Concerns over Sudan’s potential fragmentation have intensified following the convening of the Sudan Founding Alliance Conference in Nairobi, Kenya, where the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), along with various political factions, armed movements, and Sudanese figures, signed a political charter to form a parallel government to the existing regime led by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Port Sudan, its headquarters since the outbreak of war in the country on 15 April 2023.
The SAF government dismissed the move as “propaganda,” accusing Kenya of violating Sudan’s sovereignty and encouraging an alternative government for the RSF, saying that such an entity would fail to secure any form of recognition.
The Kenyan Foreign Ministry responded by stating that the move was part of Kenya’s broader efforts, coordinated with the United Nations and the African Union, to stop the war in Sudan.
The stepwas also decried by various Sudanese political parties and forces, who view it as a threat to the country’s territorial integrity and a further complication in its ongoing crisis.
The charter signed in Nairobi articulates the primary objectives of the alternative government, named the Unity and Peace government, as ending the war, achieving a just peace, ensuring humanitarian aid delivery, protecting civilians, preserving Sudan’s unity, and restoring democratic civilian governance and constitutional rights for all citizens without discrimination.
It also outlines a vision for a secular, democratic, and decentralised state founded on the principles of freedom, equality, and justice. It calls for the abolition of multiple armed groups and the establishment of a unified, professional, and national army that reflects Sudan’s diversity and pluralism and operates under civilian authority.
The Nairobi conference saw the participation of Abdel-Aziz Adam Al-Hilu, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Fadlallah Burma Nas, head of the National Umma Party and a former minister of defence, Ibrahim Al-Mirghani, leader of the Federal Party, Al-Hadi Idriss, head of the Revolutionary Front and a former member of the Sudan Sovereignty Council, Nasreddin Abdel-Bari, a former minister of justice, Mohamed Hassan Al-Taaishi, a former member of the Sovereignty Council, Mabrouk Mubarak Salim, leader of the Free Lions Forces in eastern Sudan, Suleiman Sandal, head of the Justice and Equality Movement, and Al-Tahir Hajar, a former member of the Sovereignty Council, among other civilian and military figures.
The participation of figures such as Al-Mirghani and Al-Hilu came as a surprise, sparking controversy within their respective political entities and across the broader Sudanese political landscape. Their involvement has raised questions about the motives behind their alignment with the emerging Alliance, the potential repercussions for their Parties, and the broader implications for Sudan’s ongoing crisis.
It has fuelled speculation regarding the future of the parallel government and Sudan itself, and whether this could lead to the country’s further fragmentation following the secession of South Sudan in 2011.
The architects of the Alliance have sought to bolster its political and military legitimacy by incorporating Al-Hilu’s SPLM, which controls vast territories in South Kordofan and parts of the Blue Nile region. With a legacy rooted in the armed struggle led by John Garang’s SPLM before South Sudan’s secession, Al-Hilu’s faction continued its military resistance against the regime of former Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir.
The SPLM under Al-Hilu refrained from signing the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, insisting on the establishment of a secular state and broader justice reforms.
The inclusion of the SPLM and its leader in the current Alliance could enhance its military and political standing, given the movement’s considerable armed capabilities, well-defined ideological stance, and clear vision for governance and resource management in Sudan.
The Alliance sought to incorporate figures of substantial political, intellectual, and national influence, ensuring that it was not confined to the political periphery to convey the message that they represent the entirety of Sudan, advocate for national unity, and reject separatist tendencies.
This was probably a response to accusation that the conference was aimed at fragmenting the country. The Alliance is thus refuting allegations that its government would be merely an extension of the RSF or an entity representing the “Arab Diaspora,” a pejorative label used by their adversaries, who accuse them of being Arab tribes originating from neighbouring African countries rather than indigenous Sudanese.
Participants at the conference defended their actions, saying that their move towards forming a parallel government stemmed from the Sudanese Army’s refusal over the past two years to resolve the conflict in the country through negotiations and political dialogue.
Gibril Adam Bilal, deputy head of the Justice and Equality Movement, which signed the charter, said that “we resorted to establishing a parallel government because the army has refused to provide basic and essential services to citizens across all Sudanese states, confining the provision of these to areas under its control.”
The new parallel government will face many challenges and will impose additional complications on the already complex scene in Sudan. The first consists of the major differences between its elements on the political, military, and intellectual fronts, prompting its critics to describe the gathering as “illogical,” as nothing unites these components except their hostility towards the army and its allied Islamists.
Such contradictions may trigger internal rifts within the Alliance, particularly concerning its relationship with the RSF, given the accusations levelled against the group regarding war crimes. The proposal to establish a parallel government has already fractured the TaqqadomBloc and is now fuelling discontent within the National Umma Party and other political entities.
Leadership ambitions and the distribution of power are also emerging as potential sources of friction, with multiple figures within the Alliance considering themselves qualified to assume key positions. Reports suggest that disagreements over leadership and governing structures have already delayed the signing of the charter three times.
Critics argue that the Alliance is little more than a media spectacle lacking tangible impact, questioning its ability to establish an actual government, particularly given the army’s battlefield advances and its aerial superiority.
It adds further complexity to the Sudanese crisis, an assessment echoed by the African Union at the conclusion of the Addis Ababa meetings which were convened at the request of civilian forces from both the Democratic Bloc and Taqaddom, now rebranded as Somoud following the defection of military and civilian factions that opted to join the parallel government initiative in Nairobi.
In a joint statement, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organisation, acknowledged that the Sudanese crisis remains highly volatile and that recent political manoeuvres have only deepened divisions and obstructed pathways towards a political solution.
The UN also voiced concerns over the parallel government initiative, warning that such a move could escalate divisions and further entrench the ongoing conflict.
On the domestic political scene, the initiative to establish a parallel government has ignited debate and sharp reactions. Omar Al-Degair, leader of the Sudanese Congress Party, cautioned against underestimating the dangers of a country operating under two competing governments.
While he rejected the idea of forming a parallel government, he also warned against dismissing the reality that significant political and social forces support it, arguing that ignoring its existence is tantamount to burying one’s head in the sand.
The gravity of Sudan’s current crisis necessitates halting the war to avert a catastrophic humanitarian disaster and preserve Sudan’s unity, he said. He called for Sudan’s civilian forces to consolidate their efforts in a position independent of the warring factions and to initiate a comprehensive national dialogue that addresses the country’s political failures and forges a consensus on a national project capable of breaking the cycle of violence.
Yasser Arman, leader of the SPLM-Revolutionary Current, believes the existence of two governments in Sudan is a phase in the ongoing war and is meant to culminate in negotiations over power-sharing, particularly given the exhaustion of both warring sides. The alternative, he warned, would be a prolonged crisis reminiscent of the Libyan, Yemeni, or Somali conflicts, though Sudan’s conditions are more complex.
The war dynamics will shape political outcomes, Arman said. Sudan is embroiled in resource struggles and regional and international competition in which Islamists with vested interests on both sides seek to exploit ethnic and regional divisions, obstructing the emergence of a national project capable of transcending Sudan’s historical fault lines and unifying the country based on equal citizenship.
Khaled Omar Youssef, vice-president of the Sudanese Congress Party, believes that Sudan is not merely at risk of division into two separate states but is also heading towards full-scale fragmentation and societal collapse.
The longer the war drags on, he warned, the louder the calls for partition will grow. In such an environment, external forces seeking to fragment Sudan could find willing participants among its own war-weary population.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 27 February, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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