Debates have intensified over the legitimacy of the authority that has assumed power in Syria and how it plans to govern. Many question both its ability and its willingness to represent Syrian society given that the individuals who now control key ministries and other government offices belong to Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, an Al-Qaeda offshoot. Even if the jihadist organisation has undergone a genuine ideological transformation, it will still espouse an ultraconservative Islamist framework for Syria’s religiously and ethnically diverse society. That is why Syrians need a comprehensive and inclusive national dialogue reflecting their country’s diverse regional, religious and ethnic affiliations to determine their form of government and draft a constitution.

The dialogue was initially set for 4-5 January. However, it was postponed because of the need for further study of the criteria for inviting participants, the agenda, and how to organise the activities to facilitate the participants’ efforts to reach a consensus on the contours of the transitional phase. An estimated 1,200-1,500 Syrian figures will participate in the national dialogue conference (SNDC), with at least 100 representatives elected from each governorate. In addition to administrative district representation, there will be representatives of the various religious and ethnic minorities. However, controversy has erupted over the invitation process, which is being undertaken by the SNDC preparatory committee. This committee, which oversees setting the criteria for participant selection, the conference agenda and its procedural mechanisms, was handpicked by HTS, which raises concerns that the committee, like the HTS itself, is new to institutionalised political work in democratic forums and will therefore perform its functions in an ad hoc and arbitrary way.

Some of the participant criteria announced by the committee have sparked objections. To be eligible, one must have an established history of political or revolutionary opposition to the Al-Assad regime. However, the committee excluded the possibility of inviting opposition entities that were active abroad. The argument is that inviting them would open the question of quotas as a basis for representation, which presents problems that have hampered the progress of the Syrian opposition for years.

The Syrian Opposition Coalition (National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, or SNC), established in Qatar shortly after the Syrian Revolution broke out, announced that they will not participate in the SNDC if invitations are addressed to its members individually, rather than as representatives of the coalition. Supporters of HTS rule argue that the SNC was not instrumental enough to the overthrow of the regime to merit representation as an entity. By contrast, the Military Operations Command (MOC) will be represented in its official capacity, as it was the main entity that defeated the former regime. The SNDC appears to have drawn a random line in the criteria related to regime-change instrumentality. Many political entities actively opposed the regime, even if they were not on the front lines at the final scene.

It has also been argued that inviting political entities will turn the national dialogue into wrangling matches over their revolutionary credentials and relative weight on the Syrian political map. Also, in the absence of free and transparent elections, it is impossible to tell which political entity has the largest popular following entitling it to more seats than other entities in the SNDC. On the other hand, HTS supporters argue that it will be represented as individuals as it will dissolve itself when the dialogue starts in order to give Syrians the opportunity to reorganise themselves into new entities more suited to the political transition.

Some analysts have wondered how Syria’s large Alawite community might be represented to promote national reconciliation and the formulation of a new social contract that does not marginalise them. If the main criterion for taking part in national dialogue is a record of opposition to the regime, how will those who were neutral or refrained from opposing the regime openly for fear of retaliation be represented?  It is known that the Al-Assad regime was more brutal towards its opponents from the Alawite sect.

The SNDC preparatory committee has said that it would make provisions for the representation of groups such as youth, women, political detainees and political activists. However, it is not yet known whether officers who defected from the Syrian Arab Army will be invited individually or as a group to attend the dialogue. It appears that these SAA defectors are now facing a degree of marginalisation, as the HTS leadership has excluded them in the interim administration and in the process of forming a new Syrian army. On the other hand, foreign fighters in the HTS ranks have been given positions in the new military hierarchy, suggesting that criteria other than nationality and active participation in the military operations to overthrow Al-Assad are at work.

Other commentators have criticised the preparatory committee’s vision for the conference agenda as overly simplified, especially given the many issues that need to be addressed. Merely bringing 1,500 people over a period of two days is no guarantee that Syrians will hear their views expressed on the form and content of the transition process. Established procedures, rules of order and other mechanisms must be in place to facilitate substantive dialogue as well as the orderly presentation, discussion and adoption of position papers and proposals prepared by political and constitutional experts.  

The conference agenda will cover numerous topics, including the suspension of the current constitution and the promulgation of a constitutional declaration to serve in its place during the interim period. At the same time, a mechanism will be launched to elect a constituent assembly to draft a permanent constitution that will be put to a referendum.

In addition, the proposed agenda includes the dissolution of the current parliament, the creation of a transparent mechanism to form advisory committees to assist the caretaker government in the remaining two months of its term – until March 1 – or to assist the next transitional government, and a vision for a more equitably representative transitional government to replace the current caretaker government, which represents a narrow band on the far right spectrum and has limited political experience and acumen. The transitional government will be expected to govern until general elections are held.

According to some analysts, a hastily held conference excluding representation of political entities and limited to individual representatives of regional, ethnic, religious and other primary affiliations will entrench a system based on organic bonds, such as tribes and sects, instead of promoting a civil national framework based on the overarching citizenship bond. Some commentators even suspect that the planning committee’s rush to send out invitations is an HTS bid to skirt the need to ascertain the representativeness of the conference and to forge an instant legitimacy to perpetuate its own control. These commentators’ suspicions were heightened by Al-Sharaa’s remarks about holding elections after four years and promulgating a permanent constitution after three years. They wonder whether his plan is to monopolise power during that period and, perhaps, lay the groundwork for another authoritarian regime like the one Hafez Al-Assad built in the 1970s, also relying on networks of alliances based on organic affiliations with business conducted through the spiritual leaders of minority sects, Islamic jurists, and merchants and business magnates.

On the other hand, the preparatory committee’s decision to postpone the SNDC can be seen as an attempt to respond to criticisms and take the time to formulate rules and criteria that will give Syrians the confidence that the dialogue will be genuinely representative of their society. Until the committee releases a transparent and equitable participant selection process and a more detailed and realistic agenda and rules of order for the conference, the debate over its efficacy will continue. Anyone who feels unjustly excluded from this critical forum will question its validity and the validity of its outputs. This is a problem that has plagued the Syrian opposition all through the years of the revolution and it is likely to continue until free and fair elections produce leaders whose popularity among is incontestable.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 January, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly