Growing Arab pressure on Hamas

Monjed Jadou, Wednesday 13 Nov 2024

The ceasefire negotiations in the Israeli war on Gaza appear to be entering a new phase marked by intensified pressures on Hamas not only from Israel and the United States but also from close ally Qatar.

Growing Arab pressure on Hamas
Abbas (l) with Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani (c) and Hamas exiled leader Khaled Meshaal (r) in Doha (photo: AFP)

 

In recent days, reports have surfaced suggesting the possibility of Qatar closing Hamas offices in Doha. Both Qatari and Hamas sources have denied these claims, yet the facts on the ground indicate a shift in the relationship, especially following Qatar’s announcement that it is pausing its mediation efforts in the ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas.

The Israeli media, including the newspaper Maariv, have reported that leading Arab states, with Qatar at the forefront, have issued a covert warning to the Hamas leadership in Doha, signalling that without progress on the negotiations, the status of high-ranking Hamas officials in Qatar might be at risk.

According to the Israeli reports, unusual diplomatic efforts are emerging between Arab and regional capitals alongside Doha, in which these states have crafted a joint message cautioning the Hamas leadership about reaching a “point of no return” in the negotiations.

Central to this warning is the implied threat of altering the stance on key Hamas figures in Qatar due to the stalemate regarding Gaza’s future. Frustration is reportedly building among the mediators over the deadlock in the ceasefire discussions. Arab officials argue that without advances in the discussions about Gaza’s future governance, the negotiations cannot progress.

Palestinian political analyst Akrama Al-Issa noted the lack of genuine initiatives to secure a ceasefire, as Israel has thwarted all such proposals, including those from the UN and US President Joe Biden.

Qatar’s recent statement attributing responsibility to both Hamas and Israel reflects diplomatic manoeuvering, primarily in response to US pressure, rather than a genuine shift against Hamas.

In fact, Qatar’s foreign minister has directly criticised Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for obstructing the negotiations, with recent statements aimed at managing external expectations rather than signalling an anti-Hamas stance.

Al-Issa told Al-Ahram Weekly that the intensified Arab pressure on Hamas, rather than Israel, was attributable to the limited leverage Egypt and Qatar have over Israeli policy. Their influence relies significantly on US backing, which often aligns closely with Israeli objectives.

According to sources close to Hamas, the recent allegations have prompted the group to hold internal discussions in response to statements from US officials and reinforced by remarks from Qatari sources regarding the potential halting of Hamas activities in Doha.

The developments come as Qatar, having struggled to break the impasse in the ceasefire negotiations on Gaza, has reportedly reassessed its support for the group. Sources quoted by AFP indicate that Qatar may view the Hamas political office in Doha as no longer serving a purpose.

Qatar’s Foreign Ministry commented on Saturday that reports about the Hamas political office in Doha are “inaccurate,” though it confirmed that it has suspended its mediation efforts.

A Hamas source noted that the group has not received any formal request from Qatar to close the office, and it remains unclear if or when the Hamas leadership would leave Doha or where they might relocate.

Speculation about Hamas leaders potentially departing Qatar has circulated for years, with earlier Western media reports exploring possible relocation options. While some destinations are considered feasible, logistical and political constraints make relocation complex. Potential destinations reportedly under consideration include Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Algeria.

Officials in Cairo, where recent dialogues have been held between Fatah and Hamas to address Gaza’s future, estimate that joint Arab and regional pressure could soon yield results. Sources suggest that the recent diplomatic rapprochement between Cairo and Doha could help intensify the pressure on Hamas, potentially facilitating a breakthrough.

A critical sticking point is the inability to establish a Social Aid Committee, the body proposed to administer Gaza post-conflict. The ongoing dispute between Hamas and Fatah over this committee has stymied progress in other negotiation channels.

This committee, reportedly accountable to the Palestinian Authority (PA), would comprise independent figures tasked with managing Gaza’s daily needs, with an emphasis on coordinating humanitarian aid distribution. Egyptian sources emphasise that the committee members must receive approval from the US and Israel to facilitate a realignment of the Palestinian factions in Gaza and restore a unified governance structure.

Members of the committee are expected to be appointed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. This Civil Committee to Manage Gaza, to be agreed upon and affiliated with the Palestinian Authority (PA), is part of Egypt’s broader diplomatic efforts to facilitate a Gaza ceasefire and expand humanitarian aid access to the territory.

According to the proposal, the committee would oversee civil administration in Gaza, manage the reopening and closure of the Rafah border crossing, and initiate Gaza’s reconstruction. The committee would consist not of faction members but of independent professionals from Gaza.

Fatah leaders Mahmoud Aloul and Azzam Al-Ahmad travelled to Cairo to discuss the proposal with Hamas with Egyptian mediation. According to a source, Egypt’s diplomatic efforts have prompted a shift in the Hamas position, with the group showing a willingness to establish the committee.

The proposal was further reviewed in recent meetings between Abbas and Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi.

Al-Issa said that pressure on Hamas has been mounting for some time, even before Israeli forces moved to seize the Rafah border crossing.

He said that the current US pressure, orchestrated by the Biden administration, is intended to push Hamas towards accepting a ceasefire agreement. The administration seeks a diplomatic achievement before it leaves office, given its inability to pressure Israel directly. This has led the US to press its Gulf and Egyptian allies to persuade Hamas to adopt a more conciliatory stance.

Al-Issa highlighted the severe pressures facing Hamas, especially over the past few weeks as northern Gaza has been emptied and civilians face escalating violence. He expressed scepticism that Arab efforts would yield significant results, as the ultimate decisions lie with the Hamas Gaza-based leadership, which is enduring both social and material losses.

Given its distributed leadership structure, Hamas leaders have positioned themselves across several countries, including Turkey, Qatar, Iran, Algeria, and Lebanon, allowing for flexibility and resilience against pressures targeting their operations in a specific location.

Addressing reports of possible relocation from Qatar, Al-Issa suggested that Iran would be a probable destination. However, a shift to Ankara would not substantially alter the movement’s power dynamics, as ultimate authority rests in Gaza.

Regarding Palestinian dialogue for a post-conflict future, Al-Issa said that Hamas has shown increased flexibility over governance in Gaza, expressing a willingness to transfer control of border crossings to the PA and allowing for additional security roles.

He referenced recent reports that Hamas is prepared to hand over the Gaza administration to the PA, a proposition obstructed by Netanyahu, who reportedly seeks to undermine Palestinian political governance in Gaza and replace it with local business leaders or tribal authorities.

In the light of Israel’s unyielding demands, including calls to occupy and partition Gaza, Al-Issa emphasised that Hamas views this trajectory as a major setback for the Palestinians and is thus more inclined towards accommodating some level of external pressure rather than reverting to pre-existing divides.


* A version of this article appears in print in the 14 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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