In the final week of 2024, Cairo was hoping to see the beginning of an end to the Israeli war on Gaza that began in October 2023.

“This is not the first time we have come close to securing a deal only for things to collapse. But this time it seems that Israel is serious, Hamas is serious, and the US too is really invested,” said an informed source close to the mediation group in Cairo.

According to the source, on 16 December, in the wake of parallel visits to the region by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Egypt sent a delegation to Qatar, co-mediator of the ceasefire deal, to try and finalise details for the launch of a truce.

In Doha, the source said that Egyptian and Qatari mediators are meeting with representatives of Hamas and envoys of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “hopefully” work out the final details of the deal. The source spoke hours before CIA Director William Burns landed in Qatar on 18 December to help advance the ceasefire deal.

The Burns trip, the source said, is a clear indicator that “things are moving forward”. The Joe Biden administration wants to see an end to this war before President Joe Biden leaves the White House in January and US President-elect Donald Trump wants to see it ended before he starts his presidency.

“Biden wants a political victory to end his presidency,and Trump wants to make a fresh start that will allow him to focus on Arab-Israeli normalisation and economic deals with the [Arab] Gulf [states],”said the source. 

Trump does not want to start his presidency with “the Middle East headache” because he has other foreign policy priorities, and“ending the Israeli war on Gaza is a prerequisite for stability in the Middle East. 

ISRAELI WARS: According to former senior security official Mohamed Ibrahim, it is impossible to over-emphasise the impact on regional security of Israel’s wars on Gaza and Lebanon which began following Hamas’ attack on 7 October 2023 and Hizbullah strikes on the north of Israel the following day.

The open-ended war, with spillovers that include the expansion of the Israeli military presence in Syria following the fall of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad and parallel Israeli incursions in the West Bank, has been followed in Cairo with growing unease.

Throughout the year, Egyptian diplomatic and security sources have expressed profound concerns over the impact of the massive destruction that the Israeli war has wreaked on the already impoverished Gaza Strip on Egypt’s eastern border. 

In the final weeks of the year, sources said their concerns had been compounded by questions over the stability of the Palestinian Authority, the nature of the future regime in Syria and the impact thereof on the stability of Syria’s borders with both Iraq and Jordan.

Egypt has been working on an economic cooperation scheme with Jordan and Iraq for several years. According to officials, 2024 was supposed to see major progress on joint cooperation deals. Instability caused by the Israeli wars has derailed this progress as the focus of all three states turned to security. Egypt is worried about the situation in Gaza, Jordan is worried about developments in the West Bank, and Iraq about the violation of its borders should pro-Iranian Iraqi militias move into Syria and Lebanon.

According to Ibrahim, even if a ceasefire is concluded in Gaza,there are more questions than answers about regional stability. The questions include the impact of the advent of the Trump presidency on regional dynamics, the nature of governance in Gaza when — and if — Israel withdraws, and whether the administration in Washington would support an Israeli declaration of sovereignty over the West Bank. 

According to Ibrahim,“the region is likely to see more instability due to Israel’s unchecked expansionism” and the failure to resolve other complex regional conflicts, including between Israel and Iran. “Regional stability and the security interests of the Arab nations”have been increasingly at stake as 2024 has progressed. Despite the possible end to the Israeli war on Gaza, and Cairo’s determined pursuit of diplomatic and security solutions to contain regional conflicts, the convoluted regional situation, with so many conflicting interests and schemes of regional and international players, does not bode well for de-escalation.

THE CORE OF DISRUPTION: Moataz Salama, senior political analyst at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) and the editor of the annual ACPSS strategic report,says the biggest challenges relate to the regional order and the many interventions of non-Arab regional players in Arab affairs.

“We are seeing a region that is being driven in so many ways by the interests of Israel, Turkey, and Iran,” he argued.“The essence of Arab national security has been severely compromised,”and Egypt, “with its established central political status within the Arab order”is one of the countries most affected by the decline of this order. 

According to Salama, the joint interests of the Arab countries, even at a subregional level, have been replaced by the interests of individual states in association with non-Arab players. As a consequence, issues that dominated the Arab national security agenda, including the Palestinian cause, have fallen down the list of priorities.

“We are talking about the practical liquidation of the Palestinian cause after any collective Arab position was either dropped or eliminated,” he says.

That other pressing issues — “the security of the Arab Gulf, the security of the Red Sea, the war on terror, and the future of political Islam — in all its shades”— are no longer managed on the basis of collective Arab interests is a result, argues Salama, of the erosion of collectivism and the increasingly unmasked hegemony of non-Arab regional players. 

Egypt’s attempts to cut the losses of the Arab regime through a foreign policy approach of containment and downplaying differences, Salama continued,were unlikely to succeed given the scale of the disintegration of the Arab order.

