Last week’s article looked at the meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping that took place on the sidelines of the G20 Summit hosted by the Peruvian government in Lima on 15 November.

The Lima meeting was the third to take place between the US and Chinese presidents, in which the two leaders have discussed major questions that have been of concern for the two world powers in the context of their bilateral relations as well as of regional and global issues.

Its most important outcome was an agreement to ensure “human control” over the use of nuclear weapons. The significance of this important step is that it is the first time that China has accepted to discuss this topic with the US. It goes without saying that the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region was at the top of the meeting’s agenda, with particular reference to Taiwan, the South China Sea, and, most importantly, the situation in the Korean Peninsula.

At the same time that the meeting between the US and Chinese presidents was taking place, Lima also hosted a Trilateral Summit meeting on 15 November that brought together President Biden, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru of Japan, and President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea. Whereas the US-Chinese meeting had sought to put the future course of relations between the two major powers on a track of “competition,” this summit meeting aimed at deepening security and economic cooperation between the US, Japan, and South Korea.

The containment of growing Chinese power in the Asia-Pacific region has been one of the basic objectives of this trilateral alliance since 2021 when Biden was sworn into office. His first foreign visit outside Europe was to Japan and South Korea. The US strategic objective has been to establish “extended deterrence” in order to meet the challenges represented by China and North Korea, and at the Lima Summit meeting Biden reaffirmed the US commitment to strengthen “extended deterrence” cooperation through the US-South Korean and US-Japanese alliances.

At the same time, the summit also commended the Trilateral Economic Security Dialogue that aims to deepen engagement between the three countries on economic security issues. During the summit meeting, the three countries announced the establishment of a Trilateral Secretariat that would be responsible for coordinating and carrying out their “shared commitments,” according to a joint statement released on 15 November.

One of the important outcomes of the summit meeting was the recognition that security questions in Asia and Europe are “indivisible” and more “interlinked” than ever, according to an unnamed senior US official in a press briefing on 15 November.

In addition to repeating the call for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and accusing North Korea of violating UN Security Council Resolutions related to its nuclear and ballistic missiles programme, the summit also discussed the growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea in the war in Ukraine and the deployment of North Korean troops in the Kursk region of Russia to push back the Ukrainian forces that crossed the Russian border in August.

According to reports on 23 November, 40 per cent of the territory occupied by Ukrainian forces has been cleared. The Lima Summit meeting dealt with the ramifications of Russian-North Korean security and military cooperation, stressing the need for closer coordination on how the US, Japan, and South Korea are going to respond.

The senior US official quoted above said that there are “teams” talking on a daily basis about the “best ways” of doing this. Interestingly, he added that there is a recognition that China has a role to play in this response, pointing out that “one would think it would not be in China’s interest to have this kind of destabilising cooperation” taking place in the region.

The three leaders agreed to “follow continuously” developments and said they would continue to have “intensive conversations” on how to respond “collectively” to them.

There are now fewer than two months before President-elect Donald Trump is sworn in as the 47th president of the United States, and the world has been asking since his re-election on 5 November whether his administration will continue the policies of the Biden White House not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also in Ukraine.

It has also been asking about the future of the security and military alliances that the Biden administration has set up over the past four years, alliances that have, to say the least, destabilised international security and stability.

Maybe the strategic objectives of the next US administration will not be different from those pursued by the Democrats when they were in power. However, the means used could be different, since Trump has promised to bring about peace in Ukraine and the Middle East. In his first term in office between 2016 and 2020, he broke a taboo in US foreign policy by meeting leader of North Korea Kim Jong Un in person twice. He was also the first US president to set foot in the Demilitarised Zone between North and South Korea and shake hands there with the North Korean leader.

Yet, things have changed, I would say dramatically, since then. No one could have imagined then that North Korea would deploy its forces in Europe in support of Russia. NATO at its Madrid Summit meeting in June 2022 identified China as a competitor, contrary to its own Charter of April 1949. If the West is now willing to create an “Asian NATO,” what will prevent the further unprecedented mobilisation of North Korean troops on European soil, something which has never been seen before?

It would be wise for the next US administration to reconsider the policies of the Biden administration that have led to such developments that have long-term consequences for international peace and security. The remarks made on television by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 21 November pertaining to changes in Russia’s nuclear doctrine should also not be taken lightly by the foreign policy and national security teams of the 47th president of the United States.

The writer is former assistant foreign minister.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 28 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly