A Syrian bunker complex outside the port of Tartus was ablaze and rocked by explosions after an intense wave of Israeli air strikes (photo: AFP)
Last week, Moscow opened lines of communication with the new Syrian administration. “Contact has been established with the [Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham] political committee, which is currently working in one of the hotels in Damascus,” Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov told reporters in Moscow on 12 December. He indicated that his government intends to maintain its bases in Syria to continue to help with the fight against international terrorism. The bases “were there at the Syrians’ request with the aim of fighting terrorists from the Islamic State. I am proceeding on the basis of the notion that everyone agrees that the fight against terrorism, and what remains of IS, is not over.” The Al-Assad government had leased both locations to Russia through 2066, but it is uncertain whether the new regime will honour this deal.
Losing its military bases would diminish Moscow’s influence not only in Syria but elsewhere in the region. Syria under Al-Assad had offered Russia a strategic hub from which to project its influence and secure its interests in the region. The naval base at Tartus was Russia’s only defence repair and maintenance centre in the Mediterranean, while the Hmeimim Airbase offered the prospect of strategic manoeuvrability.
With the takeover by the Turkish backed forces led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), Russia may, at the very least, risk some of the privileges it had enjoyed under the ousted president Bashar Al-Assad. Moscow is obviously aware that its support for the Al-Assad regime puts it in conflict with the militants. It is also aware that Ankara and the US will manoeuvre against the Russian presence in Syria in the coming phase. Russia is therefore understandably taking precautions. On the evening of 14 December, a Russian cargo plane took off from the Latakia Airbase bound for Libya, and according to a Syrian security official speaking to Reuters, more departures from Hmeimim are expected in the next few days.
Another worry is the security fluidity, which Israel exploited to occupy the demilitarised zone between the Occupied Golan and Syria and then to seize additional Syrian territory beyond that. This too could present challenges to Russia’s military bases in Syria.
Russian interests in Syria and the region would be immediately affected by the loss of its bases or a significant reduction in its military and political presence there. For one consideration, this would create space for Turkey to secure control of strategic areas in western Syria, while the US might contemplate expanding the territory it occupies in eastern Syria.
The increased presence of the two NATO countries in Syria would further undermine Russia’s ability to confront threats and pressures against its allies in the Eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere in the Arab world and Africa. The loss of its bases or its field operational capacities would additionally deprive it of a strategic centre for gathering and processing intelligence on the activities of hostile actors, as well as shaping and conducting its policy on the region.
The question of Russia’s military presence and political standing in Syria has implications at the level of the larger geopolitical chessboard. This applies in particular to the proxy war in Ukraine where Kyiv’s Western-supported long-range strikes against the Russian interior have thrown Russia onto a back foot, prompting it to threaten a nuclear response against Ukraine. Certainly, the loss of its bases in Syria would deprive Russia of an important card it could wield in its dealings with the upcoming Donald Trump administration, whether regarding negotiations over Ukraine or other contentious issues.
In establishing contact with HTS, Moscow is conveying messages and sending out feelers. On the one hand, it is signalling its support for the transitional phase and affirming that its hosting of Al-Assad and his family is for humanitarian purposes and should not be interpreted as a sign of opposition to a new order in Syria. At the same time, it is signalling that it would be interested in exploring paths that might enable to retain the Hmeimim and Tartus bases whether in accordance with the existing leases or some other arrangement.
However, some analysts believe that the new Syrian administration will lean towards reducing the Russian military presence in the coming phase, given its evident desire to reorient towards the West. HTS and its leader are keen to be removed from the US terrorist list while any future Syrian regime will be keen to rebuild its military, which Israel has just destroyed, according to the Western model.
Nevertheless, the current situation in Syria is still murky. The US and its allies have not yet clarified their vision with respect to HTS and the other militant factions. Until they do, it may suit the current leadership not to antagonise Russia or sever Syria’s ties with it. It could even respond to the Russian overtures, engage in talks and working out new formulas for bilateral political and economic relations. Perhaps these would include arrangements regarding the bases.
That said, Moscow is probably hedging its bets, perhaps focusing on Libya as a possible alternative. Moscow has strategic relations with the government of eastern Libya, where it also has bases in Jufra, Brak Al-Shati, Khuruba, and Qardabiya near Sirte. Libya also appears to be a base for the Russian African Corps, increasing that country’s strategic importance to Russia because of its proximity to the Sahel and Sahara and sub-Saharan Africa. According to some reports, Russia has recently stepped up the development of its military facilities and arsenals in the Brak Al-Shati and Jufra bases. However, the wholesale transfer of Russian military assets from Syria to Libya could present problems, not least because of ongoing instability resulting from the institutional bifurcation between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity and the Tobruk/Benghazi based General Command and House of Representatives government. The Libyan alternative might also present a logistical challenge as Russian transport aircraft, such as the Ilyushin Il-76, cannot fly directly from Russia to Libya with a large cargo.
Regardless of how talks with the interim government in Damascus play out, if indeed they take place, the regime change marks a strategic setback for Russia. While eastern Libya presents a convenient interim parking place for its military assets in Syria, the political and technical challenges would appear to rule it out as a long-term solution, or at least as the only solution. This helps explain Moscow’s efforts to develop military relations with Sudan and Algeria, probably with an eye to building Russian bases in these countries
* A version of this article appears in print in the 19 December, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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