The Ukrainian crisis took a dangerous turn on 19 November, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), after receiving the green light from the Biden administration, launched US-made ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) missiles deep into Russian territory, damaging a military facility in Bryansk in the west of the country.

US President Joe Biden’s decision to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range ballistic missiles against Russia reverses longstanding policy. The move angered Moscow, which had previously warned in a Foreign Ministry statement that “Kyiv’s use of long-range missiles to attack our territory would represent the direct involvement of the United States and its satellites in hostilities against Russia, as well as a radical change in the essence and nature of the conflict.”

“Russia’s response in such a case will be appropriate and palpable,” it said.

In a televised address on 21 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin put the Western powers on notice, saying Russia had the right to strike military targets in countries that supplied weapons to Ukraine to hit Russia.

On 19 November, he signed a decree updating Russia’s nuclear doctrine, effectively lowering the threshold for a Russian retaliatory strike using a nuclear weapon. It states that any aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear state that is carried out with the participation or support of a nuclear state will be considered a joint attack.

In response to the US’ allowing Kyiv to strike Russian territory using advanced Western missiles Russia responded by firing a newly developed medium-range hypersonic ballistic missile known as “Oreshnik” targeting a military facility in Dnipro in Ukraine. Putin also said that Russia would continue testing its new hypersonic missiles in the war in Ukraine.

According to some reports, Biden reversed the US policy on Kyiv’s use of ATACMS missiles in response to the uncorroborated presence of “tens of thousands” of North Korean forces in Kursk in Russia. Biden had previously warned he would consider lifting restrictions on Ukraine’s use of these weapons if North Korean forces were deployed at the front in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces have seized a small portion of territory in the Kursk region.

Kyiv has long been pressuring Biden to give it more ballistic missiles and to lift restrictions on their use. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is coming under increasing domestic pressure due to the steady Russian advances along the front in eastern Ukraine and the severe attrition on Ukrainian troops who have been battling to hold the line.

At the same time, it is no coincidence that the Biden administration’s about-face on the question of the missiles occurred immediately after the re-election of Donald Trump as the next US president in November. Trump has repeatedly pledged to stop the war in Ukraine and has criticised the Biden administration for its unchecked spending in its support for Kyiv against Russia.

Zelensky is wary of the incoming US president’s relationship with Putin. He fears that Putin might take advantage of it to further expand Russian attacks inside Ukraine. Kyiv, along with its European allies, is concerned that the US under Trump could cut its military and material support for Ukraine, with the Europeans being in no position to take up the slack.

Biden may have decided to escalate now in the hope of reversing the trajectory of the war or at least of preventing further Russian advances in the Donbas region and improving Ukraine’s hand in any negotiations to end the conflict.

However, some commentators have ventured that the step was taken to lock the incoming Trump administration into a situation that will force it to keep in line with the current approach to handling the Ukraine question.

Commenting on the Biden administration’s actions, Russian Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters that “it is clear that the outgoing administration in Washington intends to take steps to continue to add fuel to the fire and to further inflame tensions around this conflict.”

“This decision [to allow Ukraine to use US ballistic missiles against Russian targets] is reckless, dangerous, and aimed at a qualitative change, a qualitative increase in the level of involvement of the United States.”

So far, Russia appears to be calibrating its responses to the Western actions carefully. It has hinted at the possibility of striking NATO members or their interests in response to their complicity in Ukrainian strikes against Russia. Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles supplied by the Western powers means that the “NATO countries are at war with Russia,” Putin said.

Given the damage inflicted by the US and British missiles fired by Kyiv, Moscow has not ruled out the option of a nuclear weapon in response to a long-range missile fired deeper into Russia. The decree that Putin signed on 19 November allows Russia to respond with nuclear weapons if it is attacked by ballistic missiles.

However, Moscow might instead resort to unconventional or asymmetric alternatives in response to the Western escalatory tactics. It has other new weapons systems, including drones, that it could deploy. It could conduct various sabotage operations in the European countries. Alternatively, it could call some of its alliances in Africa, the Middle East, or elsewhere into play to disrupt US interests.

Meanwhile, Russia could sustain or increase its attacks on energy infrastructure or military facilities in Ukraine, while intensifying its assaults on Ukrainian forces along the front lines.

Russia has the advantage on the ground in Ukraine, and it has various ways to respond to the licence that the US and other Western powers have given Ukraine on the use of their weapons. For the time being at least, Russian reactions are likely to remain restrained and measured.

The Western governments are also not alone in facing domestic pressures because of the war in Ukraine. Putin also faces pressures at home due to economic problems and increasing popular discontent. He understands that expanding the war in Ukraine could have important adverse repercussions on the domestic situation in Russia itself.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 28 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly