump as an isolationist whose positions seem inconsistent with long-standing American values and interests. This stance has fuelled concerns among internationalists who fear his re-election could dismantle the liberal order that the United States and its allies have championed since World War II, a fear widely shared across Europe.

Charles Kupchan, a seasoned US commentator, notes that portraying Trump’s “America First” policy as a departure from American tradition misunderstands its historical and ideological roots and considerable political appeal. Trump’s approach, Kupchan argues, is less about dismantling the US-led world order and more about responding to a changing global environment and American voters’ demands.

Trump’s rhetoric and that of his advisers hint at the direction of his foreign policy in this second term: a commitment to fortifying the US domestically, thus ensuring the country stands strong and respected globally, especially against emerging powers like China.

Republican sources indicate that the few advocates of traditional isolationism within Trump’s ranks hold little sway in shaping foreign policy. Trump has notably distanced himself from pro-interventionist figures, such as Nikki Haley and the neoconservatives who pushed for the Iraq War in 2003, a cohort conspicuously absent from this year’s Republican National Convention.

GLOBAL VISION: Such apprehensions aren’t without cause, as Trump has openly discussed dismantling aspects of the US-led liberal system, pushing instead for protectionist policies and tariff strategies unseen since World War II.

Central to this vision is a move away from international institutions and towards economic nationalism, particularly in the intensifying rivalry with China.

Democrats have struggled to grasp the appeal of the MAGA movement’s call to rebuild American strength, a sentiment that resonated at the ballot box on 5 November. Trump borrows from Ronald Reagan’s famed “peace through strength” maxim, advocating expanded military spending and opposing any cost-cutting measures for the Pentagon. His vision includes bolstering a new missile defence shield—a Reagan-era idea revived, for example.

Internationally, Trump’s return to office signals to US allies in Europe and East Asia that they must increasingly manage their own security, recognising that the United States, as their security guarantor, cannot sustain these commitments indefinitely.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s immediate call for European self-reliance following Trump’s victory highlights Europe’s readiness to adopt a new approach, with several European nations already planning to boost defence spending. Yet this poses a dilemma: the US traditionally maintains influence by fostering alliances, not disengaging from them.

Meanwhile, Trump will likely maintain the pressure on China, his administration’s primary perceived threat. This focus will manifest through aggressive trade policies and industrial initiatives to repatriate manufacturing. Trump’s strategy involves tax incentives and tariffs to encourage domestic production in a sharp reversal from globalisation trends.

When Trump takes office on 20 January next year, he will confront a world markedly different from that of January 2021. At that time, he left amid the Covid-19 pandemic, which had profoundly affected both the US and global economies. In the years since the geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically: the war in Ukraine erupted; China and Russia formed a “no-limits” strategic partnership; and Iran expanded its regional influence through proxy militias.

The Israeli invasion of Gaza, the US’ inability to halt the brutal assault on civilians there, with over 43,000 Palestinian deaths, followed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s controversial resettlement plans and renewed hostilities between Israel and Iran have further destabilised the region.

In response, capitals worldwide are pondering how Trump will approach these unprecedented issues, which his first term did not prepare him for. This question looms largest as his administration prepares to re-enter the global stage.

The evolving dynamics in the Middle East over the past 13 months have left few lamenting the departure of President Joe Biden and his Democratic administration. Adopting an unwaveringly pro-Israel stance, the Biden administration has permitted military escalations to unfold without advancing any new initiatives to divert the region from a descent into broader conflict.

The 70-day transition period leading to the next presidential inauguration stirs uncomfortable memories for Israel, recalling the final days of President Barack Obama’s tenure when the US abstained from voting on a UN Security Council Resolution condemning settlement expansion in the Occupied Territories. Netanyahu remains vigilant against a repeat of such actions as he awaits the entry of a close ally into the Oval Office.

Relations between the Biden administration and Netanyahu reveal a noticeable distancing, with the Israeli leader essentially sidelining the Democrats in the months following Hamas’ attacks on Israeli soil. It is, therefore, improbable that Netanyahu will heed any demands from the Biden administration in the remaining two months of the outgoing president’s term.

The landscape awaiting Trump, who has described himself as “the most pro-Israel president in American history,” stands in stark contrast to that of his first term. During that period, Trump relocated the US Embassy to Jerusalem, recognised Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and championed the Abraham Accords, fostering diplomatic ties between Israel and seven Arab nations.

Today, Israel is actively expanding its influence and engaging in confrontations across seven fronts: Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Throughout his campaign, Trump criticised the Democrats for allegedly “directing” Netanyahu, a measure he perceived as curtailing Israel’s right to self-defence and impeding its ability to counter Hamas decisively.

Israeli analysts suggest that Trump’s approach towards Netanyahu could evolve under the looming threat of regional conflict, a scenario the incoming president would likely avoid.

Applying Trump’s core principles of not risking American lives abroad or draining resources on external conflicts could pose significant challenges for Netanyahu, who depends heavily on sustained US military backing. While Trump may, in the short term, permit Israel to pursue its stated objectives, he could introduce limitations on long-term military support, signalling a nuanced but potentially consequential shift in US-Israel relations.

In a report by the BBC, Michael Oren, Israel’s former ambassador to Washington, observed that Trump’s second term would differ significantly from his first.

He emphasised the importance of understanding who Donald Trump is and what he genuinely stands for. Oren noted that Trump “does not like wars,” seeing them as costly, and has thus requested a swift end to the Gaza conflict. Moreover, he is reportedly unsupportive of Israeli settlements in the Occupied West Bank, opposing the ambitions of certain Israeli leaders to annex parts of the territory.

Previously, in confrontations between Biden’s agenda and the Israeli Coalition Government’s objectives, Netanyahu has remained aligned with his coalition as it sustains his hold on power. However, Oren suggests such a dynamic could be different with Trump.

Trump has no specific plan for addressing the current situation in Gaza. However, his use of the term “end of the war” reflects his view that Israel should secure a decisive victory before any ceasefire is discussed, preventing Iranian-backed armed groups from once again posing a threat to Israel. This stance is a marked departure from the Democrats’ prolonged, ineffectual diplomacy and evasive tactics over recent months.

According to sources close to the Trump campaign, the president-elect has no desire to return to what is termed a “low-grade conflict,” referencing the 2014 negotiations with Hamas that ultimately led Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to strategise ways to outmanoeuvre the Israeli Iron Dome and conduct smaller-scale operations in a strategy culminating in the 7 October 2023 attacks.

Following the assassination of Sinwar in October this year, Netanyahu and the ruling elite have become increasingly focused on securing a decisive victory. Their objective is now clear: to compel Hamas into total surrender, disarmament, and the release of the hostages.

IRAN: All current assessments indicate a recalibration in the upcoming US administration’s approach to Tehran.

Advisers to Trump’s campaign have recently stated that efforts will concentrate on tightening sanctions and curbing Iranian influence throughout the Arab region. Iran’s initial response has been guarded, with officials waiting to gauge Trump’s strategy, especially given his prior directive to eliminate Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

A return to the “maximum pressure” policy, central to Trump’s first term, will likely be prioritised in dealing with Tehran. However, significant constraints complicate any plans for sweeping sanctions or military action.

Oil prices, for instance, weigh heavily on US decision-making; Trump has assured his supporters of affordable petrol and fuel, and any US military intervention or unchecked Israeli escalation could cause prices to skyrocket. Domestic energy costs remain crucial to US presidents, shaping their decisions regardless of political affiliation.

It is well-known that the “maximum pressure” policy was crafted by Stephen Mull, head of Trump’s transition team at the US Department of State. Meanwhile, Brian Hook, the former US envoy for Iran, is expected to return to play a role in shaping the new administration. Recently, Hook stated that Trump would revert to his previous approach towards Iran, saying that“he will isolate Tehran diplomatically and weaken it economically.”

Trump’s ability to rein in Iran’s regional influence in the first term remains unproven, especially after his withdrawal from the nuclear agreement signed by Obama in 2018, which he criticised as disastrously flawed. Israel, however, has taken on a substantial role, having dismantled numerous Iranian assets across the region, targeted vital leaders, and delivered severe blows to Iran’s deterrent capacities.

Netanyahu’s approach has weakened Iran’s regional power, possibly aligning with Trump’s interests. With Israeli strikes effectively curtailing Iranian capabilities, including its nuclear ambitions, Trump may be inclined to encourage further Israeli actions that strategically weaken Tehran, setting the stage for negotiations on his terms.

REGIONAL ALLIES: Elbridge Colby, co-founder and director of the Marathon Initiative, a think tank in Washington close to Trump’s strategic views, and former deputy assistant secretary of Defence for Strategy and Force Development, stresses that the president-elect “isn’t pursuing isolationism but seeks alliances that advance the American people’s interests.”

From this perspective, Trump appears open to building partnerships that serve US objectives, suggesting he may revive his vision of a comprehensive Middle Eastern alliance despite recent challenges posed by the Gaza war and Netanyahu’s hardline coalition, which is pressing for territorial expansion in northern Gaza, resumed settlement activity, and aggressive military manoeuvres.

Trump is expected to resume efforts to secure a defence pact with Saudi Arabia as the linchpin for broader regional cooperation, potentially advancing this initiative even without Saudi-Israeli normalisation.

In Washington, some may have reservations about the extensive benefits the US would extend to Saudi Arabia as its principal Gulf partner. Historical parallels to the 1980s Reagan-era mega arms deal with Riyadh underscore such concerns, which at the time prompted strong opposition from pro-Israel advocates, catalysed the rise of groups like AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) and resulted in a US-Israel bilateral agreement ensuring Israel receives the latest American weaponry.

To push through a Saudi defence pact, Trump would need to secure a two-thirds majority in the Senate, requiring some Democratic support. Additionally, the US is reportedly open to discussing nuclear reactor access for peaceful purposes with regional partners, with talks focused on whether uranium enrichment would occur domestically or in a controlled setting abroad.

The ideas promoted by think tanks close to Trump emphasise that the United States should adopt a cohesive strategy to avoid entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts. For instance, a study by the Marathon Initiative highlighted that the Houthi threat in the Red Sea is symptomatic of a broader issue involving Iran. To address this threat, the study suggests that Washington should embrace its Arab and Israeli partners to isolate Iran.

While increased sanctions and arms embargoes offer short-term solutions, the United States should, in the long term, focus on strengthening the Abraham Accords to foster greater burden-sharing among Arab partners. This would allow Washington to concentrate more effectively on its strategic competition with China.

Colby remarks that the same principles apply globally: “Foreign policy should not be a religion. President Biden’s always talking about our alliances as sacred,” he said.“The idea that these arrangements with foreign countries are sacred is kind of misconstruing; they should be based on common sense and mutual benefit, especially in a long-term context.”

Trump’s advisers are closely monitoring the growing risk of a multi-front conflict that could draw the US into engagements against Russia, China, and Iran. From the perspective of strategic planners on Trump’s team, the optimal response would involve a sequential strategy aimed at achieving a strategic defeat of Russia in Ukraine first, ideally before China makes significant moves against Taiwan.

In this scenario, the US would need to coordinate roles and responsibilities more effectively with its allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. This approach is also rooted in the belief that strategic deterrence can be achieved through modernising US forces and distributing burdens among allied nations in any global region to curb irrational spending that could lead to a more profound depletion of American power.

In conclusion, a confluence of geopolitical and economic developments would compel a second Trump administration to act differently from his first, especially given China’s rising influence on the global stage and Russia’s significant challenge to European security amid the ongoing Ukraine conflict. This scenario would necessitate a revised policy approach towards Moscow to address allies’ concerns, alongside managing the worsening situation in the Middle East.

There is a prevailing belief in Washington that Trump’s team would adopt a bolder policy to rally allied capabilities, aiming to reach settlements in major crises and confront emerging powers in international politics without direct US military intervention or unsustainable financial burdens.

Nevertheless, Trump’s policy in the Middle East remains ambiguous due to an absence of a cohesive vision, particularly concerning Gaza and Lebanon, opening the door to speculation among policy experts. Meanwhile, weary from prolonged conflicts, the region’s people fluctuate between optimism and pessimism as they look ahead.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 14 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly