The departure of former president Bashar Al-Assad from Damascus on 7 December has left an unexpected vacuum in Syria. Nothing of this sort has occurred in the country in over 50 years, since his father, Hafez Al-Assad came to power in 1971.

Even the most optimistic supporters of regime change in Syria could not have imagined that the Deterrence of Aggression Operation launched by the militant opposition could remove Al-Assad in just 11 days.

Initially, the militants’ sights had been set on expanding their areas of control in the north of the country, creating a situation that would force Al-Assad to negotiate with them and revive a political process that would include the militant opposition forces.

As it turned out, he was too slow to appreciate the magnitude of the attrition Israel had inflicted on his Iranian and Hizbullah allies, while Russia seemed indifferent to his fate. He therefore found himself stranded and unable to face the onslaught on his own.

To make matters worse, while the anti-Al-Assad forces had been preparing for years since the 2020 ceasefire in anticipation of the collapse of the Astana Process, Al-Assad himself was dismantling the militias that had stood by him during those years, for fear that they might challenge his authority and demand a share in the resources of government-controlled areas.

Syria now stands on the threshold of uncharted territory. The mere question of transitioning to an interim process is shrouded in uncertainty and fraught with risks. The opposition forces have crafted their messaging to allay anxieties among Syria’s many religious and ethnic minorities. Armenians and Christians in Aleppo and Shiites and Ismailis in the countryside have been told that they have nothing to fear from the reformed Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) group, the main militant faction.

Three days before the regime’s fall, the opposition specifically addressed the country’s Alawite community, inviting them to abandon Al-Assad and to join the opposition in becoming part of a future without sectarianism.

Words, alone, of course, are not sufficient. It took actions to give them credibility. These included avoiding friction with the Armenians and Christians in Aleppo and reaching an agreement with the Ismailis in Salamiyah in the Hama Governorate, allowing the opposition forces to pass through that area without incident on their way to Damascus.

Such concrete steps proved decisive in undermining one of the Al-Assad regime’s main propaganda tools and instruments of control, which was to disseminate fears of religious extremism among the militant opposition while casting itself as the protector of the minorities. Many instead came to believe that the opposition was bringing with it a comprehensive vision for a new and truly pluralistic society and that its battle was exclusively with the Al-Assad regime.

Similarly, the opposition’s assurances to Iran that Syria’s Shiite population and shrines would be safe were sufficient to persuade Tehran that it would be more beneficial for it to reach accommodations with the ascendant forces than to continue to support Al-Assad, especially given Iran’s waning influence in Syria.

Moscow, for its part, seemed resigned to the fall of the Al-Assad regime, when it became clear it could not muster enough forces to defend itself. Communications with Ankara may have assured Moscow that its bases in Syria would remain secure in Al-Assad’s absence. It may also be that Al-Assad’s pleas for help to his allies convinced them that he was no longer in a position to secure their interests in Syria.

Although the Astana Process failed to make a significant breakthrough towards national reconciliation, the forum played a critical role in the Al-Assad regime’s final hours. This was what permitted close and stable communication lines between Turkey and Russia and Iran, on the one hand, and Turkey and the Turkish-backed militant forces on the other.

The coordination was crucial to ensure a smooth and relatively peaceful handover to the opposition forces in key areas, especially in Hama, Homs, and Damascus.

As for what comes next, it is difficult to predict, apart from the fact that the coming phase will be extremely precarious. The opposition forces, which have been trained and primed for years for combat, are not yet prepared to assume the reigns of civilian government. transition to. The nature of a new Syrian leadership and the mechanics of the transition remain very much up in the air.

Arrangements for the day after in Syria were hammered out in principle years ago. However, these discussions, as well as the formation of many of the civil forces that would implement the plans and manage the reconstruction of Syria took place abroad.

They are now awaiting the announcement of the frameworks that will integrate them into the interim political process. The most immediate question in this regard is how much room will the rebel forces’ military leadership allow for the participation of Syrian civilians in decision-making processes?

For the moment, it appears that the debate over Syria’s near future will focus on central dichotomies, starting with the civilian-military one. How will roles and functions be distributed between the fighters who liberated Syria from the Al-Assad regime and civilian political and technical experts in the coming phase?

UN Security Council Resolution 2254 of 2015 outlines a transitional process. It calls for an interim governing body made up of both sides, the regime and the opposition, that would be formed in at most six months. But with the collapse of the regime, who will the opposition consult with to form such a body? How will HTS fit in? HTS, which was, and still is, designated as a terrorist organisation, was excluded from the aforementioned discussions.

The resolution also calls for the promulgation of a new constitution, general elections within the constitutional framework, and the establishment of a new inclusive governing authority within 18 months. This seems quite ambitious, as the constitutional drafting process will give rise to intense debates between conflicting ideological orientations over the degrees with which religion, religious rights, ethnic identities and a host of other thorny issues will be framed in a constitution that will presumably lay the foundations for a unified Syrian citizen-based nation.

The religious-secularist dichotomy will loom large in the forthcoming period. The dominant portion of the opposition forces are Islamist extremists, like HTS and the factions of the Turkish-aligned Syrian National Army. The remaining factions, which make up less than a third of the forces, are breakaway contingents from the regime’s armed forces. These groups tend to have a more secular orientation. With the common enemy gone, will the militant opposition sustain its cohesion?

The Kurdish question has persisted primarily on the sidelines of the central confrontation between the regime and the Turkish-backed factions. However, Kurdish identity will surface soon in the context of the centre-periphery dichotomy and, specifically, the extent to which the new Syria will accommodate Kurdish national aspirations and a continued form of Kurdish self-rule in the northeast.

Obviously, scope for that will be reduced to zero if Turkey has a say in the matter and, indeed, this is a major reason why Ankara has invested so much in its political and military intervention in Syria.

Elsewhere in Syria, such as in Idlib and Afrin, which are administered by Turkey, Turkish interests may clash with Syrian national interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity. More generally, the centre-periphery dichotomy will arise in the constitutional drafting period, when a constituent assembly works out formulas for local municipal or district government that respect the country’s ethnic and religious diversity and strike a balance between decentralised and centralised government.

What transpires at the different levels of these dichotomies will constitute the real test of the assurances the opposition forces gave while they were making their advances. How will they react when the debates grow heated?

The uncertainties and the potential pitfalls that lie ahead are why an effective government must remain in place for the time being to manage the affairs of the country and help steer it to safer shores during the current transition. Towards this end, it must remain above the political fray, so as to retain the confidence of all stakeholders.

UN Resolution 2254 does not seriously address the question of military arrangements for this point, which means there is no established frame-of-reference. It does call for a ceasefire, respect for which is essential to any interim phase to prevent any backsliding into conflict. At present, the most volatile fault lines are between the Turkish-backed forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as well as between the various factions that make up the militant opposition.

Because of the potential for conflict between various armed groups, the question of what to do with the multiple militia formations, as well as the current Syrian Army, needs to be addressed soon. But even before then comes the question as to who will oversee that essential process of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of the multiple opposition, Kurdish, and regime military formations.

Clearly, new UN Security Council resolutions are needed to complement Resolution 2254, filling the frame-of-reference gaps and providing a clear roadmap for managing the potentially explosive miliary/security dimensions of the coming phase.

The security breakdowns in Damascus and elsewhere underscore the risks of the collapse of central authority, security forces and law enforcement. Ongoing instability and recurrent or widespread outbreaks of violence will hamper reconstruction efforts, at the very least, and prevent the return of refugees eager to pick up life again back home and help rebuild their country.

Meanwhile, the anticipatable Israeli seizure of control of the demilitarised buffer zone in the Syrian Golan reminds us of how much more vulnerable Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity are now that Al-Assad is gone.

One can only hope that the Western powers’ glee at the fall of Al-Assad combined with Russia, China and Iran’s hope to protect what remains of the Syrian national defences might lead to a rapid consensus on a new resolution to help with the management of Syria’s day after.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 December, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly