To what extent will a Trump presidency cause Turkey to press ahead with or, conversely, put the brakes on an initiative recently proposed by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to resolve the Kurdish question through a negotiated deal ending the decades-old conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)?

Little progress has been made so far by the ruling Justice and Development Party’s junior party in the People’s Alliance. But the MHP’s apparent shift away from its long-standing opposition to negotiations with the PKK, which Turkey has designated a terrorist group, is in itself a significant step. Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has personally endorsed the initiative, lauding MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s unprecedented gesture of shaking hands with Kurdish MPs during the inaugural session of this year’s parliamentary season.

The initiative calls for the release of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and other Kurdish leaders in exchange for the dissolution of the PKK. Öcalan, who is widely revered among Kurds, has been serving a life sentence in Imralı Prison since 1999, much of it in solitary confinement. Öcalan’s release would conform with the “right to hope” that is implicit in European human rights law and, specifically, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the prohibition against torture and inhuman treatment and punishment.

Kurdish leaders have welcomed such initiatives, stressing the potential political and cultural gains they had through dialogue and peace-making mechanisms while averting the tragic losses that result from violent confrontations. Expressing such sentiments, Tülay Hatimoğulları, co-chair of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), said that Turkey’s Kurds were ready to negotiate an honourable peace. “Whatever struggle and cost it may require to establish an honourable peace, we are ready to undertake it.”

Nevertheless, she added a word of caution: negotiation and dialogue had to be substantial. “It is not enough to stand in front of the camera and say two words. A plan and a programme for a solution must be presented to the public.”   

The government’s shifting posture on the Kurdish question is informed by various factors, the most immediate being the hope to win the Kurdish vote in favour of a new constitution. While the People’s Alliance holds a majority in parliament, with 321 seats in the 600-member house, they do not possess the necessary two-thirds to push through constitutional amendments without recourse to a public referendum. In either case, the DEM’s 57 seats are crucial.

Secondly, according to some analysts, Turkey suspects that Iran plans to use PKK fighters to strengthen its regional influence to compensate for the damage that Israeli strikes have inflicted on Iran-aligned militias in Syria and Iraq. Ankara calculates that an agreement with the PKK would preempt this and minimise the cross-border threat from Kurdish armed groups in northern Syria and Iraq.

The third factor relates to Ankara’s fear of the prospect of international recognition of a separatist Kurdish entity in northeastern Syria, which could have major repercussions in predominantly Kurdish areas in Turkey. Re-opening the door to dialogue with the Kurds would contain moves to promote self-rule in southeastern Turkey.

Fourthly, Erdoğan is convinced that the Israeli regime has Turkey in its crosshairs as part of its plan to reshape the Middle East in a manner conducive to “the illusion of a promised land,” as he put it in his address to parliament in October. He believes that Israel plans to establish a foothold in northern Syria, using the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). He already suspects Mossad links to the PKK, which would increase the threat to Turkish national security.

Ankara is now likely to recalibrate its moves in the light of what it anticipates from Trump when he re-enters the White House in January. Trump, who had a relatively close relationship with Erdogan during his first term, will be keen to strengthen Turkey’s regional role in order to neutralise Iran’s influence. To this end, Trump might reduce or end US support for the Kurds in northeastern Syria, as he was about to do in his first term. This would constitute a major setback for Kurdish self-rule in the area Kurds call Rojava. The development might proceed in tandem with an accelerated withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in accordance with the agreement between Washington and Baghdad calling for the complete withdrawal of US troops by 2026.

In light of the foregoing, as keen as the Turkish government may be at present to promote a resolution of the Kurdish question, it will probably decide to wait and see what moves the new Trump administration makes on issues of direct importance to Turkey. If Trump acts as expected and withdraws US forces from Iraq and Syria, effectively ending US support for the SDF in exchange for closer relations with Turkey, the government may not be in as much of a hurry to press forward with a Turkish-Kurdish peace process.

It might be argued that restarting peace talks to resolve the Kurdish question and cement the domestic front remains a strategic priority for Ankara against the backdrop of regional upheaval. The geopolitical designs of regional and international powers could detrimentally impact Turkey’s security, economic and strategic interests after all. However, Erdogan might see the return of a personal ally to the White House as an opportunity to strengthen his hand domestically and regionally without having to make concessions to the Kurds. Indeed, some analysts predict that Turkey will revert to a hardline policy on the Kurds. The summary dismissal of three Kurdish mayors in southeastern Turkey last week points in that direction. After congratulating Trump on his electoral victory, what is more, Erdogan said he expected the US president to stop supporting those Kurdish organisations in Syria that Turkey designates terrorist.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 14 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly