It has become clear to the US administration that the Egyptian position rejecting the displacement of the Palestinians from the Gaza Strip is a principled one that is not subject to compromise.
Official statements have multiplied and have progressed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the presidency and have combined a “no” to displacement with a “no” to receiving the displaced on Egyptian soil, linking the rejection of liquidating the Palestinian cause with the rejection of infringing on Egypt’s national sovereignty and national security.
US President Donald Trump’s repetition of his statements regarding “cleaning out Gaza” and “demanding that Egypt and Jordan receive displaced Gazans” and asserting US “control over the Strip” has provoked Egyptian anger, which was initially translated into official statements describing the displacement of the Palestinians from their homeland as a crime rejected by all the Arabs and the international community.
Egyptian officials have also indicated that the displacement plans threaten the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and put the strategic partnership between the United States and Egypt to the test. After Trump hinted at the possibility of freezing US military and economic aid to Egypt, President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi channelled the official and popular anger at such plans into a diplomatic move by indefinitely postponing his planned visit to the United States.
In positioning the country against the Israeli and American promotion of the criminal displacement plans against the Palestinians, the Egyptian government’s policy should be based on clear strategic thinking whose major objectives are tenfold.
First, there is the need to foil the displacement and thus avert the danger of liquidating the Palestinian cause. Second, Egyptian national security must be protected from the many threats that will inevitably impact it if displacement occurs. Third, there must be a complete avoidance of any involvement in wars and military conflicts and the upholding of the principles of negotiation, mediation, and peaceful settlement to end wars and contain conflicts and thus preserve the stability of the Peace Treaty with Israel without this meaning accepting any infringement on national sovereignty.
Fourth, the strategic partnership with the United States must be protected, as this is a partnership that benefits both parties bilaterally and regionally in the Middle East and in other areas – regionally in the Horn of Africa, for example, and globally with international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – by keeping it away from the brink it is approaching because of the US endorsement of Palestinian displacement and threats of freezing aid.
Fifth, Egypt must be prepared to confront potential pressure from Washington to acquiesce in the displacement of the Palestinians by mobilising its resources and activating alternatives to US aid, both militarily and economically, if need be. Sixth, it must confront the annexation and settlement policies implemented by the Israeli far right in the West Bank that aim to abolish the Palestinian right to self-determination and to do away with the objective of establishing an independent state.
Seventh, Egypt must stand with Jordan, which is exposed to existential challenges from the danger of the alternative Palestinian homeland. Eighth, it must promote Palestinian national reconciliation and restore the political unity of the Occupied Territories of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem by building a national Palestinian government endowed with legitimacy. Ninth, it must continue the coordination efforts of the Arab Quintet of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to revive the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Finally, it must, despite the many difficulties and limited guarantees, work with the US administration to launch comprehensive peace and security negotiations in the Middle East.
DIRECT STEPS: In order to achieve these ten strategic objectives, which will take considerable time and effort, the Egyptian government must move forcefully and immediately to implement the following direct steps:
First, consolidate the ceasefire arrangements between Israel and Hamas and keep active the tripartite coordination mechanism between Egypt, Qatar, and the United States as sponsors of the ceasefire.
Second, ensure that sufficient relief and humanitarian aid get to the two million Gazans, which at the policy level requires Israel’s commitment not to prevent or obstruct the entry of aid and also requires Hamas’ commitment not to violate the terms of the ceasefire.
Third, announce the Egyptian reconstruction plan for Gaza agreed upon with the Palestinians and the Arabs to rebuild the Strip while enabling its people to remain in their homeland and mobilise enough material resources (heavy equipment, building materials, mobile homes, water and sewage units, electricity and mobile health care with full preference given to new technologies and environmentally friendly techniques), financial resources (Arab and European), organisational resources (Palestinian governance and security capabilities and some Arab capabilities), real estate resources (private real estate companies from Egypt and other countries in the Middle East and worldwide), and human resources (the Palestinian labour force in Gaza that is looking forward to rebuilding their cities and villages and needs sources of income after the comprehensive exhaustion of Gazans during the war).
