Iran’s foundations of its so-called “resistance axis,” particularly Hizbullah in Lebanon, have been notably weakened. Simultaneously, the regime of former president Bashar Al-Assad in Syria has suffered a dramatic collapse, leaving Iran increasingly exposed to its adversaries on the eve of 2025.

Insiders say that Iranian officials in private discussions have described 2024 as one of the most challenging years for the country since the harrowing period of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988).

In stark contrast, Turkey is revelling in its newfound regional ascendancy. Turkish-backed forces within the armed Syrian Islamist opposition successfully toppled the Al-Assad regime, seizing control of the country.

This seismic shift has endowed Turkey with a range of strategic advantages, including heightened influence in the Middle East and enhanced leverage in its dealings with both European allies and the US.

Such a transformation seemed unthinkable at the beginning of the year. Yet, the unexpected chain of events set in motion by Hamas’ attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the ensuing bloody Israeli military operations has reshaped the regional landscape in ways few could have predicted.

As the region braces for further upheavals, 2025 promises to bring even more profound changes.

Iran’s official response to the developments in Syria has been mixed and uncertain, reflecting the unease among the Iranian elites over the causes of Al-Assad’s downfall, whom to hold accountable, and how to respond.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei attributed Al-Assad’s fall to a US-Israeli conspiracy, denouncing the opposition forces that ousted him as “aggressors” with conflicting agendas operating as proxies for foreign powers.

He also pointed to Turkey’s support for certain opposition groups as a contributing factor.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian adopted a more diplomatic stance, emphasising the Syrian people’s right to shape their political future free from external interference. Vice-President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif offered a sharper critique, blaming Al-Assad’s arrogance and failure to pursue political inclusivity following his military victories over opposition forces in 2016 for his fall.

Zarif argued that Al-Assad’s reluctance to seek a “win-win” political settlement ultimately led to the current turmoil.

Other Iranian diplomatic sources have implicated some Arab states, alleging that they persuaded Al-Assad to distance himself from Iran and the “axis of resistance” in exchange for economic assistance to rebuild Syria.

According to the Mehr News Agency, this pivot left Al-Assad vulnerable and hastened his regime’s collapse. “With Syria temporarily removed from the ‘axis of resistance,’ doubts now linger over the cohesion of the [resistance] front and its constituent elements,” the agency observed.

Despite the apparent differences, these views might collectively represent a holistic Iranian assessment of the rapid fall of the Syrian regime. Tehran perceives external influences chiefly from Turkey, the US, and Israel as having been central to Al-Assad’s downfall, while also holding him and certain Arab states accountable for his regime’s collapse.

The withdrawal of Houthi and Hizbullah forces from Syria under pressure from these Arab states further exposed Al-Assad to vulnerability, Iranian sources say.

RETHINKING: The military setbacks suffered by Hizbullah, compounded by the ouster of one of Tehran’s most significant regional allies, have sparked urgent questions about the future of Iran’s strategy.

Iranian officials now face an extraordinarily narrow window to recalibrate the country’s regional approach before the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump on 20 January.

In the short to medium term, Tehran must undertake the critical task of redefining the “axis of resistance” and reassessing its key components. While Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, the Popular Mobilisation Forces and other Shiite groups in Iraq, and the Fatemiyoun Brigade in Afghanistan are likely to remain integral to Iran’s network of allies, Syria under rebel control along with Hamas and Islamic Jihad have effectively distanced themselves.

According to Iranian sources, this shift is attributed to their growing alignment with Turkey and opposition factions in Syria at the expense of Iran’s strategic objectives in the region.

Tehran must also redefine the objectives of the axis in the light of these recent developments. Initial indications suggest a significant retrenchment, with a focus on preserving the cohesion of the remaining members.

Naim Qassem, the newly appointed secretary general of Hizbullah, has acknowledged this reality, conceding that the loss of Syria represents a severe blow. He emphasised that maintaining prior levels of activity is no longer viable. Consequently, the immediate priority appears to be safeguarding the existing members of the axis.

This shift signals that Tehran is likely to prioritise the survival and unity of its remaining allies while cautiously exploring limited engagements with adversarial forces when its interests demand it.

Tehran must also confront the challenge of defining its relationship with the new regime in Syria, which is likely to be dominated by factions hostile to Iranian influence. Although the precise makeup of Syria’s future government remains uncertain, it is widely expected that Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTC) and its allies will assume a dominant role.

Within Iranian policymaking circles, a pragmatic approach seems to be emerging. This strategy envisions a relationship with Syria’s new leadership akin to Tehran’s dealings with the Taliban in Afghanistan – a pragmatic engagement rooted in necessity rather than ideology.

Such a relationship would prioritise safeguarding Iran’s strategic interests in Syria amid the ongoing shifts in the regional landscape.

One prominent Iranian reformist politician closely aligned with the Pezeshkian administration acknowledged that the Iranian government faces a set of complex choices in 2025.

He noted that the developments in Syria will undoubtedly exert additional pressure on Iran. However, he argued that the change of regime in Damascus will not alter Iran’s strategic direction in the coming period and may, in fact, reinforce it.

“Iran’s strategic approach has long prioritised openness towards regional countries, improving diplomatic relations, and seeking to revive the nuclear agreement with the incoming US administration, should it demonstrate willingness to engage.”

“This strategy remains unchanged and would have continued irrespective of whether the Syrian regime persisted or was replaced,” he told Al-Ahram Weekly.

SENSE OF BETRAYAL: Iran is grappling with profound anger and a sense of betrayal as it confronts the reality that Hamas and Islamic Jihad supported the Syrian armed groups responsible for overthrowing Al-Assad.

