Next month, the Ministerial Council of the Arab League will consider whether or not to offer Syria’s seat in the council to the new administration in Damascus. The deliberations may take some time: approval means that Ahmed Al-Sharaa, head of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), will be among the attendees of the next Arab summit in Baghdad. This is why Hossam Zaki, the assistant Arab League secretary general, visited Damascus on 18 January to meet with Al-Sharaa. Another visit by Secretary General Ahmed Abul-Gheit is expected soon.
The Al-Assad regime, which represented Syria at last year’s summit, ceded Damascus’ turn to host the forthcoming summit to Baghdad. Observers do not believe Al-Sharaa government would retract this concession if it were allowed to take Syria’s Arab League seat, but the critical decision to accept Al-Sharaa still requires considerable preparation. At the very least, it must be preceded by practical assurances that the political transition process includes all political forces and is not just a way to consolidate control of the country by radical Islamist forces and their militia factions.
The interim Syrian government is working hard to secure Arab support, a question that has been at the top of the regional and international agenda since the fall of Bashar Al-Assad regime on 8 December. Less than a week later, several Western and Arab powers met in Aqaba to discuss a framework of principles for accepting the new administration. On 12 January, a larger number of Arab and NATO powers met in Riyadh to discuss the matter in further detail, exploring ways to support Syrian stability, state-building and reconstruction.
The Riyadh meeting was attended by foreign ministers from the Gulf countries, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, France, Germany, Britain, Spain and Italy, as well as the UN special envoy to Syria and representatives of the US, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European Union. But the most important attendee was from Syria itself, the interim government’s Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shibani, who had not attended the Aqaba meeting in December. That meeting was initiated by the Arab League’s Ministerial Contact Committee on Syria to discuss military and other developments in the country. The committee was formed in May 2023 to follow up on the readmission of Al-Assad to the Arab League that month, and it was characterised by a similar scepticism regarding Syria post-Assad.
The Aqaba meeting focused on reintegrating Syria into the Arab fold based on a set of conditions. These were laid out in the closing statement which called for support for a peaceful political transition inspired by the principles, mechanisms and aims of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, a comprehensive national dialogue, and national reconciliation according to the principles of transitional justice. The document required the Syrian government to commit to counter-terrorism efforts, the creation of a police force able to provide a safe environment for the return of refugees and the preservation of Syrian state institutions. It also condemned Israeli incursions into the buffer zone, which it called an illegal occupation of Syrian territory and a violation of international law. In general, the statement made it clear that acceptance of the Al-Sharaa regime would be conditional on its alignment with the Aqaba principles.
The tone of the Riyadh meeting was significantly different. It was more in the nature of an Arab approval of a candidate for a regional and international presentation. But it did not hide significant Arab differences. While several Arab governments rushed to dispatch foreign ministers or other envoys, including security chiefs, to meet the new leader in Damascus, other countries remained wary and reluctant, confining themselves to a phone call at the prime ministerial level.
Egypt is foremost among the sceptics. The Egyptian foreign minister phoned his Syrian counterpart on 31 December, about a week after the UAE foreign minister did the same. Diplomatic delegations from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain had already visited Syria by then. Subsequently, the UAE and Jordan hosted the new Syrian foreign minister, while Iraq sent its intelligence chief to meet Al-Sharaa in Damascus. So far, Lebanon has sent the highest-level delegation. It was headed by the prime minister, the day after the new Lebanese president was elected, signalling a new chapter in bilateral relations.
The closing statement of the Riyadh meeting reflects the Saudi and Qatari welcome more than Egypt’s cautious reserve. If the statement echoes many of the principles of the Aqaba statement, the most noticeable difference is the lack of a reference to Resolution 2254 which specifically calls on member states “to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Daesh), Al-Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al- Qaeda or IS, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council”, one of which is HTS.
Instead, the statement emphasises support for Syrian reconstruction as a unified, independent and safe state for all its citizens, free of terrorism, aggression or violation of its territorial sovereignty by any party. It pledged support and advice for an inclusive and peaceful transitional process within a framework of respect for Syrian independence. In short, the statement marked a shift in emphasis and shed the caveats of the Aqaba statement.
However, the possibility that Syria could still pose a threat to the security and stability of the region remains a concern shared by Arab governments, and it is not just reflected in the Riyadh statement. The Saudi foreign minister expressed that general sentiment in remarks to the press after the meeting, stressing that efforts to support the new administration, “including its commitment to preserving state institutions, combating terrorism, and initiating a political process that incorporates all components of Syrian society,” contribute to Syria’s stability, “ensuring it does not pose a threat to regional security.” From the Saudi and other Gulf countries’ perspective, the regime change in Syria marks a success in the drive against Iranian influence, and they are determined it does not have a platform to return.
On the other hand, from the Egyptian, Jordanian, Emirati and, perhaps, Iraqi perspective, an internationally designated terrorist organisation led by someone with a long jihadist record has just come to power in Damascus. They find this deeply troubling, because of how such movements and organisations have threatened the stability of Arab states in the past, and they find little cause for optimism in the ideological shifts signalled by the rhetoric coming out of Damascus.
Still, that administration is taking steps to meet security-related concerns and conditions to win support among the wary. It reported that its security services had thwarted several bomb attacks planned by IS in Damascus and Aleppo governorates and foiled a couple of arms and drugs smuggling operations into Lebanon. It also announced that it had arrested an Egyptian fighter in HTS who had been convicted on terrorist charges in Egypt and had been posting anti-Egyptian videos since the fall of the Al-Assad regime. As important as such steps might be, the doubts and worries that some Arab governments have are likely to persist.
One key to improving the credibility of the new administration in Damascus would be for it to include figures from outside the Islamist militias, whether from the civil opposition in Syria or from among the opposition leaders abroad. The recent meeting between Al-Sharaa and Badr Jamous, president of the Syrian Negotiation Commission, and Hadi Al-Bahra, president of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, may signal a step towards this need.
Meanwhile, all eyes are on the National Dialogue Conference on 20 February. That is when the term of the single-hued caretaker government is due to end, with Al-Sharaa handing the reins to a broadly representative government to oversee the transitional process until general elections are held. If the Islamist militias merited a moment in power because they overthrew Al-Assad militarily, Syria’s future wellbeing resides in a civil state for all its citizens without discrimination, and this can only be achieved by supporting a transitional government that includes representatives from across the demographic and ideological spectrum.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 23 January, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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