Fourth, immediately after announcing the Egyptian reconstruction plan for Gaza and building consensus around it on the Palestinian, Arab, and international levels, rapidly launch reconstruction efforts in a way that guarantees for the people of Gaza the gradual restoration of human security with its key components (from clean drinking water and adequate sanitation services to suitable housing, health care and educational services), and in a way that also relies on the necessarily gradual nature of reconstruction efforts, be they operationally (removing rubble, then establishing basic facilities and infrastructure, then building housing, schools, and hospitals), geographically (to begin in the southern part of Gaza where the destruction of the war is less than in the central regions and much less than in the north), or with regard to the duration of the reconstruction (from three to five years).
Fifth, reach out to the Trump administration, which has demanded the presentation of “viable alternatives” to the displacement plans, to convince its officials of the best-case scenario of the Egyptian reconstruction plan, or to refute the administration’s claim that “the displacement has no alternative” before US and international public opinion.
Sixth, coordinate diplomatically with the international powers that reject the displacement plan such as the European Union, China, and Russia, as well as with the United Nations and its agencies that have condemned the Israeli and US promotion of criminal displacement plans in order to escalate global pressure on the Israeli and US governments.
Seventh, promote national reconciliation between all the Palestinian factions, especially with regard to the future governance of Gaza that is likely to exclude the return of Hamas to power and needs to recognise the legitimacy deficits of the Palestinian Authority (PA).
Eighth, correlate the Egyptian government’s discourse on the rejection of displacement with the firm refusal of the annexation and settlement policies that are currently being implemented by the Israeli far-right in the West Bank.
In order to succeed in implementing these eight direct steps, policymakers in the government as well as opinion influencers and the public, must remember that Egypt is a key regional actor and has enough sources of power, political tools, and spaces for manoeuvre domestically, regionally, and globally to enable it to work effectively without hesitation, anxiety, or retreat.
SOURCES OF POWER: Among the most important sources of power, political tools, and spaces of manoeuvre are the following:
First, the power of the voice of peace that Egypt embodies in the Middle East as the first Arab country to end the state of war with Israel, to seek negotiated settlements of the Palestine issue and the conflict between the Arabs and Israel according to the principle of land for peace, and to call for the Middle East to be free of all weapons of mass destruction.
Egypt has always condemned arms races, military conflicts, and proxy wars that have undermined regional security in the Middle East. It has also continued to project the power of peace without the bloodshed and madness surrounding it from all sides pushing it to abandon it or get involved in escalatory actions.
Second, the military power that guarantees Egypt’s strategic commitment to peace and protects its national sovereignty and security as a defensive force and as a force capable of developing its action in other directions if needed (which no one in Egypt wishes for).
Third, the power of popular support for Egypt’s official position rejecting Palestinian displacement and defending its national security, as well as the unequivocal popular sentiment refusing to accept US pressures on Egypt to acquiesce in criminal displacement plans.
Fourth, the many political tools that enable Egypt to play a major role in the ceasefire arrangements between Israel and Hamas, in promoting Palestinian national reconciliation, in mobilising the Arab countries to reject displacement and annexation policies in Gaza and the West Bank, in confronting the Israeli far right in a decisive and disciplined diplomatic manner, and in responding to the US endorsement of displacement in a rational manner tailored to defending Palestinian and Egyptian interests and protecting the strategic partnership with the US.
Fifth, the many political and diplomatic tools that enable Egypt to lead the Arab world in terms of developing and articulating the Gaza reconstruction plan without displacing its people, to garner Palestinian, Arab, and international support, and to address Israeli and US policymakers outlining the imminent risks and threats of the displacement proposal.
Finally, the diverse spaces for manoeuvre that are available to the Egyptian government in managing the current crisis domestically by means of popular support, regionally by means of Palestinian, Jordanian, and Arab trust in Egyptian diplomacy, and globally by means of the track record of Egypt as a voice and force for peace and for seeking restore stability and security in the Middle East.
The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 20 February, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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