Will Iran’s position implicate Syria in a war with Israel?

Bassel Oudat in Damascus , Tuesday 19 Nov 2024

Israel has recently intensified its military operations and air strikes on Damascus, focusing on areas that were previously considered secure, such as the neighbourhoods where the residences and offices of senior political and military figures are located.

The Syrian conundrum
Funeral procession at the Al-Bashir Mosque in the Palestinian Yarmuk Camp in the Syrian capital Damascus, for three Palestinians of the jihad Islamic group killed by Israel (photo: AFP)

 

Simultaneously, it has targeted those central regions of Syria known as strongholds or transit routes for the Lebanese Hizbullah, prompting speculation about whether its military campaigns will expand to encompass Syria.

So far, the strikes remain targeted and confined to specific security zones, primarily focused on figures linked to Hizbullah or the Palestinian resistance, weapons storage facilities, and critical infrastructure such as bridges, roads, and crossings reportedly used for transporting arms from Syria to Lebanon. On occasion, Israeli strikes have targeted Iranian operatives believed to be liaising with Damascus or Hizbullah.

Each time an area in Damascus or elsewhere is bombed, Israel justifies its actions by citing the presence of Islamic Jihad sites, Hizbullah transit routes, or armament depots. Sometimes it reveals the identities of the people eliminated in these operations, even though civilian casualties are a recurring outcome.

The Israeli strikes have gradually escalated, their scope and significance extending. While they remain militarily focused, the strikes convey unmistakable political messages to the Syrian regime, revealing Israel’s readiness to broaden its targeting parameters to include regime-related sites should Damascus fail to take definitive steps to meet Israel’s demands, curbing the presence of Iranian forces and Hizbullah-affiliated forces and removing certain Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders from Syrian territory.

It appears Israel and the US are adamant on curtailing Iranian influence in Syria. The US Central Command confirmed air strikes on Iranian-backed militias in Syria, citing attacks on its bases in northwestern Syria as the reason. In this context Central Command Commander General Michael Erik Kurilla said the US and its regional allies will neutralise threats to its forces and partners.

Despite vocal support for Hamas and Hizbullah in its media, the Syrian regime has maintained a neutral, non-interventionist stance in practice since the start of the new Israeli war on Gaza even when it expanded to Lebanon against Hizbullah. The Syrian regime has remained silent despite domestic criticism.

In the face of accusations of collaborating with Israel by providing coordinates for the locations of Hamas, Hizbullah, and some Iranian leaders levelled at certain figures within the Syrian regime, this silence reflects the determination not to intervene in the Israeli war, remaining neutral militarily and practically.

Meanwhile, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has affirmed the continued presence of military advisers in Syria, stating that no decisions have been made to alter the number of forces and personnel. Senior Adviser to the Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Asghar Haji said that Tehran “has not taken any decisions to change the number of its forces in Syria amidst the tensions in the Middle East.” This signals Iran’s intention to drag the Syrian regime to a larger confrontation with Israel because Tehran will not decrease its influence or the number of its troops in Syria, which is a primary demand by Israel.

But this may also be framed as a strategic media narrative, with reports citing “informed Iranian sources” suggesting that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard has already pulled its senior officers from Syria in the wake of repeated Israeli air strikes. Instead, Iran is said to be relying increasingly on its allied militias to maintain influence in Syria.

There is no doubt a trust crisis exists between the Syrian regime and Iran. Tehran believes certain figures in the Syrian regime are leaking sensitive information to Israel or the US. Hardline groups in Tehran are calling for retribution against them. Meanwhile, some Iranian moderates prefer avoiding a direct military engagement between Syria and Israel, recognising Syria’s military weakness and the potential for the regime’s collapse.

The recent Israeli escalation and airstrikes targeting areas in Damascus and central Syria coincided with the visit of Ali Larijani, adviser to the Iranian supreme leader, to Damascus, adding a significant political layer to Israel’s military operations aimed at curbing Iranian influence in Syria. Larijani met with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, during which time he reiterated Iran’s unwavering support for Syria and its readiness to provide all forms of assistance, and stressed Syria’s pivotal regional role. In addition, the visit of Iranian Defence Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh, who held discussions with both Al-Assad and his Syrian counterpart, raises critical questions about the broader implications of these high-level engagements. Do these visits reflect Iranian efforts to draw Syria into a direct confrontation with Israel, or can Al-Assad leverage his position to persuade Iran to refrain from involving Syria in this escalation?

According to Said Moqbel, a political analyst, “Iran has been supporting the Syrian regime for over 14 years, dating back to the onset of the revolution against it. During this time, Iran has granted the regime significant privileges and exercised influence on it, to the extent that a portion of Syria’s political and military decision-making now lies in Iranian hands. Currently, Iran is the primary guarantor of the regime’s protection. While Russia serves as Al-Assad’s principal strategic ally, it lacks a ground presence in Syria. Instead, numerous Iranian-linked forces and militias operate on the ground, providing critical support and field protection for Al-Assad.

“The Syrian regime’s forces are unable to engage in conflict with the Syrian opposition due to 14 years of fragmentation and weakening. Consequently, Al-Assad needs Iran. Were Iran to withdraw from Syria, it would leave a substantial vacuum and render Al-Assad significantly weaker. However, Al-Assad now also faces a dilemma: he fears alienating Iran or adopting a neutral stance, as it could jeopardise their alliance and erode his capacity to maintain control in his country.”

The Syrian regime finds itself trapped between two perilous options: abandoning Iran to allow Israel to dismantle Iranian influence in Syria, or maintaining the alliance with Iran and risking direct confrontation with Israel. However, the regime’s military weakness, economic collapse, and lack of allies make the latter option particularly risky. The concern is that this ambiguous position will continue, leaving Israel to alter the region’s military dynamics through gradual escalation to secure its borders.

Researcher Abdel-Wahed Alwani says, “Israel’s strategic objective is ensuring its national security by preventing attacks like the 7 October 2023 Hamas operation. Israel’s military strategy in Syria will focus on dismantling Iranian and Hizbullah positions, particularly along the Syrian-Israeli border, and this could involve extensive bombing campaigns to clear the area. This would pave the way for potential Israeli ground incursions, aimed at removing Iranian and Hizbullah influence and dismantling the military infrastructure in the area.”

* A version of this article appears in print in the 21 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly under the title: The Syrian conundrum

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