Marking deepening bilateral Sudanese-Russian relations, last week Khartoum announced the two countries finalised an agreement allowing Russia to establish a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Negotiations over the base had begun in 2017 under the former regime of Omar Al-Bashir, and an initial agreement was inked in 2020 with the post-revolutionary interim government.
Analysts have tied the agreement to the substantial military support Moscow has been providing to the Sudanese National Army (SNA) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which it regards as an illegal insurrectionist movement. Now that the SNA has regained the upper hand in the war, perhaps it is paying Moscow back. Analysts also note the coincidence with the decline in Russian influence in Syria after the fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in December. Tensions have arisen between Moscow and the new government in Damascus over the fate of Russia’s military bases in Tartus and Latakia, and there have been reports that Russia began to transfer equipment out of these bases in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall.
The finalised agreement with Khartoum over a Russian naval facility on the Red Sea may pave the way to additional security arrangements between the two countries. These may in turn affect the pattern of Russia’s defence strategies and deployments in the Middle East and Africa. Russia is particularly keen to bolster its security presence in the Red Sea, which will support plans to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere across the continent.
The base, near Port Sudan on Sudan’s 853 km-long coast, midway between Bab Al-Mandeb and Suez, will give Russia a logistically important foothold on the Red Sea, the strategically vital waterway through some 12 per cent of global trade, including 6.2 million barrels of oil, pass every day. It will simultaneously complement its military presence in eastern Libya, where it has signed defence agreements with the Tobruk-based government. Russia’s Khartoum together with its Tobruk agreements are indicative of a long-term vision for securing its interests in this region. Given the uncertainty surrounding Russia’s ports in the Eastern Mediterranean, a facility on the Red Sea will provide strategic depth to its presence in Libya and its naval movements in the Mediterranean.
At one level, according to some analyses, Russian interest in a Red Sea base is related to its developing strategic doctrine on security in the Indian Ocean. According to the British think tank, the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), the Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2015 identified the Indian Ocean as one of Russia’s six regional priority areas, and as of 2017, Russia has adopted a more proactive approach to combatting piracy off the Horn of Africa.
On the other hand, Port Sudan is an important gateway to the Sudanese and other East African markets, especially for Russian defence exports. It is noteworthy that one of its competitors in these markets is Ankara, a main backer of the militias that ousted the Russian-backed Al-Assad government in Syria. Ankara is also keen to establish a base on the Red Sea and has held extensive talks with Khartoum to this end in recent years.
Russia may also be eying the Horn of Africa where it wants to counter the influence of rivals, most notably the US, China, and Turkey. While the US and China have military bases in Djibouti, Ankara has maintained a large base in Somalia since 2017. Moscow may be hoping to leverage a stronger presence in Sudan to offset Western pressures on various contentious issues, especially the war in Ukraine.
On the other hand, the agreement between Khartoum and Russia, with its implications for the international balance of power, could ratchet up tensions between the US-led West, Russia, and China. This could have a potentially detrimental impact on regional security and stability if, for example, Washington takes aggressive steps to obstruct the establishment of the envisioned Russian naval facility in Sudan. At the very least, Washington may take measures to neutralise the potential negative repercussions of a growing Russian footprint on Western influence and interests in Africa.
In addition to the strategic advantages of a maritime base in Sudan, whether in terms of securing Russian maritime trade or expanding its influence in Africa, the finalisation of the deal with Khartoum is politically advantageous to Russia. For one factor, it is a much needed foreign policy victory following the setback in Syria with the fall of the Al-Assad regime in December, which added to the dwindling popularity of the Russian regime against the backdrop of the military difficulties Russian forces are encountering in Ukraine.
As for Khartoum, the agreement helps secure continued Russian support in the crucial coming phase. In addition to sustained military support for the SNA against the RSF, Russia could also use its influence in international forums to defend the SNA’s position against Western pressures.
It appears that Russia and Khartoum have marked a qualitative shift in their bilateral relations with this agreement. For Russia, it opens horizons for the expansion of its influence in the Horn of Africa and beyond. For both Russia and Khartoum, it embodies their mutual interest in counteracting pressures from international adversaries.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 20 February, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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