“This is not just Egypt’s battle but one that requires a certain level of regional coordination,” he said, adding that Arab states that have traditionally worked with Egypt to manage the Arab order are engaging less for reasons of internal unrest or recalibration.

Egyptian diplomats who have served in Mashreq Arab countries argue states are being undermined by competing ethnic and religious claims. The ensuing disintegration, one argued, is not necessarily about the division of a country but about the increasing dominance of an ethnic-based quota approach towards state institutions. “This has been the case in a number of Mashreq states and there is a risk the pattern might expand further, leading to weaker nation states,” he said.

MANAGEMENT CHOICES: The influence of non-Arab players on the region, the same diplomats said, lies behind Cairo’s decision to carefully manage its relations with Israel, Turkey, and Iran. 

According to informed sources, the aim of keeping the Egyptian ambassador to Israel in office during Israel’s genocidal strikes on Gaza was to keep communication channels open.

“Even when the serving Egyptian ambassador left Tel Aviv in the autumn as his posting was coming to an end, and earlier, when the Israeli ambassador to Cairo left, Egypt made a point of not making a fuss,” said a government source.

The subsequent “obvious delay” in exchanging new ambassadors is being “cautiously handled” by Cairo.

“Political and security teams are coming and going to resolve the disaster in Gaza. We also have economic cooperation, especially in relation to Israeli natural gas and qualified industrial zones. It serves no one’s interests for us to escalate with Israel,” he said. 

The same preference for management over confrontation was behind Egypt’s decision to open up to Turkey after a decade of a serious fallout over the reaction of Ankara to the political changes that Egypt passed through in the summer of 2013, said the same source. President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi and his Turkish counterpart exchanged visits this year — with Recep Tayyip Erdogan coming to Cairo in February and Al-Sisi visiting Ankara in September. On 19 December, Erdogan made his second visit to Cairo, for the D-8 summit.

Informed government sources say that Cairo is far from satisfied with Ankara’s positiontowards Arab countries and would like to see Turkey do more to distance itself from Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. And while Turkey has respected the zone of Egyptian interests/influence in the east of Libya, Ankara is still using Libya as “a depot for militants who operate with non-state actors” to further Turkish political expansionism.

In the analysis of concerned officials in Cairo, Turkish moves to reconcile Ethiopia and Somalia — countering political pressure that Egypt put on Ethiopia via Somalia earlier this year — is all about political expansionism. The recent Turkish diplomatic scheme to end the tension between head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan, and Al-Burhan’s ally-turned-adversary, leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), is perceived in much the same light. 

Turkey’s diplomatic move came as the support that Egypt, in cooperation with key international players, had extended to Al-Burhan appeared to be turning the tide in the conflict between the SAF and RSF.

Cairo has consistently refused to endorse militia rule of any country, especially a neighbouring state. 

“Our position on Sudan is the same as on Libya and is the source of our fears for the future of Syria,” said a senior Egyptian diplomat. “Cairo’s position is clear. We believe in the territorial integrity of countries and in the nation states with functioning institutions, with national armies at their heart.”

In 2024, Egypt revived its earlier alliance with Khalifa Haftar in the east of Libya after it had been interrupted by a falling out. But this does not qualify as support for a militia, argued the diplomat, since Haftar is a former army general who is trying to build a Libyan national army. “Haftar is very different from the militias in the west and south of Libya,though in 2024 Egypt also opened up to the government in the west of Libya as part of its management of conflict approach,”continued the diplomat.

“As in 2023, this year Egypt opted for conflict management and containment. It started with the rapprochement with Qatar and has now reached Iran.”

According to the diplomat, containing the militias that are supported by Iran, most notably the Houthis in Yemen whose attacks on vessels heading towards or leaving Israel has caused a 60 per cent drop in Suez Canal revenues, is high on the agenda. While Houthi attacks are only likely to end when the Israeli war on Gaza is over, in the meantime Egypt is engaging with Iran over its role in Gaza, and on the future of Syria after the Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham takeover in December. 

The fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime forced Iran to pull militants out of Syria, but this does not mean Tehran has lost its influence there, said Safinaz Mohamed, a senior Syria researcher at the ACPSS. According to Mohamed, in the 10 years since Iran started to strengthen its presence in Syria, Tehran“got the Al-Assad regime to give Syrian nationality to a large number of Iranians, expanding the numbers of Shia, and invested heavily in the country.” Tehran will now use this power base to try and rebuild its influence in Syria.

In December, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in Cairo for the D-8 summit. The visit that came at the end of the yearthat had seen a growing rapport between Cairo and Tehran reflected in announcements that both capitals made about consultation phone calls between their respective foreign ministers. The D-8 summit was not the first encounter between President Al-Sisi and Pezeshkian. The two leaders met in October on the sidelines of the BRICS summit, in Kazan Russia.

“This is a moment of a great deal of fluidity in the region and Egypt has no interest in fanning hostilities,” said Salama. He added that Egypt needs to ensure that it is in close contact with all the players who will have a sayin shaping the future identity of Syria. 

“Nothing is clear yet about the future direction of Syria, either in terms of the internal dynamics or in relation to the plans of regional players such as Turkey, which now has the upper hand given its association with the HTS, Iran and Israel,”Salama said. “Egypt does not need to show animosity to anyone, inside or outside Syria.”

POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENT INTERSECTIONS: Government sources in Cairo say that Egypt is keeping a close watch on developments in Syria and that its engagement with Damascus will not be tainted, for now at least, with Egypt’s opposition to political Islam. 

“Our responses to developments in Syria have been very cautious and very carefully worded from day one, but this does not mean we are okay with any plans from the country’s new rulers or its allies to resurrect political Islam,” across the region, said one government source. On this point, he added, Egypt is on the same page with the UAE, Jordan, and a number of other countries in the region.

Mohamed argued the rise of HTS in Syria, with direct Turkish support, cannot be overlooked as an indication that the Turkish scheme to consolidate the power of political Islam is still being pursued,possibly with a degree of international consent. What comes next “all depends on what [the leader of the HTS] has to offer Syria, its neighbours, and the world”, she said.

After the fall of Al-Assad, US President-elect Donald Trump praised what he said was smart Turkish intervention in Syria. Mohamed is not sure yet how to interpret this statement. Does it suggest an openness to certain models of political Islam in the region? Is it a harbinger of future cooperation between the Trump administration and Ankara?

In the view of Paul Salem, vice president for international engagement at the Middle East Institute in Washington, who spoke during a seminar hosted by the Alternative Political Solutions Center of the American University in Cairo in November, key to understanding the future choices of the Trump administration on the region is to realise that Trump’s priority is first and foremost China, and then Russia. 

Trump’s position towards the Middle East, according to Salem, will be shaped by his priorities,which include reducing the economic and political presence of China and Russia in the region.

Salem added that Trump will want to work with Arab Gulf states on energy and arms sales, and on maintaining the level of deterrence on radical groups like Islamic State.

Above all, said Salem, the US does not want any wars in the Middle East.

According to a statement issued by President Al-Sisi’s press office, Egypt’s head of state called Trump following the announcement of his election victory in November and underlined Egypt’s commitment to work closely with the US in the pursuit of peace and stability.

Stability is a prerequisite for the economic growth Egypt desperately needs and is trying to achieve through regional cooperation, especially given the loss of Suez Canal revenues, said former Egyptian diplomat Hisham Youssef.

He pointed out that the Suez Canal remains central to international trade — no one wants to take the longer route round the Cape of Good Hope — even American and British military operations designed to stop Houthi attacks have ended in failure. This is also detrimental to the interests of China, India, and other major trading nations.

Youssef acknowledged that attempts to redraw trade routes lie behind much of the strategic and political manoeuvring that has been unfolding in the region and beyond, but notes that Egypt is capable of ensuring its interests are not compromised by the plans of others.

As a beacon of stability amidst a turbulent region, Egypt is well placed to maximise the use of its assets, including the Suez Canal.

“The Suez Canal should not be a toll station. It should be turned into a vibrant economic space with industrial zones and service stops. There has been some movement in this direction, but not enough,” said Youssef.

During 2024, there were opportunities for Egypt to engage more forcefully in a number of initiatives, including the India-Middle East Corridor that is planned to run between India and Europe, via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.

“When we talk about stability as a reason for making a country an international trade hub, then Egypt is a lot more stable than Israel.” Youssef added that several other plans are currently being considered, and Egypt should firmly engage with them.

Nor, argued Youssef, is there any reason to suppose that Egypt’s work to establish itself as a natural gas hub will be undermined by the planned pipeline that will run from Qatar, through Syria and Turkey and on to Europe. “The building of the pipeline will not happen overnight. And Egypt is much more capable in the short and medium terms of securing its gas pipelines, and more importantly its solar, wind, and hydrogen energy capacity,” he said. 

Egypt’s strategic position affords a host of comparative advantages when it comes to trade between Africa and even the Gulf with Europe. 

In January 2024, Egypt expanded airline services to Libya, and to Somalia and Djibouti in September. Egypt has also expanded development cooperation, especially on water management projects, with several African countries, including the Nile Basin countries.

Egyptian diplomats say despite an inevitable focus on events just across its borders, in Gaza, Sudan, and Libya, Egypt remains committed to expanding cooperation across the Global South.

On the sidelines of the D-8 summit that Egypt hosted on 19 December, bringing together the leaders of Bangladesh, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey, President Al-Sisi discussed with his counterparts ways to expand economic and political cooperation.

The statement issued at the end of the summit not only promised to increase current levels of cooperation, but to expand membership of the group that was launched in 1997 to promote south-to-south cooperation. Azerbaijan, a close ally of Turkey, has already announced its intention to join.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 December, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly