US Envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in Beirut on Tuesday for talks with Lebanese officials after having received positive responses from both the Lebanese government and Hizbullah to a draft truce agreement the US had submitted to them last week.

The draft text was submitted by US Ambassador to Beirut Lisa Johnson, to Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Najib Mikati. It was then conveyed to Hizbullah, After studying it for three days, Hizbullah returned it through the same channels on 18 November. Nothing has been divulged officially about the proposal, but a draft leaked to the press indicates that there are two main points of contention.

The first regards the formation of an International Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanism (IMEM) to oversee the implementation of Resolution 1701. The contention apparently surrounds the composition of this body which, according to the leaked draft, would be chaired by the US and include, in addition to UNIFIL, Italy, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Hizbullah is believed to have objected to Germany’s participation, citing what it claims is evidence of Berlin’s pro-Israeli bias even as a member of a UN peacekeeping force. Hizbullah claims that a German warship operating within UNIFIL shot down a Hizbullah drone aimed towards Israel while it did not intervene similarly to stop the Israeli marine landing at Batroun.

The second point concerns Israel’s freedom of action to violate Lebanese territorial, air or sea space whenever it claims Hizbullah has taken an action to rearm or revive its presence south of the Litani River. Despite the Lebanese authorities’ categorical rejection of such a provision, Hizbullah has not rejected the proposal out of hand. Instead, its response included a number of questions and remarks concerning how to address the points of contention and overcome obstacles to an agreement.

A visit by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s Adviser Ali Larijani to Beirut last week inspired some cautious optimism that Tehran would support Lebanon’s acceptance of the US proposal which would pave the way for a truce on the Lebanese front independently of the situation in Gaza. If so, that would mean that stopping the Israeli aggression on Lebanon outweighs the principle of “unity of the fronts” in Tehran’s agenda. Larinjani’s statements suggesting that Tehran would support Beirut whatever it decides contrasted with the more highhanded approach of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Speaker of the Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf during their recent visits to the Lebanese capital.

Hochstein initially delayed his flight to the Lebanese capital, stating that he needed more clarifications on the Lebanese position on the draft proposal. The move suggested that what was on the table was not so much a proposal with some room for give-and-take as a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Some hours later, Israel’s Channel 12 reported that Hochstein had changed his mind “after he received clarifications that will allow that the agreement be signed.”

Last week, Israel expanded its bombardment of the Lebanese capital and the vicinity in a move that appeared calculated to pressure the Lebanese into accepting the American formula for a truce with no further say in the matter. During the previous round of truce negotiations, Israeli strikes targeted residential areas in the constituencies of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in Baalbek, Tyre, and Ghobeiry in southern Beirut. In the current round, residential areas in Zoqaq Al-Blat, which is very close to the Lebanese government headquarters in Beirut, were bombed.

Referring to the Israeli escalation of its bombardment of Beirut and its suburbs, Ali Hassan Khalil, an aide to Berri, said Israel was trying to negotiate “under fire” adding, “this will not affect our position.”

One of the Israeli strikes last week killed Hizbullah’s media chief Mohamed Afif, a second killed official reportedly responsible for Hizbullah military operations in the south, and the third targeted a Hizbullah logistical headquarters. Hizbullah acknowledged the death of Afif for whom it held funeral ceremonies in Sidon. It did not comment on the other two strikes.

Last week, the IOP notched up the frequency of its bombardments to four times a day, whereas its previous bombing routine was limited to the period from midnight to just before dawn and focused solely on Dahiya.

Regarding the IOP’s ground invasion, Tel Aviv announced last week that it had transitioned to its second phase, targeting a second-tier of border villages after destroying more than 35 towns and 40,000 homes in its first phase. The targeted incursion now extends five-seven km into Lebanon, whereas the target of the first phase was three-four km. In the central sector, the enemy forces attempted to seize control of the town of Bint Jbeil but were forced to retreat. In their attempt to penetrate the eastern sector via the town of Khiam, they also encountered fierce resistance. Hizbullah reported that it had bombarded the enemy forces more than seven times on Saturday and Sunday. Another Israeli contingent attempted to bypass Hizbullah defences to penetrate the western sector via the Tyre-Harfa-Shamaa axis after failing to advance from Labouna and Naqoura.

In response, Hizbullah intensified rocket attacks into northern Israel in the vicinity of Acre, Haifa, and Tel Aviv. In the process, it added a new set of military bases to its list of targets. These include the Shraga base north of Acre, which serves as the administrative headquarters of the Golani Brigade; the Eliakim and Tirat Carmel bases south of Haifa; the Haifa Technical Base, which is a logistical training base for forces deployed on the northern front; the Haifa Naval Base and the Stella Maris Base, both of which serve the Israeli navy; and the Nesher Base, which includes a gas station affiliated with the Israeli military.

In the vicinity of Tel Aviv, Hizbullah targeted the Kirya base with drones for the first time. This base houses the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff and includes the control and monitoring system of the Israeli Air Force. Attack drones combined with its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) drones are clearly Hizbullah’s most effective weapon for the offensive operations of the sort it has carried out in the past week.

As Israel pressed ahead with the second phase of its ground incursion, it attempted to consolidate its hold on the southernmost villages by introducing heavy machinery such as artillery batteries.

The civilian toll Israel is wreaking is deliberate. The purpose of its escalation is to up the pressure on the Lebanese government and generate sociodemographic strains in Lebanese society. Since launching its invasion, Israel has murdered more than 3,500 civilians, wounded around 15,000, and inflicted incalculable material loss on civilian structures, including tens of thousands of homes and properties. It will be a long time before any mechanism is devised to compensate the owners for their losses, if this happens at all. Israel’s unrestrained bombing sprees have displaced at least 1.2 million people, many of whom will be at severe risk as winter approaches.

Material losses have increased on the Israeli side from Hizbullah missile fire into northern Israel, but also due to shrapnel from the Iron Dome interception missiles. Fewer than 50 Israeli civilians have been killed in the cross-border exchanges since October 2023.

In directing missile fire towards Tel Aviv, Hizbullah signalled that, like Israel, it can reach civilian areas, although, unlike Israel, it has chosen not to, so far. Its tactical purpose, politically, was to gain some leverage ahead of Hochstein’s forthcoming visit to Beirut to counter the Israeli bombardment of civilian areas that aim to force the Lebanese authorities and Hizbullah to cave to the Israeli insistence on retaining the right to breach Lebanese sovereignty at will, even after a permanent ceasefire is reached. Many Lebanese believe there would be no other way to frame an agreement that includes such a provision except as capitulation to a foreign military aggression.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 21 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly under the title: Truce-bound escalations