As I write this, 24 hours have passed since the ceasefire went into effect on the Lebanese-Israeli front. Commentary so far has focused on three questions. First, where did the initial push for a truce come from, because that is hard to determine. It did not come from the UN Security Council or the UN in general. Nor did it come from the belligerents, whether jointly or separately. What we do know is that Hizbullah and Israel agreed to cease hostilities at a certain hour and that the decision came in the form of an announcement by US President Joe Biden, who linked it with a call to Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and Israel to intensify efforts to reach a ceasefire in Gaza. In the end, this was a triumph for US diplomacy which, from the outset, was intent on involving the Lebanese state and armed forces, which had not been party to hostilities.

Secondly, who won? Each side claims a major victory. The announcement addressed factions within Israel who would criticise Netanyahu for failing to achieve Israel’s stated objectives from the war, and factions within Hizbullah who might blame it for agreeing to a truce that flouts its earlier vow of steadfastness until total victory and its commitment to the “unity of the fronts” fighting the Israeli enemy.

Thirdly, will the ceasefire last, leading to an end of the war on that front, or is it just a temporary suspension in hostilities? The latter is not unlikely, since the war is still ongoing by other means. Both sides might see this as an opportunity to catch their breath, regroup and marshal their resources for further rounds. Certain developments on the ground were predictable. Israel claimed Hizbullah breached the terms of the agreement, expressing aggressive intentions.

The underlying fact is that the war has not ended, regardless of the cessation in fighting. Iran has made it clear that it has not forgotten the need to retaliate against Israel’s previous aggression. Public opinion in Israel is incensed because the ceasefire had not eliminated Hizbullah. In other words, Tel Aviv had not politically exploited the results of the war, namely the assassination of Hizbullah’s senior leaders and commanders and the destruction of much of its military capacities, not to mention the immense damage Israel inflicted on the Lebanese capital, especially in and around Dahiya, and on dozens of towns and villages.

On the other hand, Israel wanted more freedom to focus on the Gaza front where Hamas, responsible for the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation that triggered the current war, still holds Israeli hostages. Israeli far-right groups have set their sights on Gaza, what is more, where they plan to build Jewish settlements, while the Israeli right along with certain quarters of the US far-right thirst to exploit Gaza’s offshore wealth.

Ultimately, the coming phases in the war will be determined by which prevails: the logic that it has not accomplished its objectives for either side—Israel has not crushed the militias that oppose it, and the militias have not been able to break Israel—or the logic of building on the ceasefire.  

Another party is required to make the temporary ceasefire permanent and to build on it to achieve the same goal in Gaza. Then both these results can be channelled into a path to a comprehensive peace process that achieves regional security and prosperity for all. These aims cannot be achieved without observing and acting on three principles. First, the states of this region must become states in the proper sense of the term, which is to say their governing authorities must have exclusive sovereign authority over the territory of the state, monopolise legitimate recourse to arms, and have the sole power to take decisions regarding war and peace. This entails delegitimising armed groups established outside the framework of the state. Second, a two-state solution to the Palestinian cause will not succeed unless the Palestinian state is accompanied by Israel becoming a state that behaves like part of the region and its collective future and prosperity, instead of an outsider representing international powers historically known for their antisemitism. Third, the fate of this region is contingent on its countries’ collective resolve to assume historical responsibility for their fate. They must stop relying on foreign powers to rush to the region in times of crisis, always leaving it as it was before: volatile, prone to intermittent outbreaks of conflict, and permanently seething with hatred.

As for the other party required to help realise these ends, it exists. It consists of those Arab states that have shed ideologies and attitudes that had isolated them from the contemporary world and begun to implement structural changes in their modes of development and approaches to life. The Middle East is not an exception to the course of global evolution; it has the potential to overcome backwardness, myth and ignorance. In any case, the world has grown too small to hide from.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 December, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly