Gaza ceasefire: Will the deal hold?

Nermine Said, Friday 24 Jan 2025

The optimism surrounding the Gaza ceasefire deal ignores Israel’s multiple indications that it would welcome a resumption of the conflict.

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The ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel took effect following a meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Steve Witkoff, the newly appointed Middle East envoy in the Trump administration, that was widely regarded as a turning point in resolving the persistent stalemate in the negotiations.

However, the implementation of the deal has been accompanied by an optimism that appears disproportionate to the surrounding challenges. Many have described the agreement as fragile, warning of its potential collapse even before reaching the second stage that aims to establish a sustainable ceasefire.

Despite this, an overly simplistic narrative has emerged, treating the enforcement of the deal as the beginning of the day after in the Gaza Strip. In reality, the day after can only be considered to have started once all three stages of the agreement have been completed. This would require 126 days, assuming the deal progresses without interruption.

The most significant obstacle to its full implementation lies in Israel’s position, which appears to have been shaped by substantial external pressures – possibly to the extent of coercion – forcing it to consent to the deal.

Reading into the Israeli position, there are several indications that Tel Aviv may welcome a return to hostilities, potentially even before the agreement reaches its second stage. Prior to the deal’s enactment, Netanyahu declared that incoming US President Donald Trump had assured him of his support for a resumption of military action if Hamas were to breach the terms of the truce.

He also placed full responsibility on the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) for any future escalation, asserting that Israel reserves the right to re-engage militarily at any point after the deal’s implementation.

Netanyahu tried to undermine the truce even before it was declared. On 16 January, he said that Hamas had reneged on parts of the agreement under the pressure of last-minute negotiations. Hamas leader Ezzat Al-Rishq refuted the claim, saying Hamas remained committed to the terms of the deal.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, who succeeded Yisrael Katz following the latter’s appointment as defence minister after Yoav Galant’s dismissal, echoed Netanyahu’s stance. Saar said that Israel views the truce as a conditional pause, with the inherent understanding that it allows for a resumption of the fighting if violated.

Israel’s intentions to resume hostilities in the Gaza Strip incentivise it to fabricate justifications for a return to war. It may allege violations by Hamas, such as delays in providing the lists of Israeli hostages designated for release, framing such delays as breaches of the agreement. Furthermore, Israel may accuse Hamas of rebuilding its forces through the smuggling of weapons, portraying the group as an imminent threat along its borders.

From an objective perspective, Hamas could provide Israel with the pretext it seeks through actions perceived as provocations. For example, the deployment of masked Hamas-affiliated police forces in Gaza may serve as a demonstration of power, but it could also escalate tensions, especially given the incomplete withdrawal of Israeli forces from certain areas.

The reentry of displaced civilians to northern Gaza, as stipulated in the agreement, could further exacerbate the risk of friction. Israel might claim that armed elements have infiltrated among the returning civilian population, potentially hiding in UN Palestinian refugee agency (UNRWA) schools or similar settings, allegations it has raised in the past.

Israeli media reports have suggested that Hamas has successfully recruited people in certain parts of Gaza, potentially emboldening Tel Aviv to justify preemptive strikes to neutralise perceived threats. Such actions might include targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders who remained undetected prior to the truce. Additionally, Hamas might target some of the remaining Israeli forces in Gaza or international or Ramallah-affiliated groups.

It is safe to say that, at present, Tel Aviv has failed on the strategic level. Following 15 months of war, Israel’s illusion of its ability to manage Gaza through a so-called “moderate” Arab alternative to Hamas has undermined its position. Its unwillingness to allow the Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern the Strip stems from the perception that such a move might pave the way for the declaration of a Palestinian state.

However, this stance points to a fundamental miscalculation: the absence of a viable alternative to Hamas. Consequently, Hamas remains a persistent threat to Israel. It also means that returning to conflict will be futile, even if Netanyahu manages to justify the resumption of hostilities.

On the domestic front, Netanyahu faces pressure from the potential disintegration of his governing coalition. While he has thus far managed to stave off the collapse of his far-right government by making strategic concessions such as promising Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich a return to the fighting after the first stage and facilitating settlement expansion in the West Bank, the situation remains precarious.

Smotrich’s recent ultimatum to bring down the government if the military does not resume its attacks after the initial phase of the truce poses a challenge. The threat gains further weight given the earlier resignation of Ben Gvir and his party’s ministers.

In such a scenario, Netanyahu might find himself compelled to seek an alliance with the opposition, including Yesh Atid led by Yair Lapid or Benny Gantz, in order to maintain power. Such alliances, however, would place him in a vulnerable position, rendering him heavily reliant on the opposition – a bad scenario for Netanyahu.

Netanyahu is likely to implement the deal’s first stage, as it aligns with the commitment made by Trump. However, Netanyahu may later seek to manipulate the subsequent stages by either delaying their execution or cancelling them. This would be particularly plausible given the potential shift in the US focus under the Trump administration to other pressing global issues, such as the Russian-Ukrainian war or the escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific region.

Moreover, as the deal progresses, the number of deceased hostages could surpass that of the living, which might make Netanyahu abandon it.

Trump retains leverage over Netanyahu should the latter decide to return to hostilities following the initial stage. Among these pressure points is the potential for the US to refrain from shielding Israel from sanctions imposed by the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as adopting a more lenient stance in the nuclear negotiations with Iran – an approach likely to unsettle Israel, which remains intent on neutralising Iran’s nuclear programme.

These dynamics further complicate the prospect of advancing peace or reinvigorating the so-called Abraham Accords, presenting yet another challenge for Israel.

Additionally, the issue of the West Bank remains a potent card in any negotiations. It is critical to recognise that any decision on Netanyahu’s part to reignite the conflict in Gaza would heavily depend on sustained US financial and military support. Trump recently said that he will enforce peace through might, affirming that the completion of the Gaza deal is imperative as a testament to US credibility.

 

The writer is a researcher at the Palestine-Israel Studies Unit of the Egyptian Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS).

* A version of this article appears in print in the 23 January, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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