Over the past year, Tehran and its allies have endured significant losses in their efforts to support Gaza, only to find themselves spurned by the very factions they sought to assist.

Since the fall of Al-Assad regime and the vocal support Hamas and Islamic Jihad have offered to Syrian opposition groups, two questions have dominated Iranian social media: Is this how they repay us? And do they understand the consequences of their actions?

Critics argue that by alienating Iran and severing the Syrian corridor to the Mediterranean, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are jeopardising their own survival, as this route has been essential for their support.

For many Iranians, the billions of dollars invested in building the “axis of resistance” now seem to have led to bitter disappointment. Ordinary citizens, already burdened by economic sanctions, question why these funds were not used to create jobs and improve living standards at home.

Sarcastic remarks on social media underscore this frustration. Some have suggested that the collapse of the Al-Assad regime is a blessing in disguise, as it could free up billions of dollars for domestic needs.

Such frustrations have reignited a fierce debate within Iran about the viability of its long-standing “forward defence” doctrine. Adopted after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, this strategy relied on cultivating external allies to counter US threats.

However, with changing regional dynamics, many Iranian officials now recognise the doctrine’s limitations. They argue that it must be reassessed and adapted to align with the region’s evolving realities.

In response to this shifting landscape, Tehran is exploring strategic alternatives to safeguard its interests. Key proposals include reviving a nuclear agreement with the incoming Trump administration and the international community to lift sanctions and reduce the risk of military confrontation with the US and Israel.

Additionally, Iran aims to strengthen alliances with China and Russia to bolster its position on the global stage.

Another avenue under consideration is the pursuit of nuclear deterrence, including testing a nuclear bomb as a last resort, should Tehran perceive that the Trump administration is determined to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

These discussions underscore the urgency with which Tehran is reassessing its priorities amid mounting regional challenges and growing domestic discontent.

TURKEY’S GAINS: While Iran is preoccupied with assessing its losses and devising ways to avert further setbacks, Turkey is poised to capitalise on its strategic gains.

The overthrow of the Syrian regime and the rise of Syrian armed opposition groups under Ankara’s influence mark a dramatic reshaping of regional power dynamics in the Middle East.

Al-Assad’s government, a cornerstone of the “axis of resistance” that aligned with Iran and Hizbullah to counter Sunni powers and Western influence, has been replaced by a fragmented opposition reliant on Turkish support. For Turkey, this represents a significant geopolitical victory, dismantling an adversarial alliance and amplifying its regional clout.

Turkey’s geographical proximity to Syria has been a critical factor in its ability to exert substantial influence on developments within the country. Sharing an extensive border with Syria, Turkey has facilitated logistical and operational support for opposition forces, leveraging its position not only for practical purposes but also as a reflection of historical ties.

Syria, once a key province of the Ottoman Empire, is seen by many in Turkey as part of a legacy that Ankara is now reclaiming in modern form.

Beyond shaping Syria’s future, Turkey has secured considerable bargaining power in its engagements with global powers such as the US, Russia, and the EU. This leverage extends to crucial issues including refugee flows into Europe, counterterrorism operations, and the Kurdish question, all of which enhance Turkey’s strategic importance on the international stage.

However, Turkey’s growing influence in Syria has also raised concerns among its neighbours and other regional actors. Many interpret Ankara’s actions as a revival of neo-Ottoman ambitions of restoring Turkish dominance over territories once controlled by the former Ottoman Empire.

While these perceptions add a layer of complexity to Turkey’s geopolitical manoeuvres, they underscore the far-reaching implications of its recent gains in Syria.

However, Turkey’s successes in Syria in 2024 come with potential challenges that could complicate the situation in 2025. Chief among these is ensuring that the Syrian armed groups can govern effectively, fostering an inclusive system that accommodates all segments and sects of society.

This requires adopting a moderate approach that could facilitate removing HTC from international terrorist lists. Additionally, Turkey must work to establish internationally acceptable standards for the transitional period, laying the groundwork for transparent elections under the supervision of international observers.

Such steps are crucial to persuade the international community and the Arab states to invest in Syria’s reconstruction and recovery. Without them, Turkey risks Syria descending into chaos, potentially becoming a fractured state plagued by instability.

Ankara would likely face blame if the security situation deteriorated, especially in the event of sectarian conflicts, confrontations among Islamist militias, or a resurgence of the Islamic State (IS) group or Al-Qaeda. The repercussions of such scenarios would extend beyond Syria, jeopardising Turkey’s influence and undermining regional stability.

Another pressing challenge for Turkey is convincing incoming US President Trump that its actions in Syria will not destabilise the broader region. Trump’s statements on Syria suggest a limited and confused grasp of the complexities at play. While he has expressed support for withdrawing the approximately 900 US troops stationed in Syria, this position may hinge on Turkey’s policies towards the Syrian Kurds.

Concerns are mounting that Turkey could launch a major military operation against the autonomous Kurdish areas in northeast Syria before Trump begins his second term. Such an operation risks triggering a bloodbath among Syrian Kurds, who fought alongside US forces against IS and could place Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Trump at odds.

Moreover, it could provoke retaliation within Turkey by Turkish Kurds, who have waged a decades-long insurgency against the Turkish state.

Failure to address these challenges could have far-reaching consequences for both Syria’s future and Turkey’s regional ambitions. Ultimately, Turkey’s strategic gains in Syria represent a double-edged sword, especially since Iran and other countries in the region will not stand by and watch developments from afar.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 December, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly