The Iraqi Kurds went to the polls on 20 October amid ongoing internecine political rivalries, economic bottlenecks, and lingering disputes with the federal capital Baghdad.

The key competitors in the long-awaited elections for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s legislative assembly were the two dominant Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which have long fought for political supremacy in the Iraqi region.

The two parties have historically controlled different parts of the region, with the KDP, led by the Barzani clan, controlling the presidency along with Erbil, Kurdistan’s provincial capital, and Dohuk, while the PUK, led by the Talabani family, retaining its grip on power in Sulaimaniyah and large swathes of Kirkuk, which remains outside the region’s authority.

This division has frequently led to political standoffs in the autonomous enclave. The constant infighting has overshadowed the mythical “oasis of calm” and democracy bestowed by the Western media on the region.

The Electoral Commission declared that the KDP had won the most seats with 39 members in the 100-seat parliament in the recent elections, while the PUK came in second with 23 seats. The rest of the seats went to several other smaller parties.

The central government in Baghdad and many Western embassies were quick to congratulate the Kurdish parties on a “successful election,” but many Kurds remained less ebullient that it would create a “stable, sound, and sustainable” democracy in the region.

Indeed, the parliamentary elections, the sixth since the Iraqi Kurds established their self-ruled region in 1991, mark the beginning of another roller-coaster ride in the enclave’s politics.

Though the precise composition of the new order is not known, it is clear that without an agreement between the two rivals the region could be left teetering on the brink of collapse.

The elections were originally due to take place in 2022, but political wrangling and disagreements over the self-drafted and approved electoral system led to multiple postponements.

Iraq’s High Federal Court ruled in February to amend a number of articles of the electoral law, redefining the region’s electoral system in order to dismantle seats reserved for minorities, reducing membership to 100, and designating the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission to oversee the elections instead of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Electoral Commission.

The amendments further complicated relations between the KRG and the federal government in Baghdad. They also came in the context of ongoing KDP and PUK divisions.

When the vote was finally held, it raised new concerns not only about the value of democracy in the enclave, but also and most importantly about whether Iraqi Kurdistan’s experiment in self-governance is working.

It is not clear if there are any rules laid down in the electoral law on the date of the inauguration of the new assembly or procedures for forming a new government.

In the past, this was part of a lengthy and costly negotiation process to produce agreements between the KDP and the PUK on a power-sharing package.

But the process of forming a new government is not expected to begin before the two parties agree on a new “partnership” deal that will also allow them to retain power in their respective areas.

Nechirvan Barzani, KRG president, and his cousin, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, have said that while their KDP Party has won most seats in the new parliament it has no veto on any other party to participate.

Yet, the powerful leader of the party, Masoud Barzani, has stated that for all the parties to join the new administration they should first agree to work within the framework of “one region, one parliament, one government and one Peshmergas (force).”

The PUK, meanwhile, seems less enthusiastic about entering into quick negotiations with the KDP over forming a new government. Qubad Talabani, a brother of PUK leader Bafel Talabani, said his party gives priority to reform in the KRG over the new government.

Top PKP official Jaafar Sheik Mustafa accused the current administration in Erbil of failing “to solve the region’s political and financial problems” and indicated that among his party’s preconditions to join the government was “real partnership.”

Reports in the local media, however, have indicated that the PUK leadership is showing signs of “a marked decrease in engagement” with the KDP and may prefer to consolidate its power within the region.

High-profile leaks have suggested that the PUK is resorting to preconditioning tactics such as demanding the post of KRG president as a prerequisite to join the new government.

The post, currently held by Nechirvan Barzani, is considered symbolically important, and it is unlikely to be relinquished by the Barzanis, a dynasty which prides itself on the leadership of the Kurdish liberation movement for generations.

The two groups have also concluded an unwritten agreement to give the post of president of Iraq, which is allotted to the Kurds, to a PUK leader for the first time since the overthrow of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in 2003.

The failure to reach a coalition agreement, or even a prolonged stalemate, will bring grave challenges, not least in making the competition dangerously escalatory and deepening the bipartisan power struggle.

Fearing the dangers of escalating insecurity in a region that receives considerable Western support, the US and the UK ambassadors in Iraq have stepped in to help mend fences between the two parties.

The rivalry between the KDP and the PUK dates back to the 1960s when Jalal Talabani, Qubad’s and Bafel’s father, fell out with Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the iconic leader of the KDP.

Talabani later formed the PUK, and the two groups have since fought for political supremacy in the enclave. Over the course of the conflict, they have been occasionally driven into fighting.

The latest dispute between the two parties comes as the autonomous enclave faces multiple political, security, and economic crises, some caused by outside challenges and others by the malfunctioning of its authorities.

The relationship with the federal government in Baghdad has been at its lowest ebb since the KRG organised an independence referendum in 2017.

Baghdad has since pushed for centralisation through budget restrictions, court rulings, and sometimes also security arrangements.

In its latest effort to undercut Kurdish autonomy and assert its control over the region’s oil industry, Iraq’s Cabinet has ordered the KRG to immediately transfer its oil output to the country’s state-run firm SOMO.

In return, the cabinet said it would compensate the Kurdish government for production and transport costs at set fees of $16 per barrel for foreign oil companies operating in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Oil flows through the KRG pipeline were halted by Turkey last year after a dispute over the legality of the KRG’s exports. The new move impacts the KRG’s oil revenue sharing and its budget allocations.

The KRG has also been jittery about a national population census to be held in Iraq this month, warning the count may be used for political purposes in areas where Kurds share residency with Arabs, Turkomans, and other ethnicities.   

Other key concerns for Iraqi Kurds include economic difficulties and financial shortcomings due to the mismanagement of the region’s wealth and its share in the national budget and corruption.

As a result, the region is struggling with shortage of public services such as electricity, a lack of job opportunities, and nepotism and corruption, all also central issues in the elections.

Overall, security and stability remain precarious as the conflict-ridden region continues to be under pressure from its two powerful neighbours, Turkey and Iran, which have invested huge resources to increase their political and economic influence in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Collectively, these various challenges render the parliamentary elections in Kurdistan largely meaningless unless they can produce a powerful and functioning government that can save the fragmented and volatile entity from protracted uncertainty or even falling apart.

Iraqi Kurdistan has been depressingly familiar with occasional standoffs over elections since its first “free” polls following its break-away from the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in 1992.

Since then, every election has been marred by squabbling and disagreements and then power-sharing deals, rendering what was hoped to be a democracy into a dubious oligarchical system that has nothing to do with collective decisions, representative governance, or direct participation.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 14 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly